BOMBING OF JW MARRIOT AND RITZ CARLTON, JAKARTA

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Contents

Acknowledgements

Part I

JW Marriott and Ritz Carlton

Chronology of Events

Security Measures of the JW Marriott and the Ritz Carlton

Attack Target

Impact

Attack Investigation and Possible Suspects

Lessons and Way Forward

Part II

Further Information about the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies

Further Information about the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research
Acknowledgements

THE PRICE OF PEACE IS ETERNAL VIGILANCE

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JW Marriott and the Ritz Carlton

The bombings on 17 July 2009 at the JW Marriott and the Ritz Carlton Jakarta shook both members in the security and intelligence community and the hotel industry. The attacks collectively reaffirm the undeniable threat that Southeast Asia faces with terrorist and extremist groups within the Southeast Asian region. All terrorist attacks are an intelligence failure. The twin attacks draw attention to the intelligence failure that culminated in the attack. After a hiatus of four years, the recent attacks in Jakarta highlight the resonating threat posed by Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)\(^1\) and its affiliates in Indonesia and the region.

JI aims to establish an Islamic state (Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara) that includes Indonesia, Malaysia, southern Philippines, Singapore and Brunei. All JI’s top leaders and many of the men involved in JI bombings in the past had trained in Afghanistan over a ten-year period between 1985-1995. The jihad in Afghanistan had a huge influence in shaping their worldview, reinforcing their commitment to jihad, and providing them with terrorist and guerilla training.

New leaders had since taken over but their commitment to jihadism has been steadfast. JI possesses the ability to remain resilient and has shown the ability to have the necessary foresight to withstand the test of time. Sustained by a backbone of steadily reinforced ideological underpinnings and operationally ready with technical capacity to conduct attacks, JI and the more dangerous faction led by Noordin Mohamed Top posed a significant threat to regional peace and stability. Covert JI operational cells remain undetected. Even with the demise of Noordin M. Top, their ability to rest, recover and strike back are evident. On 17 July, the perpetrators had managed to circumvent the intelligence and security architecture of the hotel and carry out its planned attacks on both the JW Marriott and the Ritz Carlton.

This report will briefly explore the following:

1. The 2003 attack against the JW Marriott and the security measures put in place;
2. Shed light on the chronology of events that led to the attacks on 17 July 2009;
3. Seek to understand security measures that were in place at the JW Marriott and the Ritz Carlton;
4. Evaluate the potential attack target and tactic use;

\(^1\) JI has its roots in Darul Islam (DI), an organization that has existed since the 1940s. It was an anti-colonial movement that became a political opponent of the Indonesian government after the colonial period. The prominent founders of JI, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and the late Abdullah Sungkar, were inducted into DI in 1976. They were members of DI until 1993 when they broke away to form JI.
5. Explore the impact of the attack on the community;

6. Briefly analyze the operations against the perpetrators of the attack and

7. Draw preliminary lessons from the attack

This preliminary report thereby seeks to understand and explore the lapses that led to the attack and the lessons that can be learned from this tragedy. Against an elusive enemy eternal vigilance is key.

**History of Attacks in Jakarta**

The security, intelligence and law enforcement community had learned lessons from the attacks in the past. Although there were lessons drawn from the attack on the JW Marriott in 2003, there was a noticeable lapse in the time and speed that intelligence and law enforcement officials had taken to react to the aftermath of the operations in Cilacap in July 2009. The hotel security infrastructure in Jakarta was given a rude awakening with the Marriott attacks in 2003.

It is important to understand the nature of 2003 attack on the JW Marriott. Through the lenses of the attacks of the past and in particular the attack on the JW Marriot in 2003, the security lapses in the 2009 bombings of both the JW Marriott and the Ritz Carlton and the potential intelligence failure of the security agencies come to the foreground.

