## 1. Group Profile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Group:</th>
<th>Al-Shabaab</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Symbol:</td>
<td>1) Thumbnail: <img src="image1" alt="Symbol" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description:</td>
<td>The Arabic writing reads: ‘Al-Mujahideen Youth (Al-Shabaab) Front. There's no God but Allah and Muhammad is His Messenger. The army of torment in Somalia.’ The AK-47 rifles affirm Al-Shabaab’s commitment to violence. Through the various symbols, Al-Shabaab upholds militant actions and the restoration of the Islamic caliphate.</td>
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### 1) Thumbnail: ![Thumbnail](image2)  
<p>| Description: | Symbol for the December 2009 media wing of Al-Shabaab, Al-Kataeb Institute for Media Production |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Group Type:</strong></th>
<th>Salafi Extremist</th>
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<td><strong>Area of Operation:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Within Somalia</strong></td>
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Al-Shabaab operates or has active cells in the Bay and Bhoobool region, south-central Somalia and Mogadishu, and Puntland and Somaliland. It is in control of Hiran province, north of Mogadishu, although it lost the city of Bulo Burde in September 2009 to government forces (see Recent Activities). It is in full control of seven provinces in the south, including: Lower Juba, Middle Juba, Gedo, Bay and Bakool, Lower Shabelle and Middle Shabelle.

From the Kenyan border, Al-Shabaab trains its fighters and al-Qaeda members, and also attacks the Shabelle and Juba provinces. Important to note, Al-Shabaab seeks control over Mogadishu and directs operations there, but does not have complete authority over it. Controlling this stronghold is considered a significant goal of Al-Shabaab and has been the source of significant violence in 2010, including near the President’s Palace.

In December 2009, Al-Shabaab seized control of several islands on the far borders of southern Somalia, including: Jolla, Guay, Mtaua and Ras Kambouni. They also gained the cities of Batoui and Kolbiyo, near the Kenyan border.

Al-Shabaab controls the port of Marka and commands other key posts near the Kenyan border. It controlled the port of Kismayo until 26 September 2009 when Hizbul Islam’s Ras Kamboni Brigade and Anole (see Group Affiliations) forced Al-Shabaab guerrillas to peacefully transfer control. Kismayo is significant, not only because it is a port town, but because it was territory lost to the Ethiopians in the fighting between the end of 2006 and beginning of 2007. On 20 December 2009, Al-Shabaab also took control of Afmadoow, in Juba, following fighting with Hizbul Islam. Also near the Kenyan border, Al-Shabaab controls the towns of Dii and Dhibley.

By late 2007, the government was only effectively controlling 20% of Somalia, allowing significant space for Al-Shabaab and other militants to develop. Although organised, Al-Shabaab’s areas of operation do experience considerable friction that undermines its overall effectiveness and destabilises its overall...
Outside Somalia
Internationally, Al-Shabaab fighters have originated from the United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway and the US, in particular Minneapolis.  

A homegrown cell from Melbourne, Australia was arrested in Sydney in August 2009 in advance of an imminent attack.

An act by Al-Shabaab was considered the most credible threat against the January 2009 inauguration of US President Barack Obama.

Leadership:

1) Current Leaders and Commanders
Sheikh Mohamed Mukhtar Abdirahman, aka Abu Zubeyr aka Ahmed Abdi Godane (hereafter referred to as Godane), is the official leader of Al-Shabaab, although a ten-member Shura council decides actions. His health is questionable, as he was seriously wounded in an explosion at a Mogadishu safe house in May 2009.  

Sheikh Ali Mohamud Raghe, alias Sheikh Ali Dhere (hereafter referred to as Dhere), is the spokesman and has mainly addressed media regarding Al-Shabaab’s tactics. He assumed this position in May 2009, after Mukhtar Roobow (see below) resigned. Sheikh Bare Mohamed Farah Khoje is also an al-Shabaab spokesman, but not as senior as Dhere. Abdighani Shaykh Muhammad is the spokesman in Kismayo and has issues warnings to Kenyan troops in November 2008.

Mukhtar Roobow (hereafter referred to as Roobow), aka Abu Mansur, oversees the Bay and Bokool regions and is the former spokesman. Roobow supposedly masterminded the October 2008 suicide bombings (see Significant Events). Roobow was previously the leader of Al-Shabaab from 2008-2009. Given Roobow’s visibility and history with Al-Shabaab, he could be a likely successor to Godane.

Xasan Xuseen is a spiritual leader. In July 2009, he was invited by the Bellevue Mosque in Gothenburg, Sweden to deliver a sermon (see Source of Supply). Although this engagement was protested by many in Gothenburg, it was an example of how Al-Shabaab’s leadership has a proven ability to reach individuals far from Somalia’s borders.

Fazul Abdullah Mohammed likely serves as Al-Shabaab’s intelligence chief, as he held the similar position for the Islamic Courts (see History of Development), and is believed to have been involved in
the 1998 US embassy bombings.\textsuperscript{xxvi}

Shaykh Abdirahman Abdi Shakur ‘Hudeyfi’ is a member of Al-Shabaab’s executive (see Command and Control Structure). Shaykh Mukhtar Abdi Moussa is also a member of the executive.\textsuperscript{xxv} Qadi Abdullah Ahmad Muhammad heads Al-Shabaab’s justice division. Shaykh Hassan Yakub Ali is the Information Secretary for Kismayo.\textsuperscript{xxvi}

\textbf{Other Notable Personalities:}

Several individuals lead the Mogadishu Command.\textsuperscript{xxvii} Hassan Abdillahi Hersi, aka Turki, is a jihadist commander and oversees a stronghold near the Kenyan border, the Juba Valley (see Area of Operations).\textsuperscript{xxviii,xxix} He serves as a military commander and senior trainer, owing to his previous experience with al-Qaeda camps during the 1990s.\textsuperscript{xxxi,xxv} Albrahim Haji Jaama ‘al-Afghani’ is a senior commander in Somaliland, Puntland and Ethiopian border area, originally from Somaliland like Abdirahman.\textsuperscript{xxxi} He also serves in the Islamic administration of Kismayo and may be a spiritual leader. Another high ranking commander is Fuad Mohamed Shangole, a Swiss national, who serves in Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{xxx} Abdullahi Uthman Jibril is the Field Commander for Gedo region, along with Barre Muhammad Farah.\textsuperscript{xxx} Shaykh Farah Muhammad ‘Abu Shureym’ specifically commands the Bardera region of Gedo.\textsuperscript{xxx} Harun Hussein Ibrahim is the leader in the Gedo region.\textsuperscript{xxx} Abu Mansur al-Amriki is the Field Commander in south Somalia and is suspected of being a former member of the US military.\textsuperscript{xxxv} Abdirahman Muhammad Ali ‘Filow’ is the commander in the Lower and Middle Juba regions. Shaykh Hassan Abd al-Rahman is the security chief in Shabelle. Elsewhere, Hassan Deerow is the commander in Baidoa. Hassan Jibril Jama is another field commander near the Kenyan border. Shaykh Hassan Muhammad Abu Ayman commands the Bay and Bakool regions.\textsuperscript{xxxviii} Khalif Adayle Abu Muhsin is the field commander of Hiwaye/Habr Gidir.\textsuperscript{xxxix}

Shaykh Abd al-Rahman Sirah is the governor of the Wilayah of Shabelle.\textsuperscript{xl} Shaykh Abdirahman Hassan Hussein is the governor of the Middle Shabelle region. Shaykh Abdirahman Siro is the governor of the Lower Shabelle and has reported recruited child soldiers.\textsuperscript{xli} Shaykh Abdullahi Mu’alim Ali ‘Abu Utayba’ heads security for Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{xlii} Shaykh Ali Muhammad Husayn is the governor of Banadir region, which includes Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{xliii} Shaykh Ibrahim al-Maqdisi heads Treasury affairs in Shabelle. Shaykh Sultan Muhammad Aal Muhammad heads the Da’wa of Shabelle.\textsuperscript{xlv}

Ahmed Abdi Aw-Mohammed and Isa Osman Issa from
Al-Shabaab were named by the US Department of State as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in November 2001. Issa has served as a commander of Al-Shabaab in Somalia, as well as led assaults targeting Ugandan peacekeepers and recruited suicide bombers. He is also skilled in surface-to-air missiles. Muhammad Adan Kofi is the spokesman of the Islamic Courts and joined Al-Shabaab in December 2008.

