The Incident

After a string of raids in Aceh Besar regency, which resulted in the arrest of around 22 suspected terrorists,¹ Indonesian police marked another success with the killing of Dulmatin, one of the most wanted terrorists in Southeast Asia. This operation is believed to have been done after a tip off received from those arrested in the previous raids in Aceh Besar regency.² The raid in Pamulang area killed three men with one of them believed to be Dulmatin.

¹ “Terrorist aim to set up base in Aceh: Governor,” The Jakarta Post, 9 March 2010.
The killing of Dulmatin in the police raid was formally announced by Indonesian police at a press conference on 10 March 2010. The raids on 9 March 2010 were concentrated in two places located within closed proximity of each other. They are an internet kiosk (Multiplus internet kiosk) at Siliwangi Street, and a house at Gang Asem – in a small alley in the Pamulang area, near Setiabudi Street.

At 11.00 am, Dulmatin arrived at the internet kiosk. Approximately five minutes later, a man, believed to be Dulmatin, left the internet kiosk and opened fire on the police squad waiting outside. He was killed in the exchange. Police recovered one revolver with 12 bullets from him. Later at 12.00pm, police raided another house - believed to be the safe house of the suspected terrorist group – and killed another two suspected terrorists after an exchange of gunfire. The initials of the two suspects are R and H. The police also arrest another two men, BR alias AH and SB alias I. At the second raid police confiscated a laptop, CD, books on jihad and two plastic bags. Another suspect who is still at large is Dr. Fauzi, the owner of house where the

6 Ibid.
second raid took place; and is a suspected safe house. Dr. Fauzi reportedly met Dulmatin during the 1999-2000 religious conflict in Ambon, where Dr. Fauzi is believed to have been part of a volunteer medical team.

A police officer in a blast suit examines the body of an alleged terrorist killed during a raid on a narrow alley in a residential area in Pamulang, South Jakarta. (courtesy: Jakarta Post/J. Adiguna)

Who is Dulmatin?

The body of the man believed to be Dulmatin (courtesy: Metro TV)
Dulmatin was a close associate of Hambali and Dr Azahari. He rose to a senior leadership in JI after the capture of Hambali. He was considered as the most dangerous local terrorist after Dr. Azahari Hussin. He is believed to have excelled in making firing devices needed to detonate a bomb.

Dulmatin is the fourth of five children of Usman and Masniati. He was raised by his grandfather Haji Sofi after his father passed away. Dulmatin excelled in mathematics and electronics in Junior High. His academic achievements continued throughout high school. Dulmatin wanted to study chemical engineering at Bandung’s Institute of Technology or Gajah Mada University but failed their entrance tests. He left for Malaysia where he found a job working in an electronics factory.

He is also known to have attended a militant training camp in Afghanistan and returned to Indonesia in the 1990s. In 1995 he returned home to Pemalang to begin life as a car trader and farmer. A year later he married his cousin Istiadah. He requested the religious office in Comal to put his name in the marriage certificate as Asmar Usman (using his late father’s family name). According to family sources, Dulmatin went to Solo often to see Ustad Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and to Lamongan possibly to meet with Ustad Zakaria. Ba’asyir is head of the Al Mukmin Islamic Boarding School in Ngruki, and was in police custody on charges of masterminding a number of bombings. Zakaria is chief of the Al-Islam Islamic Boarding School in Lamongan.

Whenever Dulmatin left home, his whereabouts were unknown to his family members. Ali Imron claimed that Dulmatin fought in the Ambon and Poso conflicts in 1998. Family members noted that since his return from Malaysia, Dulmatin practiced a strict interpretation of Islam. He got angry when he saw women without headscarves and forbade his family from watching television except news broadcasts.

Dulmatin went to Mindanao soon after the August 2003 bombing of the JW Marriot in Jakarta, Indonesia. There he became one of the four top JI leaders, including Omar Patek, Zulkifli bin Hir and possibly Abdul Rahman Ayub. They trained JI members and the Abu Sayyaf Group in demolitions, explosives and bomb-making, allegedly in Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) training camps.