The JW Marriott Hotel opened in November of 2001, not long after the attacks against the United States. Marriott International had a robust security program in place which included tiered “threat conditions” that were colour coded. Each level had specific procedures for the hotels to follow. When the JW Marriott in Jakarta opened, it opened at “threat condition red” – the highest level. Included in the procedures at that level were metal detector screening of everyone coming into the building, all luggages and all vehicles were to be inspected. The JW Marriott was attacked for the first time on 5 August 2003. A powerful car bomb exploded in front of JW Marriott. Twelve persons were killed and 149 others were wounded in the attack. Although significant, many others would have been killed or injured if not for the procedure already in place to inspect vehicles. The truck would have made its way into the front lobby of the hotel, wreaking certain devastation. Instead, three security officers stopped the Kijang as it entered the driveway. Those security officers lost their lives as a result. Suicide bomber Asmar Latin Sani had driven the explosive laden car into the commercial district of Kuningan before detonating it at the hotel during the peak lunch hour.

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According to findings from the security and intelligence community the JW Marriott was chosen as a target for its western affiliations and its accessible location. The Kuningan area is frequented by the expatriate community and Indonesia’s elite. The JW Marriott is situated in Kuningan the golden triangle of business in Jakarta. Moreover, the hotel is within close proximity of the Embassies of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden.

The attack in 2003 was both a well-planned and a highly coordinated suicide attack. The bomb used in the attack consisted of 150kg of explosives packed in three containers, along with four jerry cans filled with a mixture of petrol and kerosene. The composition of the explosives was similar to those utilised during the first Bali Bombing on 12 October 2002. The explosive compound was made up of both low grade and high grade explosives, such as black powder, Trinitrotoluene (TNT) and potassium chloride. 3

The mixture of petrol and kerosene was meant, to start a fire ball of fury when the bomb was ignited. Like the bombing in Bali in 2002, the bomb at the JW Marriott in 2003 was detonated by a mobile phone. An Ericsson T-10 cell phone was recovered from the scene. To prevent instant identification and the tracing of sources, the bombers had tried to erase serial numbers on the vehicle’s engine and chassis, similar to the 2002 Bali bombings. However, investigations reveal that the Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) used was a blue Kijang - a 1986 make with license registration number B 7462 ZN, chassis number 5 KO134591 and engine number KF50000478.4

There were no arrests made until 2005, when the police in Poso arrested three suspects. SR alias Adi of Banyuwangi, East Java; SP alias Iful of Cilacap, Central Java; and Sep alias Hamman of Ponorogo, East Java were arrested by a joint police team in Pandanjaya village, South Pamona sub district.5 The 2003 attack was planned after Noordin Top, a key figure in JI, was informed of a stock of leftover explosives from JI’s December 2000 Christmas Eve bombing by Toni Togar.

This is an important finding because:

1. It reflects the professional or advance bomb making knowledge of members of JI;
2. JI’s access to bomb making resources; and
3. The internal networks and links amongst departments or sub-sections within JI.6

Evidently, the immediate impact was the number of lives lost and the damage to buildings. However, in the long run, JI internal networks and its links to affiliate groups or individuals

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3 “Bomb Carnage linked to Bali,” Australian Morning Herald, 6 August 2003.
5 “Three Marriott Hotel Bombing Suspects Arrested in C Sulawesi”, Antara, 3 May 2005
would come to remain a far greater challenge. The July 2009 bombings of the JW Marriott and the Ritz Carlton are testament to that very challenge.

The 2003 bombing at the JW Marriott displayed JI’s ability to move resources, plan and execute operations even amongst loose departments or cells within the group or factions outside the JI administration. Investigations revealed that Asmar Latin Sani was a recruit of Laskhar Khos or Special unit. This special unit within the JI included sections that comprised of suicide bombers. Since 2003, they had been believed to have been gearing up for more attacks. The 2009 bombings of the hotels is a reflection of this continued threat.