**Former Leadership**

Adan Hashi Ayro (leader of Al-Shabaab from 2007 to May 2008 and alleged senior al-Qaeda member trained in Afghanistan) was killed by a US military raid in Dusamareb, Somalia in May 2008.

Roobow (see above) was previously the leader from May 2008-2009.

Until he was killed by a US military helicopter raid in September 2009, Sheikh Ali Fidow led the Mogadishu Command, along with three others, and was the Secretary of politics and regions.

**Possible Future Leadership**

In addition to Roobow, Hassan Dahir Aweys is a possible candidate to lead or absorb Al-Shabaab. Aweys is the former leader of the Islamic Courts (see History of Development) and active figure during the past three years of Somalia’s instability, participated in the ‘Black Hawk Down’ incident in 1993 and was named by the US Department of State as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in November 2001. Aweys is the current leader of Hizbul Islam (see Group Affiliations) and has previously sought a merger with Al-Shabaab. Aweys’ group has voiced support for inclusion with Al-Shabaab (see Other Group Affiliations), but prefers to maintain its own control over geographic areas with historical clan ties to Hizbul Islam’s members. The recent conflict over Kismayo will have a significant impact on the future between Hizbul Islam and Al-Shabaab (see Group Affiliations). Aweys also trained in al-Qaeda camps during the 1990s.

**Political Objectives:**

Al-Shabaab has national and international aims. It aims to fight the government, as well as Ethiopian supporters, and establish Sharia law across Somalia. In particular, it wishes to build an army that places an Islamic identity above clan loyalties. Then, and somewhat simultaneously, Al-Shabaab has stated that it intends to wage jihad against the West and any foreign interveners as part of the al-Qaeda network.

**2. General**

**Group Affiliations:**

1) **Within Somalia**

The Council of Somali Islamic Courts (hereafter referred
to as the Islamic Courts) created Al-Shabaab as a youth militant or special force in the years leading up to 2006. The Islamic Courts consisted of eleven individual courts in the south and east of Somalia that were heavily dominated by the Hawiye clan. During the fighting of early 2006, the Islamic Courts and Al-Shabaab emerged victorious against the US-supported Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism. Although it created Al-Shabaab, the Islamic Courts have had a tense relationship with Shabaab’s radical elements, especially as the Islamic Courts sought to uphold a positive international face. The Islamic Courts apologised for the more radical acts of violence committed by Al-Shabaab, but that rhetoric did little to correct mounting international disapproval for their ‘Taliban-like’ actions during 2006.

When Al-Shabaab was consolidating in 2006, it was supported by Mogadishu businessmen who were against many of the defeated warlords.

Other anti-Somali government groups include: Alliance to Re-liberate Somalia (ARS), Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI), al-Qaeda, Jabhat al-Islamiya, Mu’askar Ras Kamboni, and Mu’askar Anole.

On 29 January 2010, Al Shabaab acquired the Mu’askar Ras Kamboni (the Ras Kamboni Brigade, founded by Turki (see Leadership)), splitting their rival Hizbul Islam further (see below). The two will work together to support al-Qaeda and the ‘international jihad’, as announced on the Al Qimmah Forum.

**Hizbul Islam**

There is an uneasy rivalry between Hizbul Islam and Al-Shabaab. Hizbul Islam, led by Aweys (see Leadership), was created in January 2009 in Somalia when four Islamic groups merged: Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia-Eritrea; Jabhatul Islamiya (the Islamic Front); and, Anole. Hizbul Islam is primarily dominated by the Marehan and Darod clans, whereas Al-Shabaab hails more from the Hawiye clan. Through the history of its individual components and leaders, Hizbul Islam can also be considered a product of the Islamic Courts.

Hizbul Islam seeks to assert its own control over areas of Somalia, like its September 2009 take-over of Kismayo port (see Current Activities), but also would like to merge with Al-Shabaab. Aweys announced the desired union to a crowd at the Aba Hureyra Mosque in Bakaraha market in Mogadishu during June-July 2009. However, this potential marriage was stressed on 30 September 2009 when Al-Shabaab declared war on Hizbul Islam over control of the port of Kismayo. Hizbul Islam vowed to fight Al-Shabaab in any part of Somalia and the two groups are currently engaged in a bloody battle.
preparation for this, Al-Shabaab ordered all doctors and nurses to the hospitals. As of 30 September 2009, citizens are fleeing the area and taking to the bush.\textsuperscript{ix} In a number of battles between the two near the Janay Abdalla village in the Lower Jubba region, Al-Shabaab is suffering heavy losses and has been forced to retreat. Aweys has called for a ceasefire and is discussing the terms of an agreement as of 7 October 2009.\textsuperscript{x}

Historically however, there have been other connections between the two groups. In February 2009, Hizbul Islam and Al-Shabaab killed some 50 African Union peacekeepers and wounded a further 300. They have also cooperated on other raids.\textsuperscript{ix} The body of an Afghan fighter from Hizbul Islam was found in Somalia following fighting in July 2009.\textsuperscript{x} Lastly, Hizbul Islam assists Al-Shabaab in controlling the southern and many of the central provinces, as well as influencing Mogadishu (see Area of Operations).\textsuperscript{lix}

The central question for Hizbul Islam is whether it will ever again seek to be a part of Al-Shabaab, or desires to take control from it in some or all areas. If an important goal of both organizations is territorial control, it is interesting that Hizbul Islam would violently prohibit Al-Shabaab from controlling Kismayo, where some of Hizbul Islam’s clans are based. It is forcefully prohibiting Al-Shabaab from occupying what could easily be viewed as common—and certainly strategic—grounds. This is the opportunity for the government to reach a middle ground with Hizbul Islam, perhaps involve them in the transitional government, and isolate Al-Shabaab from the south and east of the nation.

