

## **Attack Details and Analysis**

**Date of attacks:** October 1, 2005

**Location:** Bali, Indonesia

**Attack Details:** Three coordinated blasts took place in Bali. Two of the explosions occurred in Jimbaran at 7.50pm at two crowded beachside seafood restaurants, near the Four Seasons Hotel.

Ten minutes later, about 30km away, another blast took place in a three-storey Raja restaurant at the Matahari Square shopping centre. The bomb apparently went off at the second storey of the restaurant.

The attacks are the work of suicide bombers who carried backpacks. Indonesian police confirmed that parts of the bombers' bodies had been found at the sites of the attacks in the Kuta and Jimbaran resort areas.

**Casualties:** 26 people are reported dead, including 12 Indonesians, 3 Australians and one Japanese. The 122 injured included 20 Australians, four Americans, eight South Koreans, three Japanese, one French, and one German.

**Analysis:**

**Why Bali Again?:**

Bali is of strategic interests to the terrorists because of its' tourist industry. As evident from the first Bali bombings, hitting a tourist spot will guarantee them publicity and increase the chances of foreigners being killed. It will also take everyone by surprise as Bali was just recovering from the impact of the previous bombings and no one expected the terrorist to strike twice.

It was also a perfect timing as Indonesia's security forces had their attention focused on Jakarta, where trouble was expected from protesters against the fuel price hike.

**State of JI:**

All indications are that Azaharui Husin and Noordin Mohd Top were the masterminds of these latest attacks. Some intelligence sources claimed that they think the bomb carriers were recruited from Darul Islam, a hard line Islamic group whose aim is to form an Islamic state in Indonesia. This should not be ruled out as the suicide bombers involved in the first Bali bombings and the Australian embassy bombing had links to DI. There have also been reports that the suicide bombers were drug addicts and could have been lured with the promise of money without the knowledge that the bombs that they were carrying were going to be detonated.

The above information has not been verified thus far but if the latter is true, this is indeed a new development. It could also imply that the duo is having difficulty in getting new recruits and have to turn to criminals. This should be seen in the light of increasing opposition, within some circles in JI and other Islamic militant groups, to bombing busy cities and causing Muslim deaths.

Freelancers may also be playing an increased role. These freelancers are not formal members of any organization although they share a similar ideology with JI. They may have cooperated with some JI members before. As a result, there is no longer a single structure to identify with.

### **Intelligence Failure Yet Again?**

Indonesian police do not have access to a working database of domestic and international radical groups. Only the military has access to it. This is the legacy of the Soeharto's rule. This lack of intelligence has impeded the police from uncovering and crushing plans of terrorist attacks. It has done a good job in arresting suspects following an attack but it lacks the capability to take preventive actions. Poor coordination between the police, military and intelligence bodies further worsen the problem.

**CT measures Indonesia should consider:** The current problem now lies in the Anti-Terrorism law that allows only the National Police to question and arrest suspected terrorists. This means that after the intelligence bodies have conducted their investigations and possess strong evidence on particular figures, they have to submit their findings to the police, as they do not have the authority to make any arrests. It is up to the police to use the data given. The police may also decide to conduct further investigations. The long process needed to take action on the terrorists means that by the time the police decide to move in, the terrorists have already escaped. The traditional duty of the police is to collect evidence after a particular bombing or attack has taken place and thus, they may be myopic in conducting investigations. Unlike the intelligence apparatus, police may not be able to see the connections to previous bombings and to trace out the pattern. There needs to be an overhaul of Indonesia's security forces. Indonesia is now pushing ahead with a bill to empower its intelligence agency. This may be submitted to the Parliament early next year. The Bill will also ensure coordination among all government institutions to allow effective information gathering.

The anti-terrorism law is more focused on dealing with a terrorist act after it has been committed. There is no registration of mobile phone owners and internet service provider. When the police uncover a communication network within a terrorist group, tracking the number to the owner often lead to a dead end as the numbers are not registered.

Indonesia has to ban JI if it is to effectively crush the group and its affiliates. By not doing so, the police cannot arrest suspected members of JI who have not yet committed a crime. This is a problem for the police as evident in a recent case, which took place on

July 1, 2005 where the police anti-terror detachment arrested 24 people for their alleged links with JI. The arrests were made even though JI was not an outlawed organization. In a further contradiction, police have repeatedly said JI was the regional terror group that masterminded the 2002 Bali attacks, the 2003 J.W. Marriott hotel bombing and the 2004 bomb blast outside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta. However, in response to the arrests, activists from the Anti-Kidnapping Front staged a demonstration in front of the Surakarta Police station. The protesters demanded the release of the 24 people, accusing the police of violating the Criminal Procedures Code (KUHAP) in detaining them. This poses a problem for the police to engage in preventive detention.

The authorities should also take efforts to prevent imprisoned terrorists from communicating with outside people. The prisoners should not be allowed to communicate with their sympathizers, other members of the group or give interviews to the media. This is important as terrorists use the media for publicity and to promote their agenda. It is also important to ensure that those in prison are not allowed to freely communicate with each other. Putting them in the same cell may allow them to regroup and plan further attacks once they are released.