Dulmatin was wanted by the Indonesian police for the 2002 Bali Bombings which killed 202 people, mostly foreigners. Dulmatin and Dr. Azahari assembled the bomb. One of those arrested was Ali Imron who implicated Dulmatin when he was interrogated by the police in February.

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8 It is likely that the family practised the local custom of using a single name as referred to in news reports.
9 The Genius from Comal, Tempo, Special Report, October 14 - 20, 2003
10 Bali Bombing: The ‘Servant of Allah’ Mystery, Tempo, December 24 - 30, 2002
2003. Shortly after the October 2005 Bali bombings, the US offered a USD 10 million reward for his capture.\textsuperscript{11} The amount was equal to the amount that US paid Thailand for its role in the arrest of Hambali in 2003. The Philippines initially thought that Dulmatin was killed by the military when it conducted air strikes on a suspected meeting between the ASG and the JI in January 2005. However, the Indonesian Police later confirmed that Dulmatin was not among the casualties.

On 16 January 2007, the Philippine military reported that Dulmatin was wounded in an army commando raid in Jolo, Sulu.\textsuperscript{12} The raid resulted in the death of ASG leader Jainal Antel Sali Jr. alias Abu Solaiman. On 11 May 2007, Philippine military forces conducted operations on a safe house located in Simunul Island in Tawi-Tawi where Dulmatin was believed to be hiding but he managed to elude capture and instead the military found Dulmatin’s four young children, aged between two to nine years old.\textsuperscript{13} The children were subsequently turned over to the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). Dulmatin’s wife has appealed to the Philippine government to release the children to her in Indonesia.\textsuperscript{14} There was little development on the Philippines authorities’ efforts on locating Dulmatin, officials claimed that the last they heard about his whereabouts was sometime in late 2009.\textsuperscript{15}

**Impact Analysis**

Dulmatin reportedly returned to Indonesia from the Philippines, with other JI members by end 2009. In May 2008, some Indonesian JI members were reportedly using the illegal routes which connecting southern Philippines with other Indonesian islands such as Sulawesi and Kalimantan, to come back to Indonesia. Dulmatin might have been part of that cluster though others believed that he came back to Indonesia later than that. These JI cadres are said to be well trained and skilled and are “on-call” for deployment at any time.

Given the length of time that he has probably spent in Indonesia and the number of JI cadres with their ‘ready-to-sacrifice’ attitude, it is likely that Dulmatin has had sufficient time to pass his knowledge on weaponry and bomb making to other members. As reported before, Dr. Azahari Husin passed on his knowledge in bomb making within a month. For instance, Gempur Budi Angkoro alias Jabir, a Ngruki graduate and cousin of the legendary Faturrahman al-Ghozi, the JI operative and Hambali associate killed in the Philippines in 2003. He had stayed with Dr.

\textsuperscript{12} “Philippine military says top terror suspect wounded in raid which killed terror group leader”, Fox News, 25 January 2007, [http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,246840,00.html](http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,246840,00.html)
Azahari from mid June until 5 July 2004 and later became an important member of Noordin’s inner circle, reportedly helping recruit the Bali II suicide bomber. Jabir was one of the two killed in the April 2006 raid in Wonosobo.\textsuperscript{16}

The individuals taken in the Pamulang raid are believed to have supported the Aceh military training through providing funds for the purchase of weapons. This confirms that the militant network is still capable of supporting violent terrorism.

There is no doubt that the killing of Dulmatin is another blow to the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah. However, while the group has had its operational capacity substantially reduced fact remains that the radicalization and terrorist recruitment is still taking place. The success of the raids should be applauded, but this does not mean the work is completed. The Indonesian government has to create a more comprehensive strategy to address the radicalization that has been taking place. Otherwise the JI and related networks can replenish their lost leaders.

\textit{Report compiled by Fatima Astuti}
\textit{Research Analyst, ICPVTR}
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