Clans
Clans and their subdivisions determine many of the alliances across Somalia and are related to the various insurgent groups and fuel many of the rivalries. The population is distributed in the following way amongst the dominant clans:

- Hiwaye – 25%
- Isaaq – 22%
- Darod – 20%
- Rahanweyn – 17%
- Dir – 7%\textsuperscript{lxiv}

Al-Shabaab members are not from one primary clan, but from several, largely based on the person’s place of origin. Because of the incredibly strong role that clans play in everyday life, it is incredibly likely that resulting loyalties will color decisions by secondary groups, like Al-Shabaab. However, with violent mobile or foreign forces, clan elders are finding their influence diminished in light of an automatic weapon wielded by young militants.
Al-Qaeda
Al-Qaeda is the most internationally visible link and Al-Shabaab became officially part of it on 1 February 2010.\textsuperscript{Ixx} This connection goes back until summer 2006, at least, in Somalia when leaders from both organizations first voiced their support for each other.\textsuperscript{Ixvi} In a speech that year, Osama bin Laden voiced support for the Islamic Courts.\textsuperscript{Ixvi} Two years later, Roobow told US newspaper the Los Angeles Times in August 2008: ‘we will take our orders from Sheik Osama bin Laden because we are his students. Al-Qaeda is the mother of the holy war in Somalia.’\textsuperscript{Ixvili}

There have been a number of videos linking Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab. The videos produced by Al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda are similar in style and quality. Al-Shabaab videos are hosted on al-Qaeda web forums and are reminiscent of the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) requesting integration with al-Qaeda.\textsuperscript{Ixvii} The following is selection of videos linking Al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda:

- In January 2007, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s number two, called on Somalis to use guerrilla tactics, suicide attacks and roadside bombings to attack Ethiopian troops.\textsuperscript{Ixx}
- A September 2008 video showed an Al-Shabaab leader pledging allegiance to al-Qaeda and encouraging young fighters to come to Somalia; this video featured Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, aka Abu Yusef, a Kenyan al-Qaeda operative.
- In February 2009, al-Zawahiri praised Shabaab’s seizure of the town of Baidoa and encouraged jihad against America.
- Turki, Indha-adde (former defence minister for the Islamic Courts prior to 2007) and Roboow were featured on al-Qaeda propaganda videos.\textsuperscript{Ixviii}

Operatives from al-Qaeda are willing to travel, fight and die for Al-Shabaab’s cause. In particular, Somalia sheltered three al-Qaeda operatives—Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan and Abu Taha al Sudani—wanted for their role in the 1998 US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.\textsuperscript{Ixxi} Nabhan and Fidow, also wanted for the 2002 Kenya hotel bombing, 250 miles south of Mogadishu, were killed by a suspected US military helicopter raid in September 2009, severing a strong tie between the two groups.\textsuperscript{Ixxii} Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has also allegedly assisted Al-Shabaab.\textsuperscript{Ixxv}

Hezbollah
Hezbollah may be establishing ties with Al-Shabaab. When Al-Shabaab members returned from fighting in Lebanon (see Training) in August and September 2006,
five Hezbollah members accompanied them to Somalia.⁷⁵ Although unsubstantiated, this could be a signal that Al-Shabaab is willing to counter moderate Somali Sunni populations that oppose it by engaging in any alliance possible, even a Shiite one. Or, this could be more of a functional exchange for fighters to gain experience and share knowledge.

Other Connections
For involvement by other nations and groups, see Source of Supply and External Involvement.

Organization Structure:

1) Al-Shabaab is a well organised hierarchy with independent components. At its head is a ten-member Shura Council that decides all major objectives and operations. It is led by an emir who, while significant, does not have sole authority. Below the Council are several subdivisions covering traditional areas like politics, media, military operations, etc. Also under the Shura Council is the military branch, Jaysh Al-Usra or army of hardship, as well as a more judicial branch, Jaysh Al-Hesbah, of Al-Shabaab to uphold law and morality.⁷⁶

Below the management levels is a regional division (see Area of Operations). Al-Shabaab appoints a political and a military representative for each region under its control. If this is a new region without Al-Shabaab clan ties, then a representative from a neighboring area will be brought in and appointed.⁷⁷ Regional commanders (see Leadership) are free to pursue independent action without consulting the Shura council.

Command and Control Structure:

1) A ten member Shura council, led by an emir, decides all major activities. It is likely supported by sub-emir of various jurisdictions including military, politics, media, etc.⁷⁸

It is further divided geographically (see Area of Operations) where a political and military commander oversees local operations. In each of these regions, the commander is relatively independent, creating both a strength, whereby decisions can be made and implemented quickly, but also a weakness as there is poor communication and integration with the other divisions.

Although it does not take marching orders straight from al-Qaeda, it is unlikely that Al-Shabaab would act in opposition to this most important ally and new partner. Also, the disjointed command below the Shura council may well act on any messages broadcast from al-Qaeda communications and videos. That said, Al-Shabaab is not so cohesive and consolidated that al-Qaeda could easily co-opt it further and instead must simply inspire
### History and Development:

1) Somalia has been plagued by instability, border skirmishes, warlords and clan disputes from the 1960s, in addition to its tumultuous history. Muhammad Siad Barre led a military coup in 1969, declaring Somalia a socialist state, and governed until 1991 when he was overthrown in 1991. From that point on, clan warlords murdered and wounded thousands of civilians, prompting the US and United Nations to send troops and peacekeepers to restore stability and deliver aid. The US ended its involvement in March 1994, primarily following the deaths of 18 US Army Rangers whose helicopters were shot down by Somali insurgents in Mogadishu in the infamous ‘Black Hawk Down’ incident from 3-4 October 1993. Later, the UN peacekeepers left in 1995, having failed to achieve its objective.

Warlord Muhammad Aideed died in 1996 and was succeeded by Hussein, his son.

In August 2000, clan leaders and elders elected Abdulkassim Salat Hassan the president of Somalia. In October, Hassan and Prime Minister Ali Khalif Gelayadh announced the first government Somalia has known since 1991. They were plagued by Somali warlords supported by Ethiopia. In August 2004, a transitional parliament was inaugurated in Kenya and governed Somali while in exile. This was the 14th attempt to install a central government since 1991.

Al-Shabaab was founded between 2004 and 2006 as the militant wing of the Islamic Courts. It was created by the Islamic Courts as they were attempting to unite Mogadishu, restore peace and govern in their religious vision after years of instability. In December 2006, Ethiopia launched an offensive into Somalia to unseat the Islamic Courts and force a regime change, providing an outlet for Al-Shabaab’s actions as the Islamic Courts disbanded the organization and fled the country. Al-Shabaab fought on and its disjointed defensive appeared ‘just’ against a foreign invader, especially as it was waged by primarily by Somalis.

In the past few years, Al-Shabaab has attempted to evolve into a ruling authority in addition to simply waging jihad, with some success. Its initial recruits were called to fight for Somali sovereignty and self-dignity. The recruits, heavily scrutinised, hailed from poor and disenfranchised parts of Somalia.

From 2007, Al-Shabaab has affiliated itself with al-Qaeda (see Group Affiliations). It became a formal part of al-Qaeda in February 2010.
Al-Shabaab continues to exist in opposition to the current Transnational Federal Government (TFG) government, as well as any external involvement by peacekeepers. Early in the recent unrest, the US made a decision to align with the TFG of Somalia and Addis Ababa, thus making the Islamic Courts and its subsidiary groups like Al-Shabaab enemies to it.

3. Financial

Source of Supply:

For additional information on finances, see Annual Budget.

Fighters are concentrated in towns where it is possible to work a job in order to earn money as quickly as possible. Money could also come from pirate ransoms from the port of Haradhere. Additional money is being sent by supporters abroad. In one example, it is believed that Xuseen (see Leadership) has used speaking engagements in Sweden to recruit fighters and raise funds.

