Kata'ib Hezbollah

COUNTRY/LOCATION WITHIN COUNTRY
In and around Baghdad, 1 Sadr City, Ali al Gharbi (245 km southeast of Baghdad), Ali ash Sharqi (some 265 km southeast of Baghdad), Maysan province and the city of Amarah2, Najaf3

OTHER NAMES/ALIASES

Variants:
Kata'ib Hezbollah, Khata'ib Hizballah, Khata'ib Hezbollah, Kata'ib Hizballah fi al-Iraq, Khattab Hezbollah5

WEB PAGE
According to the Infomatics Team at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, http://www.kataibhizbollah.org/ is the official Kata'ib Hezbollah’s website as of 18 February 2010. Videos, news of the group’s developments, statements, articles, and links to other related websites are here. Kata'ib Hezbollah also posts videos at http://mkadas.com/ar/index.php, a Shiite forum. This website is similar to the Al Fallujah Forum and has many sections and categories, including medicine, on all things Shi’ite. Kata'ib Hezbollah has also utilised http://www.newsalgalibon.net/ for similar purposes. This website contains news of their movements, information about Shiite cities in Iraq, details about Iran, and current affairs regarding Shiite cities. The website is poorly organised and possibly still under development.

According to the US Treasury in July 2009, Kata'ib Hezbollah’s website was: www.alaseb.com. However, this domain is no longer in use and is available for sale as of February 2010.
SYMBOLS

The logo is very reminiscent of Hezbollah of Lebanon’s symbol with the fist raising an AK-47 weapon. The script translates to English as ‘the battalion of Hezbollah (Allah's party)’. The AK-47 is outlined in red and the script is outlines in a yellow-green colour. The arm and fist are a light-skin tone. The base of the arm is captured in a cloud where the elbow is the shape of Iraq. There is also a rocket that appears to be rising from the script.

OBJECTIVES

Kata'ib Hezbollah seeks to end US and foreign intervention in Iraq, as well as establish a Shiite Islamic government. Of note is its leaders’ connection with the Mahdi Army, with lends credibility to the idea that it supports a Shi’ite ruling authority in Iraq.

Like its brother Hezbollah world-wide, it probably seeks to exert Iranian influence over Iraq. In addition, it may be sympathetic to the goals of Lebanon’s Hezbollah that seek to eradicated Israel and liberate Palestine.
### LEADERSHIP

Little is known precisely about the leadership, but Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (official name listed by the US Department of Treasury) is a senior adviser and also advises Iran's Quds Force. Identified as a ‘threat’ by the US Treasury, al-Muhandis has nineteen aliases and is a citizen of both Iran and Iraq. He was born in 1953 in Ma’ghal, Basrah, Iraq. In particular, al-Muhandis is credited with forming a Shiite militia to train Kata’ib Hezbollah, as well as Jaysh al-Mahdi to attack US and Coalition forces. He is also responsible for organising the movement of weapons from Iran to Iraq and the subsequent distribution. In addition to weapons, al-Muhandis has moved logistical equipment—like trucks—from Iran into Sadr City, Baghdad, as well as fighters. In the 1980s, al-Muhandis assisted with Western embassy bombings in Kuwait and the failed assassination of the Kuwaiti Emir.

### Past Players

The leadership and membership of Kata’ib Hezbollah has risen from past organisations intent on waging violent attacks against US and Coalition Forces. A number of affiliated and past individuals help better explain the leadership dynamics of this current group.

Although not Kata’ib Hezbollah, Qais al-Khazaali, a former spokesman for cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and Mahdi Army commander, led a group to carry out a January 2007 attack against a provincial government building in Karbala, assisted by Iran. Al-Khazaali was affiliated with the League of the Righteous (see Group Affiliations). The League of the Righteous is now under the command of Akram al Kabi, a member of Khazzali’s faction and former leader of the Mahdi Army’s Special Groups.

Around the same time period, Ali Mussa Dakdouk served Hezbollah proper, but was ‘working in Iraq as a surrogate for the Iranian Quds force’ (see Group Affiliations).