The attacks in 2003 also showed that the operational team members were recruited based on personal ties and geographical needs. While, Noordin Top relied on personal networks to carry out plans, his choice of personnel reflects a geographical dimension. This was also a telltale sign that JI had cells operating from different provinces in Indonesia and alluded to the wide reach that Noordin Top possessed.

Unlike the twin bombings in July 2009, the police were reported to have received warnings that JI would be staging a major attack weeks before the bombing. Suyono alias Abu Farouk Al-Syukur, the head of Lampung Wakalah, along with Mustofo, commander of the JI’s suicide branch at Kaliabang, Bekasi, were arrested by the police in early July 2003. Mustofo’s arrest played a significant role in investigations prior to the attack because he was believed to have stockpiled and supplied explosives to both the perpetrators of the Bali and the 2003 JW Marriott bombing. Through police interrogation Mustofa revealed that he was a suicide brigade trainer with the Khos Militia and had issued a bomb threat to the police. Unfortunately, the police failed to notify the business community about the threats.

In response to Mustofa’s warning, two days before the Marriott attack in 2003, the police were busy searching the Bank Mandiri building on Jalan Gatot Subroto, Jakarta following a report that there would be an explosion. They found nothing. Moreover, acting on an intelligence report, the police raided several places in the North Jakarta business district but found nothing that suggested a bombing would take place. Just before the blast at the JW Marriott Hotel, the police got hold of a mobile phone coded text message that read, “I have graduated from a master’s program and I want to marry soon.” Essentially, what the message really meant was that the bomb was ready go off.

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The operational team behind the bombing were as follows:

1. Noordin Top
2. Dr. Azhari Hussein;
3. Indrawarman alias Toni Togar;
4. Mohammed Rais;
5. Asmar Latin Sani;
6. Ismail alias Mohamed Ikhwan;
7. Sardona Siliwangi;
8. Masrizal Bin Ali Umar alias Tohir;
9. Mohamed Ihsan alias Jhoni Hendrawan alias Idris

The following observations were made during the investigations:

1. The car bomb was a blue Kijang minivan and its registration number was B7462ZN
2. The bomb contain a mixture of black powder, TNT, potassium chloride, petrol and kerosene;
3. The bomb was detonated by a mobile phone;
4. The list of casualties included four Silver Bird taxi drivers, three Marriott Hotel security guards, Hans Winkel Mollen (Dutch national) and a chauffeur.

The events leading to the Marriott bombing were serendipitous in nature. Indrawarman alias Toni Togar had informed Noordin Top of a stockpile of explosives. The explosives were leftovers from the JI’s previous suicide bomb attacks on 24 December 2000. Plans to utilise the ‘leftovers’ thus took form. Asmar Latin Sani who was recruited from JI’s suicide unit, was the designated suicide bomber for the operation. Several locations were considered, the Jakarta and Australian International Schools and Citibank before the bombers had decided on the JW Marriott. Likewise surveillance of the JW Marriott and the Ritz Carlton were conducted for the 2009 attacks.

Mohammed Rais was arrested and received a sentence of seven years imprisonment on May 2004 for his role in the 2003 bombing. Mohammed Rais, the brother-in-law of Noordin Mohammad Top and was convicted for his role in the transportation of explosive chemicals. Muhammad Ikhsan alias Idris alias Doni Hendrawan was also arrested and brought to trial on July 2004. In 2005, the Poso police department apprehended SR alias Adi of Banyuwangi, East Java; SP alias Iful of Cilacap, Central Java; and Sep alias Hamman of Ponorogo, East Java, all of whom were linked to the 2003 JW Marriott attacks. Dr. Azahari Hussein died in a police operation at his hideout in an East Java town of Batu on 9 November 2005. Noordin Top, one of the perpetrators of the 2003 attack on the JW Marriott was on the run. The Indonesian police conducted several raids after the 2002 Bali bombings and the 2003 JW Marriott bombings. Despite concerted efforts to apprehend him, Noordin Top remained at large. The events that were to unfold after the twin bombings of JW Marriott and the Ritz Carlton on July 2009 were going to bring an end to the prolonged manhunt. The Marriott Bombing in 2003 served as a harsh reminder that loose cells operating out of the main JI administrative are capable of staging attacks.
Chronology of Events