In the communities that support them, Al-Shabaab received the majority of its ‘long term’ financial support from the local mosques, imams and communities. In particular, they provide food, water, shelter, clothing and moral support in exchange for justice and security. In turn, this frees up additional resources for the purchasing of weapons.

Communities on the cost, insofar as they are connected to piracy, are especially lucrative. Residents have confirmed that some monies paid from piracy ransoms are being passed to Al-Shabaab. However, the pirates are primarily in control of such decisions and have rejected other Al-Shabaab demands, such as a request from weapons from the Ukrainian ship hijacked in 2008.

External Support:

In July 2009, Eritrea was accused by the US Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice of arming and funding the insurgents. Eritrea continues to face strong criticism from many nations for its alleged involvement in the Somali conflict. In addition, a 2006 UN Report stated Iran, Libya, Egypt and a few others in the Gulf region have been supporting insurgents in Somalia.

Without government support, communities in Australia, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the US are supporting Al-Shabaab with recruits and donations. Additional money is being sent by supporters abroad. Three Norwegian-Somalis were charged with sending
money to Al-Shabaab in March 2008.

**Annual Budget:**

Given the millions of dollars circulating and known costs, the author of this report believes it is possible that Al-Shabaab has an annual operating budget around $2 million or more per year. All figures provided in this report are US dollars.

There are some known breakdowns and estimates of expenses. Recruited non-Somali fighters earn between $100 and $300 a month. Three hundred fighters would then cost between $360,000 and $1,080,000 annually if all are being paid.

The average cost of a plane ticket from the US to Somalia is on average $2000, indicating some $40,000 alone may have been spent to fly the 20 known recruits from America.

Some $10 million dollars disappeared in the bankruptcy of Dalsan International, a remittance company with ties to Al-Shabaab. That money may have been used to fund the insurgents in June 2006.

There are a few other less predictable costs paid by Al-Shabaab. In the event a fighter is killed, burial costs are paid by Al-Shabaab and money is sent to the family. If he is wounded, his medical expenses are covered and he is given monetary compensation.

### 4. Operational Strategy:

**Terror and Duality**

Al-Shabaab uses terror to mobilise the people of Somalia, but also seeks to build ties with the communities. Al-Shabaab is attempting to establish a power duality with the national government. In 2006, Al-Shabaab orchestrated a series of town visits to preach at town meetings and hold discussions with the clan elders. They have built roads, organised markets, and distributed food and monies to needy towns. In November 2009, Al-Shabaab announced the construction of a new bridge in the Lower Shabele, as well as the distribution of food, money and other aid for immigrants from Mogadishu. In February 2010, the Office of Zakat collected some 428 cows and sheep, then distributed these to locals who needed it. However, some of their plans are to the detriment to the next generation, including the March 2010 banning of science and English lessons in southern Afmadow. This decision came after the schools refused to answer Al-Shabaab’s cry for fighters and volunteers. To assert control in Baidoa in the Bay region of Southwest Somalia, Al Shabaab will destroy respected graves visited by Sufis, as a different caustic example.
Shabaab militants are also independently enforcing their own interpretation of acceptable hair styles, using scissors in the street to alter any unacceptable hair-dos. In addition to civil services, Al-Shabaab serves judicial functions with “mobile Sharia courts.” In 2009, they conducted a ceremony where four men ‘convicted’ of stealing each had a hand and foot amputated in Mogadishu. While basing in towns, Al-Shabaab conducts public floggings and executions to instill fear. When conducting village killings, the fighters cover their faces. This has been particularly successful in controlling the south of Somalia. Al-Shabaab is careful not to isolate wealthy merchants, such as those who sell khat, a tobacco-like stimulant. It also seeks to painfully murder any spies or government informants. Al-Shabaab assassinated two alleged spies for the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in September 2009. In its latest oppression of women, Al-Shabaab is also inspecting women to ascertain whether they are wearing a bra, a violation of Islam in their opinion. If found guilty, the woman is whipped in public. Overall, the acts of violence have resulted in approximately 1 million displaced persons.

Al-Shabaab seeks to control ports, especially in the South, where the pirates present a lucrative alliance and directly interfere in the distribution of international aid to the 3.2 million needy people in Somalia. The August 2008 battle for the port of Kismayo alone displaced more than 35,000 people and the pending violence there is causing people to flee for the bush. Previously, the violence targeted at the Ethiopian military caused some 400,000 individuals to abandon Mogadishu in late 2006. On Thursday, 16 October, Somali pirates seized the Singaporean MV Kota Wajar in the Indian Ocean, near the Seychelles. Earlier in October, Yemeni officials claimed to have apprehended nine Somali pirates in the Thubab region of Yemen.

They also expel international forces and assistance, including the US humanitarian aid agency CARE, International Medical Corps, and Doctors Without Borders. In January 2009, the United Nations World Food Programme became the next organisation to suspend operations, including the distribution of critical food supplies. In addition, it is suspected that food aid from the United Nations is being diverted to Al-Shabaab, corrupt contractors and even local UN workers.

Guerrilla Warfare
After its confrontations with the Army in 2006, Al-Shabaab has adopted more traditional guerrilla tactics and conducts operations in phases. It uses its regional commanders (see Command and Control Structure) to conduct attacks, often along side of supporting organizations (see Group Affiliations).

Roadside bombs are being used to harass African Union peacekeepers. In particular, Al-Shabaab targeted the Ethiopian Army’s supply lines in western Somalia in 2008.

However, it has engaged in direct conflict with local clan militias, as occurred in August 2008 when Al-Shabaab fought the local forces in a bloody three day battle to take over the southern port of Kismayo, which it held until September 2009 when Hizbul Islam took control. It is also fighting a series of pitched battles against Hizbul Islam. Its new alliance with al-Qaeda will likely create additional result in additional suicide bombers, simultaneous bombings and other al-Qaeda trademark moves.

After it experiences defeat, such as the successful defensive operation by the African Union to protect an armory in Mogadishu in July 2009, Al-Shabaab announces that it will change tactics (see Tactics) to more traditional guerrilla-style suicide bombs and assassinations as they used against Ethiopians in late 2008 and early 2009.

**Recruiting Volunteers from Somalia and Foreign Fighters from Abroad**

Fighters are recruited from inside and outside Somalia. The movement may have between 3000 and 7000 fighters, although the upper limit may include individuals technically belonging to other groups. After a review of all publicly available ranges, the best estimate—including dedicated foreign fighters—puts Al-Shabaab’s strength at approximately 4,000 individuals.

UN Security Council documents estimate foreign fighters to number anywhere from 280 to 300. Fighters from Afghanistan, Eritrea, Pakistan and Yemen are believed to operate in Somalia. Kenya fighters number several hundred, but are not particularly dedicated and frequently defect owing to Al-Shabaab’s strict rules against alcohol, smoking, chewing khat and having extra-marital relations with women. Arab fighters are incorporated with Al-Shabaab units, as well. In one case, 25 Arabs fought with Al-Shabaab members in December 2006.

Al-Shabaab’s initial recruits have been historically heavily scrutinised. At the beginning of the movement, they came from poor and disenfranchised parts of Somalia,
especially in the southern part of the nation. The members of Al-Shabaab are men between 20 and 30 years of age, mostly uneducated, although there have been reports boys as young as 14.