Al-Khazaali, his brother Ali al-Khazaali and Dakdouk were subsequently captured by US troops in March 2007. During interrogations, they revealed that the January 2007 attack would not have been possible without support from the Quds force. Al-Khazaali was released in late December 2009 as part of a reconciliation process, but this has also been referred to negatively as a little more than a prisoner swap.

In September 2009, the Iraq National Emergency Response Brigade arrested Khalid Masur Isma’il (aka Abu Mustafa), accused of being Kata’ib Hezbollah financier and recruiter. Prior to this arrest, Isma’il maintained a front as a manager for a security firm.

From the Quods Force (see Group Affiliations), US and Coalition forces have captured: Mahmud Farhadi, one of the three Iranian regional commanders in the Ramazan Corps and Ali Musa Daqduq, senior Lebanese Hezbollah operative. Azhar al Dulaimi, one of al-Kazzali’s fellow senior tactical commanders, was killed in Iraq in early 2007.

Seventeen other Qods Force fighters have been captured since mid-October 2008, with at least one killed.
GROUP AFFILIATIONS
Kata'ib Hezbollah has a number of current and historic ties with Iran and Shi’ite groups.

Iranian Revolutionary Guard and Qods Force
Kata’ib Hezbollah arose from a vested interest by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in Iraq. With the Iranian Revolutionary Guard comes a tie to the Qods Force, its special operations unit, which has likely assisted Kata’ib Hezbollah. The Qods Force has supported a number of Shi’ite militants and terror groups in Iraq, including the Mahdi Army, which they allegedly helped to build in their image.12 Captured Shi’ite terrorists have admitted to this link. The Qods Force also assisted Madhi Army offshoot Asaib al Haq, or League of the Righteous.13 The League of the Righteous opposed the Mahdi Army ceasefire and continued operations against US and coalition forces.

Lebanese Hezbollah
Previously, Lebanese Hezbollah militants allegedly were operating in the conflict zone, with their combat experience and Arabic language skills. In addition, the US military believes that the Lebanese Hezbollah helped to fund and train, as well as support, Kata’ib Hezbollah and its affiliate groups.16

Mahdi Army
Kata’ib Hezbollah is one of the many groups that rose in the vacuum left behind after the effective dissolution of the Mahdi Army, which Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah helped establish.17 To be clear, Kata’ib Hezbollah is not a direct descendent or part of the Mahdi Army.

Syria
US officials also believe there to possibly be Syrian assistance to, or complacency regarding, Kata’ib Hezbollah. Previously, Shi’ite militia members have been known to transit through Syrian territory with the knowledge of senior government officials. There was also an alleged meeting between Syrian officials, Imad Mugniyah (senior Lebanese Hezbollah member) and Ghassam Soleimani (Iranian Revolutionary Guards) on how to further antagonise the US in Iraq.18 Previously, Mahdi Army fighters from Diwaniya, Basra, Shoala and Sadr City went by bus through Syria into Lebanon.19

HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT
From 2006, there was the marked involvement of Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah in internal Iraqi security matters. In particular, they assisted with the arming and training of the Mahdi Army (See Group Affiliations).20 The Qods Force guided this development, which laid the ground work for groups like Kata’ib Hezbollah in 2007. Kata’ib Hezbollah has made its mark by attacking American forces in Iraq—using improvised explosive devices, mortars, rockets, rocket propelled-grenades, and snipers—in the Green Zone, among other areas. They have also attacked aligned parties, such as United Nations workers. In particular, Kata’ib Hezbollah is believed to have obtained the encrypted video feed in December 2009 of the Predator unmanned aerial vehicles above Iraq, a massive security breach.21
AREA OF OPERATION

Kata’ib Hezbolloh primarily operates in and around greater Baghdad, namely Sadr City. However, evidence of their operations have been witnessed in Ali al Gharbi (245 km southeast of Baghdad), Ali ash Sharqi (some 265 km southeast of Baghdad), Maysan province (south-eastern Iraq on Iranian border), Amarah (south-eastern Iraq near Tigris River waterway) and Najaf, a traditionally Shi’ite area and location of the Al Quds Mosque, the most holy shrine for this religion.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Analysis of Organizational Structure:

Little is known about the precise organizational structure, but it might logically mirror or blend elements from the Lebanese Hezbollah (see Group Profile # 4487) or the Mahdi Army (see Group Profile #37813). Drawing from Lebanese Hezbollah, it could be influenced by hierarchical infrastructure, where religious clerics or spiritual leaders play a strong role and are supported by a Consultative Council. There may also be an executive committee and other bodies to oversee political, cultural, educational and financial committees.