The morning of 17 July 2009, the four year hiatus from bombings in Indonesia came to an end. Two simultaneous bombings occurred in the Mega Kuningan District. The first blast occurred at 7.47am at the lobby lounge of the JW Marriott and the second blast occurred at 7.57am at the Airlangga restaurant in the Ritz Carlton. The two hotels are located within close proximity of each other and are connected by a tunnel.

The explosions left around 55 people injured and 9 killed. Among those identified killed were 1 New Zealander, 3 Australians, 2 Dutch and 1 Indonesian. The authorities were also able to recover the body parts of two suicide bombers. The injured people were sent to three different hospitals: MMC Hospital, Police Hospital (RSPP), and Medistra Hospital.

As of 18 July 2009, 55 were injured including 16 foreigners (6 U.S., 1 Australian, 2 Dutch, 2 Canadian, 1 Indian, 2 South Korea, 1 New Zealand, and 1 Norwegian). 8

Chronology of Events at the JW Marriott

On 10 July 2009, a call made by an unidentified man who requested a room reservation from 15 July to 17 July 2009. The man who made the call has since been identified as Amir Ibrahim alias Amir Abdullah. Police spokesperson Irjen Wahyono acknowledged that the arrest of Abdullah was a nodal point in the investigations and assisted tremendously to break the case. Abdullah had informed police not only of his counterpart Ahmed Ferry who had travelled to Solo to pick up a minivan and explosives but he additionally informed police about the identities of the suicide bombers.

On 15 July, at 03.00pm, a bluebird taxi dropped a man off at the JW Marriott. The man registered for room 1808 with an Indonesian Identity Card under the name ‘Nuri Hasdi’. The suicide bomber for the JW Marriott has since been identified as Dani Dwi Pratama. Dani Dwi Pratama was the suicide bomber in JW Marriott. He was an 18 years old youth from Bogor. Both Dani and Nana Ikhwan Maulana from Pandeglang, Banten - the suicide bomber in the Ritz Carlton were recruited as suicide bombers by a man named Syaifudin Jaelani, the brother-in-law of Ibrahim, a key player on the bombing operation. Ibrahim was later killed in a police raid in Temanggung on 8 August 2009.

Dani had used the name “Nuri Hasdi”. The staff at the front desk noted that the first room she was going to offer showed up “Vacant Dirty” on her computer screen. Then, she proceeded to offer “Nuri Hasdi” a second room but there was a problem. As such the room on the 18th floor was offered. “Nuri Hasdi” contrary to popular understanding had not requested specifically for room 1808. He paid USD $330 in cash.

The CCTV footage below shows “Nuri Hasdi” signing a copy of the registration card. An image of the registration card is shown below. Unfortunately both photocopy machines were working slowly at the JW Marriott. As a result, the front desk staff was unable to make copy of his Identification documents. “Nuri Hasdi” was asked by staff at the front desk to return later to photocopy his passport, however he never returned.

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9 Interview with Alan Orlob, Vice-President for Corporate Security and Loss Prevention, Marriott International, Sunday 19 July 2009
11 Interview with Alan Orlob, Vice-President for Corporate Security and Loss Prevention, Marriott International, Sunday, 10 August 2009
The man Dhani Dwi Pratama alias NURI HASDI* was captured on CCTV while checking in at the JW Marriott
On 16 July 2009, Ibrahim brought in assembled bombs through a loading dock of Ritz Carlton hotel and send it to the Room 1808 at the JW Marriott.12

On 17 July 2009, the man went down from the 18th floor to the lounge area at the first floor. He carried a backpack and a stroller bag. On his way, a security officer who was suspicious of his luggage, approached him and asked what he was doing.13 The man told security that he needed to meet his boss at the lounge to pass a package to him. The security staff let him pass, and a few minutes later the bombs were detonated.