As many as 20 Somali-Americans from ages 17 to 27 have been recruited from Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA and travelled to Somali to train or wage jihad. One such Somali-American, Shirwa Ahmed, completed a suicide mission in October 2008 (see Significant Events). To get US-Somali recruits into Somalia, young men travel alone, routing through various cities to avoid arousing suspicions. The cost of such a ticket, some $2000, is supposed to be financed by the organization or a sympathiser.

Only one known non-Somali and convert from Minneapolis, US, Troy Kastigar, was killed in the field. It is believed that connections at local mosques play a part in the radicalization of these youths and inspire—if not finance—their travel to Somalia. However, it is likely a radical individual, not the Imam or elders, who was most central in the recruitment process.

On 12 October 2009, Kenyan police arrested an American man attempting to enter the Al-Shabaab regions of Somalia.

Technology and Media
Al-Shabaab makes extensive use of the internet and videos to convey its message. In January 2007, it threatened a possible deployment of African Union peacekeepers in its first video posting on its then website, URL unknown. One of its official websites was www.kataalib.net, set-up on 13 April 2007 and removed in January 2009 where the US government ordered the web hosting company to shut it down.

Qaadisiya.com, the Somali language website of the Islamic Courts in 2007, has featured al-Shabaab affiliated videos in the past. For videos connecting al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab, see Group Affiliations.

Al-Shabaab has also used Falluja Islamic Forums, current as of November 2009, to post announcements on construction, aid and other parallel government activities.

Al-Shabaab launched its new media wing—Al-Kataeb—on 27 December 2009. Loosely translated, their announcement read: ‘Al-Kataeb Institute for Media Production will manage all releases exclusively by Al-Shabaab and will cover news of jihad and mujahideen so that it will be a platform to reveal truths to our Muslim brothers all over the world.’ Al-Kataeb announced that
a military parade had been held for graduates from military training on 2 January 2010. Al-Shabaab leaders in attendance were Roobow, Fuad Mohamed Khalef and Dhere.\textsuperscript{cxxvii}

**Divine Approval**

Al-Shabaab may be seeking external religious sanction for its actions. Al-Shabaab is suspected of attempting to obtain a fatwa (religious blessing) in advance of the thwarted Holsworthy army base attack in August 2009 in Australia (see Significant Events).

Yet, its adherence to strict Islam and Sharia is doubtable. It applies Sharia differently based on the inclination or tolerance of the province or city. Also, Al-Shabaab vowed to escalate fighting during the holy month of Ramadan.\textsuperscript{cxxviii} There is an opportunity for more traditional or moderate Muslims in Somalia to delegitimise the movement, as a number of clerics are seeking to do.

**Military Capability:**

With several thousand fighters originating primarily from the powerful Hawiye clan, Al-Shabaab does have a considerable core and ability to continually conduct operations, although it is not as strong as it was under the Islamic Courts.\textsuperscript{cxxix}

Of thousands of possible members, three to eight hundred members create the core of the movement and are especially dedicated to the radical ideology.\textsuperscript{cxxx} Less significant are the people that have been forcefully recruited. Al-Shabaab also relies on international recruitment in the United Kingdom and US, particularly Minneapolis. The movement may have between 3000 and 7000 fighters, although Al-Shabaab’s realistic strength is 4,000 individuals (see Operational Strategy).\textsuperscript{cxxxi}

It is suspected that arms are being shipped through Eritrea.\textsuperscript{cxxxii} Al-Shabaab fighters are equipped with AK-47s and rocket propelled grenades. Landmines, grenade launchers and rockets have all been imported to guerrilla forces in Somalia.\textsuperscript{cxxxiii} They are also being trained to deconstruct various equipments for parts, likely to be reconstructed as bombs and other weapons (see Training). Although Al-Shabaab has weapons, they do not have enough to sustain operations in the long-term without acquiring more from abroad or taking armories by force. They are unable to mount a standing battle against peacekeepers and conventional troops, and must rely on traditional guerrilla warfare.

The next few months will show the impact of joining with al-Qaeda.
Tactics:

Al-Shabaab uses suicide bombers, assassinations, improvised explosive devices, and other guerrilla tactics to conduct its operations.

**Suicide bombers**
The introduction of suicide bombings is seen as very taboo in Somali culture and is very much viewed as an imported tactic. There have been some 12 suicide attacks—not individual attackers—since the tactic was first used in 2006.

On 29 October 2008, a Somali from Minneapolis successfully conducted a suicide attack. As a larger part of this operation, various suicide bombers attacked the UN compound, Ethiopian consulate, presidential palace and two intelligence facilities in Puntland, Somalia. See ‘Significant Events’ for other examples of suicide attacks and plots.

**Assassinations**
Al-Shabaab has claimed responsibility for assassinating many individuals, including: Aisha Ibrahim Dhuholow; Colonel Tobanle; Ibrahim Hasan (government security officer); Abdullahi Jawareer (government official); Brigadier General Ahmed Ali; Sheikh Ibrahim Goonle (Hiiraan Court official); and Colonel Abdi Haji Ahmed, among others. On 9 August 2009, Al-Shabaab assassinated Ali (above) by detonating a landmine in Mogadishu. In addition, Al-Shabaab occasionally beheads individuals accused of spying for the government or being in opposition to their movement.

**Bombings and other attacks**
Al-Shabaab also conducts bombings, attempts to down aircrafts and wages mortar attacks. In June 2009, some six Somali government soldiers and other civilians were killed by a roadside bomb in Mogadishu. Following the US air operation in September 2009 to target terrorists in Somalia, Al-Shabaab ordered its fighters to shoot down any war plane seen over their ‘airspace.

**Shifting Tactics**
Dhere (see Leadership) announced in July 2009 that Al-Shabaab would shift, or rather revert, guerrilla tactics more like those used against the Ethiopia and peacekeepers in late 2008 and early 2009, as those proved effective in causing the foreigners to withdraw. As a result, Somalia has seen a resurgence of suicide bombers—and not conventional attacks on compounds—over the past few months against foreign targets. In addition, one of the few cases of kidnapping of an aid worker has been linked to an Al-Shabaab affiliated Somali businessman.
**Targets:**

Al-Shabaab targets any Western or foreign influences in Somalia. Following the May 2008 attack by US forces that killed Ayro (see Leadership), Al-Shabaab reciprocated by vowing to target all US, Western and UN people and activities, as well as any Somalis working or employed by the US or the UN, and any regional collaborating nations.\(^{cxxxvi}\)

Assassins linked to Al-Shabaab have been responsible for the deaths of a peace activist, foreign journalists and aid workers.\(^{cxxxii}\) In February 2009 (see Timeline), they murdered eleven Burundian African Union peacekeepers and killed a further 15+ in Mogadishu.

Al-Shabaab is keen to target any influence or soldiers of Ethiopia, a historic enemy to some. On 5 February 2008, Al-Shabaab conducted twin bombings in port city of Bossaso, as claimed in an internet posting. The site was chosen because Ethiopian soldiers and families frequent it for entertainment purposes. This was the first attack in the Puntland regions.

They also attack any people or forces affiliated with the Transitional Federal President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke and the national government.

To reach the individuals, Al-Shabaab will target vehicle convoys, administrative buildings, camps and other physical areas.