If following more of the Mahdi Army model, it will better resemble a coalition of semi-independent units including advanced combatants, low-level fighters, and part-time volunteers. To assert additional control over its territories, it may have a socio-religious wing to implement Islamic law, education and customs. Given the actions seen thus far, it is more likely that Kata’ib Hezbolloh follows the Mahdi Army design.

COMMAND STRUCTURE

The command structure is also a little elusive and may mimic either the Lebanese Hezbollah or Mahdi Army. If following Lebanese Hezbollah, a regional commander would be subordinate to the leader or Secretary General. The Mahdi Army structure would recommend a supreme leader or commander with several mid-level leaders and commanders in charge of specific areas and operations. Commands and orders would be handed down to each region, which seems plausible given the divided yet coordinated actions witnessed thus far.
FINANCIAL

SOURCE OF SUPPLY

It is strongly suspected the Kata’ib Hezbollah receives direct support from the Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran, a charge Iran refutes. Previously, the Qods Force (see Group Affiliations) allegedly provided a plethora of help—including weapons, training, funding and other assistance—to the League of the Righteous. With financial backing, the League of the Righteous, who followed a similar trajectory to Kata’ib Hezbollah, was able to launch very deadly attacks with explosively formed projectiles (EFP), as well as other weapons.25

The US Department of the Treasury has named the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corp as a supporter of Kata’ib Hezbollah as of 2008 (see State Responses).26 The US Department of State has also asserted a connection between Kata’ib Hezbollah and Lebanese Hezbollah (see States Responses).

EXTERNAL SUPPORT

Iran

The alleged link between Iran and Kata’ib Hezbollah has been extensively mentioned in the various sections in this report.

ANNUAL BUDGET

There is no information available pertaining to an annual budget.
MILITARY CAPABILITY

Kata’ib Hezbollah could have a maximum number of 2,000 fighters and supporters, but this number is based on the number of individuals from Shi’ite insurgency groups trained by Hezbollah in Lebanon and not on actual suspected members of the organisation.27

American officials believe Kata’ib Hezbollah to have decently extensive capabilities, thanks to Iran’s assistance. In particular, they list explosives, ‘shaped charges’, triggers for roadside bombs, conventional roadside bombs, assault rifles and other equipment or training.28 US Army General John Abizaid believes evidence of Iranian support to insurgent Shi’ite groups was solidified when the factions used a rocket propelled grenade-29 against an American M-1 tank in Iraq in 2006.29

Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis’ (see Leadership) teams trained Kata’ib Hezbollah in guerrilla warfare, explosives and other weapons, including mortars, sniper rifles and explosives. Sniper training is a particular hallmark of al-Muhandis’ followers, partly a result of his sniper rifles smuggling network from Iran to Iraq.30 In addition, Kata’ib Hezbollah has access to and has used explosively-formed penetrator land mines and improvised rocket-assisted mortars, or ‘flying improvised explosives’.31

Logistics and Capability

Networks of al-Muhandis are also capable of moving ammunition, logistical infrastructure and weapons, including items that can pierce bullet proof vests, and distributing those to militant forces.32 In April 2008, trucks stacked with mortars, Katyusha rockets, EFPs and other explosive equipment moved from Iran to Sadr City, Baghdad. In addition, al-Muhandis oversaw the transit of other weapons to militant groups in Basrah and Maysan in Spring 2008.33

STRATEGY USED

Kata’ib Hezbollah appears to use classic guerilla warfare strategies, including hit and run or IED attacks, with a bit of sophisticated technology. Their attacks have the potential to be quite deadly (see Military Capabilities) and many have been posted on the internet to further spread their message and instill fear, or garner support (see Tactics Used: Psychological Warfare).
According to the US Department of State, Kata’ib Hezbollah has launched several violent terrorist attacks since 2007 using a variety of deadly tactics.34