**Chronology of Events at the Ritz Carlton**

At 6.51 am, Ibrahim, an employee at the florist located in the tunnel between the JW Marriott and the Ritz Carlton, met a man at the employee entrance. CCTV footage showed the man arriving in a taxi. Two white cardboard boxes and flowers were taken out from the taxi and brought into the hotel.

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Ibrahim was believed to have put the explosives inside the box under the flowers. He entered the employee entrance together with the suicide bomber.\textsuperscript{14} Investigations later revealed that the suicide bomber was Nana Ikhwan Maulana. At 07.51am, Nana Ikhwan Maulana was captured by CCTV footage of the Ritz Carlton at the lobby lounge on his way to the Airlangga restaurant.\textsuperscript{15}

At the restaurant, Nana Ikhwan Maulana was asked by the receptionist for the number of the room he was staying in. He gave a false number but he was quick to correct it and apologise for forgetting his room number. The receptionist then ushered him into the restaurant.\textsuperscript{16}

Based on information from an eyewitness inside the restaurant, the man put the bags down and walked away. He then pulled a trigger that caused the huge explosion.

\textsuperscript{14} “Ibrahim Diduga Kuat Menyelundupkan Pelaku Bom ke Dalam Hotel,” TVOne, 31 July 2009.
\textsuperscript{15} CCTV Footage from Ritz Carlton
\textsuperscript{16} Interview with Alan Orlob, for Corporate Security and Loss Prevention, Marriott International, Sunday, 19 July 2009.
Compared to the number of fatalities at the JW Marriott, the bomb at Ritz Carlton did not result in as many fatalities. When the first bomb exploded at 7.47am the guests from the Ritz Carlton had moved near the windows to look at the JW Marriott across the road. As a result when the bomb exploded at the Airlangga Restaurant at 7.57am, most people were away from the radius of the impact.\footnote{Ibid}

**Security Measures of the JW Marriott and the Ritz Carlton**

The security measures that were in place at both the JW Marriott as well as the Ritz Carlton were security measures similar to those used in airports.\footnote{AFP, Marriott Jakarta had 'tight security', *The Age*, July 18, 2009, [http://news.theage.com.au/breaking-news-world/marriott-jakarta-had-tight-security-20090718-doph.html](http://news.theage.com.au/breaking-news-world/marriott-jakarta-had-tight-security-20090718-doph.html)} Both hotels were operating at “threat condition red”. Massive gates prevented cars from entering the premises without being inspected. Patrons went through a walk through metal detector and their luggage was inspected. Security at the two hotels was generally thought to be the tightest in the city. Other hotels did not have such strong security measures. These measures may have prevented the attacks from having a greater impact. Certainly it would have been difficult if not impossible to launch an attack of the scale in 2003. However, despite these measures, the suicide bombers managed to carry out the attacks against both hotels. As much as the attack points to a failure in the intelligence apparatus of the state, it also points to the fact that hotels may have to employ even more security in the future. Admittedly, total security is an ideal and a challenge that often cannot be overcome. However, hotels must continue to add to their security apparatus to meet the threat.

As the investigation continues to unfold in the coming weeks and months, it is imperative that several questions are answered. What were the security measures in place? Were these security measures enough? What could have been done to avert the devastation? The answers to these questions will direct future plans of hotel security in Jakarta, hotels within the region and even globally. An adept understanding of the situation will facilitate a greater appreciation for the threat facing hotels and assist hoteliers to greater comprehend the need for the growing emphasis of hotel security amidst the larger threat landscape.