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**Training:**

Al-Shabaab fighters typically undergo a six week training course, either in a camp or former government building. Fish Trafico, outside Mogadishu, is one such camp that was formerly a police station.\(^{cxxxiii}\)

The camps divide the recruits into small groups, then house and feed the trainees, as well as provide medical treatment.\(^{cxxxiv}\) The men are taught to build strength and endurance through running, crawling and jumping.\(^{cxxxv}\) In particular, they must learn to shoot while running.

Some of the more excellent students go international for additional instruction. Occasionally they are sent to Eritrea for advance training in guerrilla warfare and explosives, including roadside bombings, suicide bombs and car bombs. They are taught to deconstruct or cannibalise weapons systems and other arms for materials.\(^{cxxxvi}\) Their members are trained for special operations, in particular.\(^{cxxxvi}\) Upon returning to Somalia, these foreign-trained Al-Shabaab members impart their new knowledge to the rest of their camp or team.\(^{cxxxvii}\)
Foreigners are brought to the training camps to give weapon instructions. They are typically very educated and have originated in Egypt. One instructor is rumoured to be a white American. Al-Qaeda may be training al-Shabaab members on various weapons and the construction of roadside bombs, as well as making funds available for the purchase of such arms.

Upon successful completion of the course, most men are sent to battle Somali government troops, Ethiopians and African Union peacekeepers in conflict areas. Al-Shabaab members are also sent to fight abroad. In July 2006, Ayro sent 720 hand-picked members to Lebanon to fight the Israelis. By September, only 100 had returned along with five members of Hezbollah (see Group Affiliations).

### 5. Political

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideology:</th>
<th>Religious Extremist;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Affiliations:</strong></td>
<td>Although more of a militant organization, Al-Shabaab could be considered a political party in the unofficial sense, owing to its political aim to govern Somalia and apply Sharia law. It has no direct affiliation to a political party, although groups in opposition to the Transitional Federal Government could be viewed as sympathisers in the more violent areas. It could be telling that organizations seeking political control like the Islamic Courts have sought to distance themselves from the more radical elements of Al-Shabaab in the past. The extent to which Al-Shabaab would enjoy popular support in light of a more stable, central government—if one could be installed—is doubtful.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support Base:</strong></td>
<td>Al-Shabaab is supported by young men drawn to its religious and political messages. As it can apply some level of stability to a town, Al-Shabaab enjoys some support from communities in the south and east of Somalia, although these communities are first loyal to their local clan or subclan, an allegiance Al-Shabaab hopes to supersede. Some communities provide financial support, as well as provide food, water, shelter, clothing and moral support (see Sources of Supply). Any acquiesce or support to Al-Shabaab is rather tenuous. In Kismayo, Al-Shabaab ordered villagers on 30 September 2009 to choose between Hizbul Islam and them, causing many to flee the violence all-together rather than stand and fight. As a result of Al-Shabaab’s poor governance, the citizens of Kismayo...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
prefer Ras Kamboni and Anole of Hizbul Islam who have promised fair government and will permit the humanitarian organisations to operate.^{vi}

Al-Shabaab enjoys support from abroad (see External Support). Possible state supporters may include Eritrea, Iran, Libya, Egypt and a few others in the Gulf region. Somali Foreign Minister Ali Ahmed Jengeli criticised Eritrea on 18 October for inciting the violence and instability in Somalia.^{vii}

There is also financial and volunteer support from individuals in Australia, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the US.

### 6. State Response

**State Response:**

1) As Somalia has lacked a solid central government since 1991 and warlords continue to operate quite extensively, it has been difficult to institute counter-insurgency tactics that have any degree of effectiveness. In March 2010, Somalia’s transitional government signed a peace accord with Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a, a Sufist militia, to jointed combat Al-Shabaab and work toward national reconciliation. In exchange for their support, Ahlu Sunna was given senior military positions and some five ministerial posts. This was an important change as Ahlu Sunna has fought Al-Shabaab for control over central Somalia since December 2008.\(^{vii}\)

In addition, there have been efforts at kinetic and soft responses by states.

**United States**

The US, in particular, has sought to enhance kinetic capabilities to counter Al-Shabaab and any other militants by training and equipping elements of the Somali transitional government and neighbouring nations. However, the US has been very clear, as of March 2010, that is will not directly support, i.e. airlift assistance, the Somali government.

This does not contradict its previous ‘limited military support’ and ‘training’ of forces, as well as helping the African Union acquire ‘non-lethal’ military equipment.\(^{vii}\) In particular, the US is encouraging the Ugandan People’s Defense Force (UPDF) to equip Somali soldiers with small arms and ammunition, while promising to backfill the Ugandan stocks. It has agreed to partially finance Somali soldier training by Kenya, Burundi and Uganda, as well as give logistical support to the African
Union. The United States of America Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa completed its sixth counter terrorism course to train UPDF soldiers on 16 June 2009.

The US has been strengthening its foothold in the region and has signed an agreement with either Ethiopia or Uganda exempting US military operatives from the International Criminal Court in exchange for military assistance, as well as signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). However, an increased American presence could undermine the work done by the African Union and peacekeeping troops.

The US has—confirmed and allegedly—conducted a number of military raids in Somalia previously to locate or kill individuals wanted in the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. It is suspected of a helicopter military raid fired on a car carrying Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, wanted for the 2002 Kenya hotel bombing, 250 miles south of Mogadishu, killing him and inciting Al-Shabaab to vow revenge, in September 2009. In particular, US air strikes targeting Al-Shabaab areas have increased the support for the group and rallied cries against America.

Following accusations of assistance to rebels, Eritrea may be in danger of UN sanctions, as strongly advocated by the US and African Union.

In a show of soft power, the US provided $74 million in FY 2008 in humanitarian assistance to Somalia. FY2009 figures are not yet available. In a diplomatic measure, former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice officially designated al-Shabaab a Foreign Terrorist Organization on 26 February 2008.

**Australia, Britain and Canada**

Australia listed Al-Shabaab as a terrorist organization in August 2009, five weeks after arresting five Australian men, allegedly Al-Shabaab, planning to conduct a suicide attack on the Holsworthy army base in Sydney. Australia is preparing its police force to deal with threats from Al-Shabaab on its homeland.

In March 2010, the United Kingdom and Canada also announced plans to list Al-Shabaab as a foreign terrorist entity and ban any of its operations in their borders.

**Other Foreign Intervention**

In February 2007, the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) deployed with an authorised force of 8,000 peacekeepers from Uganda and Burundi; only 5,500 are in place. It is headquartered in Mogadishu and operates in central and southern Somalia. Its mission is to conduct a Peace Support Operation in Somalia to stabilise the security situation, including the take over
from Ethiopian Forces, and to create a safe and secure environment in preparation for the transition to the UN.” AMISOM is reportedly becoming more offensive instead of strictly defensive as the attacks by Al-Shabaab continue. Somali President Sharif has requested additional troops from Uganda, Sudan, Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia and other nations. The United Nations may soon take over the mission.