Guerrilla Attacks
In February 2010, Kata’ib Hezbollah ambushed US and Iraqi military forces entering Duwayjat city from residential buildings.35 The military returned fire, but may have injured or killed civilians. Kata’ib Hezbollah’s other attacks involving roadside bombs and improvised rocket-assisted mortars have been posted on the internet (see Psychological Warfare).36 In other attacks since 2007, Kata’ib Hezbollah has used IEDs, grenade attacks and sniper operations.37

In January 2007, it was strongly suspected that the Qods Force was behind an attack on the Provincial Joint Coordination Center in Karbala that required extensive intelligence, training and reconnaissance.38 With alleged Iranian backing, it is not unlikely that Kata’ib Hezbollah’s attacks will become increasingly sophisticated.

Psychological Warfare
Kata’ib Hezbollah has concentrated effort on translating its attacks on Coalition Forces into propaganda in the form of videos posted on the internet. Some 1,200 videos from four hard drives seized from a Kata’ib Hezbollah media helper details ‘sophisticated planning and attack tactics, techniques, and procedures…[and] use of the most lethal weapons—including RPG-29s, IRAMs, and EFPs—against Coalition Forces in Iraq’.39 Thirty-five of these videos included Kata’ib Hezbollah’s logo. Al-Manar in Beirut has broadcast Kata’ib Hezbollah’s videos of attacks on Coalition Forces, especially in 2008.40

Kata’ib Hezbollah had previously issued threats against Coalition Forces, especially when the November 2008 Iraqi-US security agreement was being discussed.41

Kidnapping
Some of their peers, including the League of the Righteous, kidnap American contractors in attempt to cause further unrest.42 Lebanese Hezbollah, with suspected Iraqi militant support, was also involved in an attempted kidnapping of US forces in January 2007.43 Given this influence, it is not inconceivable that Kata’ib Hezbollah might try a similar strategy to further its goals.
TRAINING

For the training of his Shi’ite militias, al-Muhandis ensured that his men completed a course in Iran on sniper rifles in November 2007, with the intention of launching later operations against Coalition Forces. 44 He has also sent men to Iran for other training, including: guerilla warfare, light arms, marksmanship, improvised explosive devices (IED) and anti-aircraft missiles. 45 Most of this training is conducted by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Qods Force and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, according to American officials. 46 Lebanese Hezbollah has also travelled to Iraq to train on the ground. 47

According to a Mahdi commander in 2006, the fighters trained by the Qods Force and Lebanese Hezbollah are the best trained and effective insurgents in Iraq. 48

Kata’ib Hezbollah’s contemporaries (see Group Affiliations) received training as mortar teams 49 and it is likely that Kata’ib Hezbollah would therefore have received this guidance, as well.

TARGETS

Kata’ib Hezbollah is intent on targeting any persons associated with the United States or Coalition countries including Iraq, as well as non-governmental organisations. On 29 November 2008, Kata’ib Hezbollah launched a rocket attack on the International Zone in Baghdad that resulted in the deaths of two United Nations workers. 50 Kata’ib Hezbollah mounts attacks on Coalition troops and patrols, as well as threatens Iraqi politicians and civilians that are in support of democratic reform in the country that does not result in an Islamic Shi’ite leadership. 51 The Mahdi Army, although keen on engaging in politics, wanted it on their own terms with Muqtada al Sadr on the ballot.

Kata’ib Hezbollah may also react violently to any threats to Shi’ites, as there was a marked increase in violence following the February 2007 bombing of one their important shrines, the Askariya Mosque. 52 This response is in line with the Mahdi Army’s principles when it was operational.
POLITICAL

IDEOLOGY
Religious Extremist

POLITICAL PARTY AFFILIATIONS
Kata’ib Hezbollah will likely affiliate with a variety of Shi’ite political parties that seek to establish an Islamic government with their predominance. However, Kata’ib Hezbollah has yet to push for a political platform the way the Sadrist and the Mahdi Army have, but its actions do affect political participation. The US Congressional Research Service hypothesizes that the low voter support in 2009 for the Sadists is a result of ‘voter disillusionment’ with these organizations that have a violent extremist wing and who actively destabilise Iraq.53 Kata’ib Hezbollah also has yet to outwardly support the Sadists bid for political representation. Interestingly, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the most senior Shi’ite cleric in Iraq and major international religious figure, decreed in 2008 that the Iraqi government is the sole authority to uphold laws, weakening the legitimacy of groups like the Mahdi Army who threaten to boycott elections and generally disrupt the political process.54

By virtue of their numerous connections, Kata’ib Hezbollah is likely affiliated with the Iranian regime’s politics, as well as those of the Lebanese Hezbollah (see Group Affiliations).

