Spot Report On/Profile of The Raid Of Terrorist Suspects in Bali

Police Raid in Denpasar, Bali

18 March 2012

The Incident

Indonesian anti-terror police carried out a successful raid. The raid ended with the killing of 5 terrorists in a gun fight. The 5 terrorists' had planned to carry out both a robbery and bombing operations in Bali. The raids were believed to have been conducted after the police detected a group of terrorists' present in Denpasar on 18 March 2012. This had prompted officers from the police and military to go on their highest alert. The raids came as Bali prepares to mark 10 years since the 2002 bombings which left more than 200 people dead. The two raids took place on Jalan Soputan Street, Denpasar and at Laksmi Hotel located on Jalan Danau Poso, Sanur-- a popular tourist district. Two men were killed at the raid in Denpasar and another three died in at the hotel.

Laksmi Hotel on Danau Poso Street, Sanur, Bali, where three terrorist were shot dead (courtesy: detikcom)

Prior to the raids, police had received a tip that five men linked to the violent robbery on a CIMB Bank in Medan had arrived in Bali late Saturday, 17 March 2012. On the first night, the men slept in different places then regrouped on Sunday morning to survey potential targets.⁵

In the morning of Sunday, 18 March 2012, police tailed two terrorists, HN and AG who were conducting surveillance of potential targets for a robbery. At the same time, police were also conducting their own surveillance against three terrorists, named UH alias Kapten, DD and M alias Abu Hanif, who were staying at Laksmi Hotel on Jalan Danau Poso, Sanur.⁶

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At 8:30pm the police tried to arrest the two terrorists on Jalan Soputan, Denpasar but as they resisted arrest, the police shot them and confiscated a pistol and its ammunition in the scene. At around the same time, police also raided the hotel and opened fire after the terrorists tried to escape with guns blazing. In the second raid at the hotel, police shot dead the three terrorists.⁷ Police also found several semi-automatic guns, ammunition magazines, masks and sketches of robbery targets during in the location of the raid.⁸

Police were guarding the location of the raid in Sanur (courtesy of Tempo)

Who are they?
The five slain terrorists were part of the group that masterminded the 2010 CIMB Niaga Bank robbery in Medan (North Sumatra) which took place on 18 August 2010.⁹ They were under the leadership of Hilman Jayakusuma, who had been on Indonesia’s most-wanted list for more than two years for his involvement with the CIMB bank robbery.¹⁰

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⁷ Ibid.
The members of Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid during the CIMB bank robbery in Medan on 18 August 2010 (Corteousy of Republika).

The men were believed to have entered the island province of Bali in February 2012. One of them, Hilman Jayakusuma, was a high profile terrorism suspect. It is not known exactly how many were in the group but the police believed that “some (members of the group) might still be on the loose.”

They were in Bali trying to rob several locations to finance their terrorist acts. A day prior to the police raids, the five men were scouting several potential targets including the Bali Money Changer on Jalan Sriwijaya, Kuta, a jewelry store on Jalan Uluwatu, Jimbaran and a Denpasar Cafe named Lavida Loca.

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According to the head of the National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT), Mr. Ansyad Mbai, they five men were members of *Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid* (JAT), a terrorist organization established by the jailed cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. JAT had previously been involved in several terrorist acts in Indonesia. JAT activities have included the set up of a military camp in Aceh in January 2010, robbery of CIMB Bank in Medan on 18 August 2010, shooting of police officers in Kebumen, Central Java in March 2010 and in Purworejo, Central Java in April 2010, series of bombings in Klaten and Yogyakarta in December 2010. In January 2011, JAT conducted a suicide bombing in Cirebon in April 2011, shootings of police officers in Palu, Central Sulawesi in May 2011, poisoning plot in June 2011, bomb explosion at Umar Bin Khattab Pesantren in Bima, West Nusa Tenggara in July 2011 and suicide bombing at GBIS Church in Solo in September 2011.\(^{13}\)

**Impact Analysis**

The terrorists successfully evaded arrest by the police after the CIMB Bank robbery in Medan which took place in August 2010. They later entered Bali without being stopped on their way and conducted surveillance on several targets that they would rob. The terrorists are certainly well trained and skilled. Careful preparation precedes the conducting of operations. It is possible that these men were on standby to conduct a robbery upon request from their leaders. The increased emphasis to source for funding could allude to the fact that the terrorists' sources of fund are draining. The lack of resource could have propelled them to plan robberies in Bali.

In this situation the terrorists turn to *fa’i*, a term they use for robbery to raise funds for jihad. The *fa’i* targets in Bali which they had selected were seen legitimate because they belong to infidels. They believe that robbing these targets was part of jihad and has to be done for greater jihad operations.

The fact that they were planning to conduct a bombing operation on the Day of Silence in Bali reminds us that Bali continues to be an attractive target for terrorist attacks. Bali is an iconic destination that is often frequented by Western tourists.

The individuals that were killed in both the Denpasar and Sanur raids are believed to have supported the terrorist organization, Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid. They aimed to provide funds through robberies for future terrorist attacks. JAT's network is still capable of supporting terrorist acts.

There is no doubt that the killing of these terrorists deals yet another blow to Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid. However, while the group has had its operational capacity substantially reduced, the fact remains that radicalization and terrorist recruitment continues to take place. The success of the raids should be applauded, but this does not mean the work is complete. The Indonesian anti-terror police needs to build an effective strategy to reduce killing terrorists fatally and to improve their scores of arresting terrorists alive who can
then assist in providing crucial insights to the underlying threat emanating from the
groups in Indonesia. The Indonesian government needs to create a more comprehensive
strategy to address the radicalization that has been taking place, failing which Otherwise
JAT and related networks can replace their lost leaders to create a more vicious terrorist
organization.