### 7. Assessment

**Significant Events:**

1. **November 2001** – Aweys named as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist by the US Department of State for his role in the ‘Black Hawk Down’ incident in 1993 (see Leadership)

2. **Late 2006** – guerrilla operations including suicide bombings, gun violence and assassinations occur primarily in Mogadishu

3. **December 2006** – Somali-Kenyan border closed following a retreat by jihadi fighters from Mogadishu and Kismayo into the swamps at Ras Kamboni, all in Somalia

4. **December 2006** – Ethiopia launches an offensive to unseat the Islamic Courts and force a regime change

5. **6 December 2006** – United Nations Security Council passes Resolution 1725 that authorises the deployment of IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM)

6. **28 December 2006** – Ethiopian and Somali forces capture Mogadishu from insurgents

7. **January 2007** – Last stronghold of the militants in Kismayo is abandoned

8. **19 January 2007** – Qaadisiya.com hosts video describing the transformation of the Islamic Courts Union into a resistance movement

9. **30 January 2007** – Al-Shabaab warns that it will kill any peacekeepers deployed in Somalia in a videotape posted on its official website. This is the first use of video messaging on the internet by Al-Shabaab.

10. **February 2007** – African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) deploys with an authorised force of 8,000 peacekeepers from Uganda and Burundi. It is headquartered in Mogadishu and operates in central and southern Somalia.

11. **March 2007** – Worst fighting between peacekeepers/government forces and insurgents in 15 years, according to the International Committee of the
July 2007 – Peace talks in Mogadishu are shelled by mortars. Islamic insurgents do not participate in the talks.

August 2007 – fighting between Ethiopian forces and Al-Shabaab causes 400,000 people to flee Mogadishu

5 February 2008 – Al-Shabaab announces twin bombings in port city of Bossaso in an internet posting. This was the first attack in the Puntland regions, resulting in some 20 deaths and 70 injured persons.

26 February 2008 - US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice officially designated al-Shabaab a Foreign Terrorist Organization

March 2008 - Three Norwegian-Somalis were charged with sending money to Al-Shabaab; US launches missile strike in Dhole, targeting suspected al-Qaeda operative implicated in the 2002 Kenya Hotel bombing.

1 May 2008 – US aircraft killed Ayro (see Leadership) in Dusamareb, Somalia; Al-Shabaab vows revenge on US and any other Western or West-affiliated targets.

June 2008 – ceasefire pact signed by government and opposition Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia, which is rejected by Aweys.

July 2008 – Osman Ali Ahmed, head of UN Development Programme, is killed in Mogadishu by gunmen

20-22 August 2008 – Al-Shabaab fights local clan militias in a bloody three day battle to take Kismayo port in southern Somalia

29 October 2008 – five suicide bombers attacked the UN compound in Somaliland, Ethiopian consulate, presidential palace and two intelligence facilities in Puntland, Somalia. One suicide bomber was Shirwa Ahmed from Minnesota, USA.

December 2008 – Ethiopia announces it will withdraw all troops by the end of the month

January 2009 – Ethiopia troops withdrawal from Somalia, eliminating a primary cause for the existence of Al-Shabaab; clan militias begin opposing Al-Shabaab; Al-Shabaab takes control of Baidoa; Al-Shabaab was considered the most credible threat to the inauguration of US President Barack Obama

28 January 2009 – Al-Shabaab suicide attack kill some 13 African Union peacekeepers in Mogadishu
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30 January 2009</td>
<td>Somalia’s parliament elects Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, a moderate Islamist, president for a two year term</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 February 2009</td>
<td>Said Tahlil Ahmed, director of Horn Afrik radio, is killed in Bakara market by militants</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 February 2009</td>
<td>Sufi clerics in Somalia declare support for unity government and President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 February 2009</td>
<td>Some 300 clerics and clan elders called for AMISOM to depart Somalia within 120 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 February 2009</td>
<td>11 Burundian African Union peacekeepers are murdered and a further 15+ people killed in Mogadishu in a joint Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2009</td>
<td>Osama bin Laden releases video calling on Al-Shabaab to fight on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 May 2009</td>
<td>Al-Shabaab begin ‘final’ assault on Mogadishu, assisted by Hizbul Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 May 2009</td>
<td>Godane was seriously wounded in an explosion at a Mogadishu safe house in May 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2009</td>
<td>Suicide bombing at hotel in Beledweyne, north of Mogadishu, kills Somalia’s security minister and some 20 other people; state of emergency declared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ahmist renewed cries for assistance from neighbouring nations; Ethiopia threatens to intervene; estimates place 4 million, or a third of the population, in need of food assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 June 2009</td>
<td>The United States of America Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa completed its sixth counter terrorism course to train UPDF soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2009</td>
<td>Dhere announced Al-Shabaab will revert to more traditional guerrilla tactics against the pro-government forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 July 2009</td>
<td>Insurgents shell presidential palace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent Activities: 1)</td>
<td>4 August 2009 – Five Melbourne members of Al-Shabaab are arrested in Sydney for an imminent suicide plot to attack the Holsworthy army base with automatic weapons. The militants may have obtained a fatwa for the attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 August 2009 – Two pilots and four aid workers are released after being abducted in November 2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
20 August 2009 – Government forces retake town of Bulo Burde in the Hiran region in central Somalia, formerly under the control of Al-Shabaab fighters.


17 September 2009 – Al-Shabaab suicide bombers attack African Union base in Mogadishu and killed 21 people, including the deputy African Union commander and 16 other peacekeepers. It is suspected that a Somali-American, from Seattle USA, was one of the suicide bombers.

20 September 2009 – Al-Shabaab releases 48-minute video ‘Labayka Ya Usama (Here I am at Your Service, Usama)’ that is available on a host of jihadi websites. It builds on the March 2009 video (see above), criticising the president and religious scholars who are not aligned with the movement.

24 September 2009 – Betin Kaziu, Brooklyn USA resident, indicted on conspiracy to commit murder abroad and support foreign terrorists charges by the US. He intended to join Al-Shabaab and was en route to Somalia when arrested in Kosovo after routing through Cairo. He also planned to train in Pakistan and fight US troops in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans.

26 September 2009 - Hizbul Islam’s Ras Kamboni Brigade and Anole (see Group Affiliations) forced Al-Shabaab guerrillas to peacefully transfer control over Kismayo to their forces.

30 September 2009 – Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam war over Kismayo.

7 October 2009 – Hizbul Islam calls ceasefire over hostilities with Al-Shabaab.

November 2009 – Al-Shabaab announces construction of new bridge in the Lower Shabele.

20 December 2009 – Al-Shabaab takes control of Afmadoow from Hizbul Isami.

Late December 2009 - Al-Shabaab seizes control of Jolla, Guay, Mtaua and Ras Kambouni. They also gained the cities of Batouli and Kolbiyo, near the Kenyan border.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27 December 2009</td>
<td>Al-Shabaab launched its new media wing—Al-Kataeb Institute for Media Production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 January 2010</td>
<td>a man with alleged ties to Al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda broke into Danish cartoonist’s house and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>attempted to murder him clxxvi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 January 2010</td>
<td>Al-Kataeb announced that a military parade had been held for graduates from military training.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Projected Activities:**

1. Al-Shabaab is most certainly a threat to the region and nations far from its homeland. Currently, it is serving as a terrorist’s best case scenario – a porous nation with support from other extreme organizations like al-Qaeda, a solid base from which to recruit, ample funding and the ability to exercise control over large portions of Somalia. Al-Shabaab is in an incredibly strategic position in Africa for the moment, especially if piracy and other lucrative illegal enterprises are allowed to continue operating. Although Al-Shabaab is not connected to major international crime rings and drug trafficking, they are running in the same leagues as many of the major financial brokers on the continent and maritime borders. However, a number of factors will determine its growth and sustainability.

**Future Support**

The future amount of popular support is debatable. Early 2009 estimates believed that the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Somalia would erode the movement’s popular support, especially as civilian causalities continue.