SUPPORT BASE
There is very little conclusive information on community and local support for Kata’ib Hezbollah, but a number of likely scenarios and state support exists.

That said, there are extremist Shi’ite communities who remain complacent or under the influence of the militant forces. In February 2010, Kata’ib Hezbollah used residential buildings in Duwayjat city to launch an ambush on US and Iraqi military forces. However, it is unknown whether the citizens willingly gave the insurgents access to their homes.

Some suspected supporters are split between the League of the Righteous and Kata’ib Hezbollah, although they both work toward similar goals. Other communities in their area of operations are increasingly upset with the violence and instability, limiting Kata’ib Hezbollah’s supporters or sympathisers.

Most likely, Kata’ib Hezbollah does not have a wide base from which to draw and relies instead on the international assistance provided (allegedly) from Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah. The Qods Force is the primary support base, providing everything from funding to training and advice (see Sources of Supply and Group Affiliations).55
The United States has been explicit that ‘the Iranian hand is stroking violence’ in Iraq, as well as directly assisting with such groups as Kata’ib Hezbollah. In response the US has taken a number of actions. On 2 July 2009, the US Department of the Treasury designated Kata’ib Hezbollah and its leader al-Muhandis as entities that threaten stability in Iraq and its government under Executive Orders 13438 and 13224, which prohibit ‘all transactions between the designees and any U.S. person and freeze any assets the designees may have under U.S. jurisdiction.’ The same day, the US Department of State designated Kata’ib Hezbollah a Foreign Terrorist Organization under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and under section 1(b) of E.O. 13224. This legislation covers groups who have either committed or pose a grave risk of terrorist acts. Previously, the US Department of Treasury had named the IRGC-Qods Force as a ‘Specially Designated Global Terrorist’ on 25 October 2007.

Recently, the US and Iraqis have conducted joint operations along the Iranian border to disrupt the supply chain to Kata’ib Hezbollah and enhance the security of the neighbouring provinces. In February 2010, Iraqi Security Forces arrested 22 alleged Kata’ib Hezbollah terrorists. The arrests came during joint security operations that targeted the weapons smuggling network on the Iranian border. Several suspected Kata’ib Hezbollah terrorists are believed to have been killed during the operation.

Previously, al-Muhandis was convicted in absentia by the Kuwaiti government in the 1980s for his role in the bombing of Western embassies and an attempted assassination of the Emir of Kuwait, a majority Sunni country approximately 131 kilometres south of Basra, Iraq.
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1980s - al-Muhandis was convicted in absentia by the Kuwaiti government for his role in the bombing of Western embassies and an attempted assassination of the Emir of Kuwait.\textsuperscript{62}

From 2006 - marked involvement of Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah in internal Iraqi security matters; factions used an RPG-29 against an American M-1 tank in Iraq.\textsuperscript{63}

January 2007 - Lebanese Hezbollah, with suspected Iraqi militant support, involved in an attempted kidnapping of US forces and attack on the Provincial Joint Coordination Center in Karbala, city of the Imam Husayn Mosque

February 2007 – bombing of Shi’ite shrine, the Askariya Mosque and subsequent sectarian violence

25 October 2007 - US Department of Treasury named the IRGC-Qods Force as a ‘Specially Designated Global Terrorist’

November 2007 – al-Muhandis’ men completed a course in Iran on sniper rifles

Early to Mid-2008 - Al-Manar in Beirut broadcasted Kata’ib Hezbollah’s videos of attacks on Coalition Forces

February 2008 – rocket attack in Rustamiya area of Baghdad results in one US civilian death and other injuries to US civilian and Coalition Forces personnel\textsuperscript{64}