**Security Measures**

The security measures put in place at both the JW Marriott and the Ritz Carlton included amongst others target hardening measures\footnote{Target hardening is a term predominantly used by those working in building security or security of any infrastructure, referring to the strengthening of the security of critical assets in order to reduce or minimizing the risk of attack or theft.}. These were measures undertaken to reduce...
the risk of a potential attack through mitigating the possible means through which an attack could have been conducted. Besides the physical security measures described above, surveillance systems and equipment assisted security personnel to monitor the hotels. The range of technology use to assist security personnel included Close Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras, a combination of handheld Explosive Vapour Detectors (EVD), hand held metal detectors and walk through metal detectors.

In response to the previous attack on the JW Marriott in 2003, efforts had been undertaken to increase the security infrastructure put in place. These included the following:

- Sealing off the driveway, Increasing the setback from the lobby entrance
- Installing a Blast Wall with a capacity to withstand approximately 10 tons of Trinitrotoluene (TNT)
- Placing of Barricades at entrance and exits points
- Adding a Vehicle Checkpoint
- Metal detectors
- Explosive Vapour Detectors used for Luggages
- Canine Unit
- Digital CCTV Cameras
- Laminated Glass that stretches to the 3rd floor

The measures that were put in place after the JW Marriott attack in 2003 were directed at target hardening the building against a similar vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). The measures that were in place at the both the JW Marriott and the Ritz Carlton are shown in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RITZ CARLTON</th>
<th>JW MARRIOTT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Walk Through Metal Detectors</td>
<td>Car Park Lobby Loading Dock (staff entrance only garrett)</td>
<td>Car Park Lobby Entrance Associate Entrance Corridor to Unlimited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X-Ray Machines</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explosive Vapor Detectors</td>
<td>Loading Good Entrance Lobby (2 broken units, 1 spare unit)</td>
<td>Car park Lobby Terrace Associate Entrance (1 spare unit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garrett Units</td>
<td>8 units</td>
<td>8 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canine Unit</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Loading Dock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCTV Camera</td>
<td>60 (51 active, 5 defective, 16 unavailable, 5 new and 6 broken)</td>
<td>25 All active, fixed no optical zoom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These equipments used are not foolproof ways of guaranteeing the security of the building. They need to be used hand-in-hand with effective handlers who are able to identify potential threats and work towards mitigating the situation.

**Metal Detectors – Walk through Metal Detectors and Hand held metal detectors**

Walk through detectors were placed at all the major entrances of the JW Marriott. Three were placed at the entrance and exits points of the Ritz Carlton. The associate or staff entrance of the Ritz Carlton had instead a security guard who would use a handheld metal detector - Garrett unit.20

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20 Interview with Adi, Manager, Loss Prevention Officers at Ritz Carlton, 21 July 2009
Explosive Vapour Detectors (EVD)

There were a number of EVD detectors at the hotels – four at each hotel. These are sophisticated devices meant to detect most explosives through vapour or trace detection. Each EVD costs in excess of USD $25,000, so the hotels had made a considerable investment in security. The JW Marriott had noted that three EVD detectors were working and one was kept as spare.

Closed Circuit Television Cameras

The number of CCTV cameras in each hotel varied. Both hotels had numerous cameras, both inside the hotels as well as perimeter cameras. Each hotel had CCTV showing the lift landing at the lobby level which were instrumental in identifying both of the bombers. By examining the electronic lock system, hotel security was able to pinpoint the time whenever a guest enters his room. At present it is uncertain if there was anyone else visiting with the bomber at his hotel room.

In the control room, in both hotels there was one individual who is tasked to monitor the activities on the CCTV. While CCTVs are by no means an absolute assurance of security, the images captured are a tremendous assistance in investigations. It was CCTV images that had managed to assist security and law enforcement personnel in post-attack investigations.
Security in the Tunnel

The JW Marriott and the Ritz Carlton are connected by a tunnel linking Basement one floor of the Ritz Carlton to the Lobby entrance of the JW Marriott. The tunnel opens at 7:30 am each day. On the day of the bombing, it opened at the normal time with security officers posted at the entry on both the Marriott and Ritz Carlton sides. Both of them had hand held metal detectors to screen people. On that day, security officers reported seeing only two individuals pass through the tunnel in the 16 minutes preceding the attacks. Both of them were female.