Clan militias and clerics began to actively oppose Al-Shabaab in January 2009, expelling the group from Galgadud in central Somalia.clxxvii Sufi clerics are encouraging individuals to support the government and rebuild the nation. clxxviii If they were to issue fatwas, a religious ruling, against Al-Shabaab it could have significant impact on the level of support offered by the population.clxxx

Further, the International Crisis Group has reported the mobilization of orthodox Sunni Muslims in Somalia to repel Al-Shabaab.clxxx This said, many Somalis are particularly weary of UN, AU and foreign intervention and are open to the ‘nationalist’ extremist activity if it can provide peace and security. clxxxi It is essential that a central government demonstrate its ability to bring peace to Somalia and provide civil services to its provinces without the direct intervention of Western nations.

**Future Relationship with al-Qaeda**

In 2008, analysts believed that Shabaab’s ties to al-Qaeda were weak, but this has changed in the past year with new violence and pledges of allegiance to the global...
terror network. In particular, there is very real concern that Somalia’s borders and relatively accessible 3,000 kilometre coastline will harbour and facilitate radical groups seeking to exert influence over the region. However, al-Qaeda’s verbal level of support—even videos—have yet to translate into tangible assistance.

Internal Divisions and Rival Organisations
Al-Shabaab is internally divided between various clans and organisers with differing ideologies and agendas. While in some areas it is practical to strictly apply Sharia law, in other towns that is not feasible as it would alienate too much of the population. Kismayo is ruled under exacting Sharia law, whereas Baidoa is more relaxed. As of December 2008, Al-Shabaab permitted girls to attend school. It is also environmentally conscious and forbids the burning of charcoal. Al-Shabaab appears to be learning that it must measurably apply Sharia law to the population it is governing, or risk serious opposition. In addition, by properly engaging the town, it is seeking to win popular support of the clans, leaders and civilians, thus giving Al-Shabaab an informal political objective.

Al-Shabaab frequently argues with Hizbul Islam and other groups assisting it. As of 30 September 2009, it is engaged in an all out war with Hizbul Islam, a group that formally wanted to merge with Al-Shabaab, over control of Kismayo. In October 2009, there were reliable rumours that former members of the insurgent group Hizbul Islam have joined the national government of Somalia and declared their allegiance to the state security forces.

Future Weapons Technologies and Tactics
Al-Shabaab’s weapons are becoming more sophisticated, like their use of roadside bombs, indicating increased access to training and the desire to evolve their tactics. As they push to be more internationally affiliated, there may be the opportunity to acquire new technologies. Given its effectiveness and no shortage of volunteers, suicide attacks are likely to continue and escalate when Al-Shabaab mounts specific campaigns against the Somali government and any peacekeeping forces, as it has recently declared.

Projected Government Actions
Given the movement’s breadth and depth, coupled with an instable Somalia, it seems unlikely that the government or a UN force will be able to eliminate it in any decisive battles. Instead, it is more probable that a traditional policy of isolating the fighters from the population will be coupled with a long counter-insurgency campaign. To subvert some of the root causes that led to
the development of Al-Shabaab, future governments should look to better include minority Islamic parties and perhaps apply Sharia law in certain districts. In particular, the counter-insurgency campaign must address the superior communications strategy and video technology of Al-Shabaab. The deep split between Hizbul Islam and Al-Shabaab gives the Somali government and international community a real opportunity to further splinter support for Al-Shabaab, should they capitalise on this development.

In particular, the international community should pay keen attention in the future to who controls Mogadishu, how much support the diaspora and business communities are providing and the negotiations with the Somali government.

If Al-Shabaab wishes to sustain its movement, it is likely to further provoke and compel the US, government of Somalia and Ethiopia to further intervene. It has also indicated that it could expand attacks to nations, like Uganda, who might support peacekeeping interventions into Somalia.

The US also believes that Al-Shabaab is expanding its operations. According to FBI Director Robert Mueller, there is some intelligence that Al-Shabaab leaders would like to undertake operations outside of Somalia, possibly in the US. Mueller is also concerned that any Americans travelling to Somalia to learn terrorist tactics will be able to freely reenter the US.

**Future Leadership**

Amidst internal divisions and rivalries, Al-Shabaab’s leadership and command structure are likely to survive. Thankfully for their organization, Al-Shabaab does not rely on one figure-head to rally supporters and decide operations. The Shura Council, led by the emir, has proven its ability to transition authority from one individual to another three times. With the questionable health of Godane (see Leadership), a number of individuals could be likely choices as emir.

Roobow, a former emir of Al-Shabaab, is a highly visible member and out-spoken supporter of the alliance with al-Qaeda. Another possibility is Aweys, should the split with Hizbul Islam resolve itself. Should Hizbul Islam succeed in marginalizing or defeating Al-Shabaab in the event of a large-scale battle, Aweys may emerge as the leader of all radical Islamic opposition groups in Somalia. Internal candidates aside, Al-Shabaab derives strength and sustainability from the foreign fighters that have joined its rank, often in senior positions or advisory roles.
Reference:

i ‘Washington’s Self-Defeating Somalia Policy’, Matt Bryden, CSIS Policy Forum

ii ‘Designation of al-Shabaab as a Foreign Terrorist Organization’, US Department of State, 26 February 2008

iii ‘Al-Shabaab’, CFR Backgrounder, 27 February 2009

iv ‘Diplomats stress need for all-inclusive talks on the future of Somalia’, USA Today, 9 February 2009

v ‘Designation of al-Shabaab as a Foreign Terrorist Organization’, US Department of State, 26 February 2008


viii ‘At least 75 killed in fighting in Somali capital’, CNN, 13 March 2010

ix ‘Somali Opposition Movement Al-Shabaab Controls The Southern Regions’, Iraq Al-Islam, 27 December 2009


xv ‘Recruited for Jihad?’ Newsweek, 24 January 2009


xviii ‘Al-Shabaab vows deadlier war tactics’, Daily Nation, 1 October 2009


xx ‘Somali group seeks US raid revenge’, Al Jazeera.net, 16 September 2009


xxiii ‘Terrorutpekad till Göteborg’, Göteborgs-Posten, 2 July 2009


xxviii ‘The rise of the Shabab’, The Economist, 18 December 2008
xlv ‘Country Reports on Terrorism 2008’, US Department of State, April 2009
xlvii ‘Somali group seeks US raid revenge’, Al Jazeera.net, 16 September 2009; ‘Extremist Splinter Group of Somali Islamic Courts Formed’, The Somaliland Times, 12 August 2006
lii ‘Washington’s Self-Defeating Somalia Policy’, Matt Bryden, CSIS Policy Forum
liii ‘Extremist Splinter Group of Somali Islamic Courts Formed’, The Somaliland Times, 12 August 2006

Last Updated: 18 March 2010

iv ‘More on the announcement of merger of Shabaab and the Ras Kamboni Brigade’, *The Long War Journal*, 1 February 2010


lxii ‘Eritrea’s entry changes face of Somalia conflict’, *The Ugandan Independent*, 21 July 2009


lxviii ‘Shabaab reaches out to al Qaeda senior leaders, announces death al Sudani’, *The Long War Journal*, 2 September 2008


lxvi ‘Yemen Airstrike Hits Al-Qaeda Camp’, *The Long War Journal*, 14 March 2010


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