13 May 2008 - RPG-29 attack on a U.S. tank located in Sha’ab, a Shi’ite dominated neighbourhood of Baghdad, Iraq

October – November 2008 – Iraqi-US security agreement discussions, Kata’ib Hezbollah issues warning against cooperation

29 November 2008 - Kata’ib Hezbollah launched a rocket attack on the International Zone in Baghdad

2 July 2009 - US Department of the Treasury designated Kata’ib Hezbollah and al-Muhandis as foreign terrorist entities; US Department of States designated Kata’ib Hezbollah a Foreign Terrorist Organization

September 2009 - the Iraq National Emergency Response Brigade arrested Khalid Masur Isma’il (see Leadership)

RECENT ACTIVITIES

December 2009 - Kata’ib Hezbollah is believed to have obtained the encrypted video feed of the Predator unmanned aerial vehicles above Iraq\textsuperscript{65}

February 2010 - Kata’ib Hezbollah ambushed US and Iraqi military forces entering Duwayjat city from residential buildings

February 2010 - Iraqi Security Forces arrested 22 alleged Kata’ib Hezbollah terrorists near the Iranian border
Projected Activities

The long-term impact of Kata’ib Hezbollah is unknown at this point. In the short-term it is likely that Kata’ib Hezbollah will continue its operations with external support so long as the supply chains remain relatively intact. However, thus far they have been very dependent on the Iranian foreign assistance, training and supplies to sustain their operations. It is no surprise, therefore, that US and Iraqi forces are enhancing border patrol operations and seeking to cut-off the insurgent lifeline. There will likely be further clashes as the Iraqi forces step up their patrol and aggressively target the insurgents, forcing Kata’ib Hezbollah to resort to guerrilla tactics.

Previously the US military was relatively successful in countering the Mahdi Army and other terror groups operating in the country, especially during the ‘surge’ in 2007. However, unlike the Mahdi Army, Kata’ib Hezbollah’s ties to Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah seem to be much more cemented. As long as the supply lines are open, Kata’ib Hezbollah has a greater chance of inflicting more serious damage, as well as destabilising the peace process. In addition, should they build on their technological advances, the US military will have to take extra precautions to protect their equipment from hacking and surveillance.

1 'Iraqi, US forces kill 10 during clash with Hezbollah Brigades near the Iranian border', The Long War Journal, 12 February 2010
2 'Iraqi, US forces kill 10 during clash with Hezbollah Brigades near the Iranian border', The Long War Journal, 12 February 2010
3 'Treasury Designates Individual, Entity Posing Threat to Stability in Iraq', US Department of the Treasury, 2 July 2010
4 'Treasury Designates Individual, Entity Posing Threat to Stability in Iraq', US Department of the Treasury, 2 July 2010
5 'Treasury Designates Individual, Entity Posing Threat to Stability in Iraq', US Department of the Treasury, 2 July 2010
6 'Treasury Designates Individual, Entity Posing Threat to Stability in Iraq', US Department of the Treasury, 2 July 2010

10 'Iraqi Special Operations Forces arrests Hezbollah financier, recruiter', Multi-National Corps-Iraq, 30 September 2009
11 'Iranian-backed Shia terror group kidnaps US civilian in Baghdad', The Long War Journal, 6 February 2010
12 Allegations of Hezbollah’s Terrorist Activity in Iraq Are Met With Skepticism, Forward.com, 11 July 2007
13 'Iranian-backed Shia terror group kidnaps US civilian in Baghdad', The Long War Journal, 6 February 2010
14 'Iranian-backed Shia terror group kidnaps US civilian in Baghdad', The Long War Journal, 6 February 2010
15 'Allegations of Hezbollah’s Terrorist Activity in Iraq Are Met With Skepticism', Forward.com, 11 July 2007
16 'Iranian-backed Shia terror group kidnaps US civilian in Baghdad', The Long War Journal, 6 February 2010
24 ‘Treasury Designates Individual, Entity Posing Threat to Stability in Iraq’, US Department of the Treasury, 2 July 2010
26 ‘Treasury Designates Individual, Entity Posing Threat to Stability in Iraq’, US Department of the Treasury, 2 July 2010