SECURITY PERSONNEL

Hotel security personnel form the basic tenets in the security infrastructure of most hotels. Security personnel in both these hotels comprised a mix of hotel staff and outsourced security. One third of staff dealing with security came under the hotel. The remaining two thirds were outsourced from a security service provider. Both the JW Marriott and the Ritz Carlton had outsourced their security to the Wira Sandi Group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>RITZ CARLTON</strong></th>
<th><strong>JW MARRIOTT</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Associates</td>
<td>660 persons</td>
<td>630 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Workers</td>
<td>276 persons</td>
<td>Approximately 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss Prevention Staff</td>
<td>40 personnel</td>
<td>41 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outsource Security</td>
<td>94 personnel</td>
<td>79 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Guest Rooms</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Floor for Guest Room</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function Rooms</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Club Meeting Rooms</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spa, Pool and Gym</td>
<td>5th Floor</td>
<td>3rd Floor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of security personnel who were outsourced formed a large percentage of the total security personnel in each of these hotels. The Wira Sandi group is a common security service provider who counts several well known hotels and private service apartments under its list of clientele. Although checks and screening are conducted on hotel staff working on security related matters, it is uncertain at present if similar
background checks are conducted by the Wira Sandi Group.\textsuperscript{21} The Wira Sandi Group does state that they “trained and developed Security candidates.”\textsuperscript{22}

*The Human Element*

The human element formed a large portion of the security infrastructure in both hotels. For instance the barricades at the entrance and exits at the hotels were manned by staff. In addition to metal detectors and EVDs visual checks were used.

*Training of Security Staff*

The training of staff handling security related matters form a quintessential part of the general security infrastructure of the hotels. The fact that two-thirds of the security personnel were outsourced would have meant that a tighter watch would have been needed over outsourced personnel. This however will require defined training budgets, which proportionally require up to 24-28\% of additional operating expenditure by a company. It is generally expected the providers conduct this training. However with a few exceptions costing for training is not usually included in the provision of contract services.

The precise level and nature of training of the Wira Sandi Group has yet to be ascertained. According to sources within the industry, training within the service provider is focused on punctuality, appearance, police regulations - particularly centered around a 1975 direction

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{21} Out of approximately 600 security service providers, only a handful conducts active screening of employees. This however does not go beyond the interviewing or “verbal reference” of the employee having an obvious record (either criminal or otherwise).

\textsuperscript{22} Wira Sandi Group Website, \url{http://www.wirasandi.com/ws%20contain/provider.htm}

Training in the Indonesian context consists of having passed a police “SATPAM” training program which is widely known to produce low standards. The training is administered by the SPN, a National Police training centre which is the domain of the National Police (POLRI). The key objective is the collection of funds. Corruption is widespread. Only one training institute (BiTDeC) in Bali conducts a vocational and academic program for private security candidates. The training is supplemented by a student loan program which allows students to being placed with companies upon completion. The program is a Diploma (D-2/D-3) level program. Other training courses provided are administered by the security service providers to fulfil internal needs or programs which are either purely physical (self defence) or run by the various consultancies.}
on what to wear. Constructive and planned training programs which extend beyond the daily security routine are typically not present.

Training of the loss prevention staff at both the JW Marriott and the Ritz Carlton includes training in fire safety, first aid and CPR, and other security related matters. It also included specific training for the hotel industry including lessons on presentation and conversational English to better communicate with guests. Loss Prevention officers had been certified in the Marriott International security training program and wore pins on their lapels signifying that certification.

It is essential for hotels to have Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) when dealing with suspicious guests. The line between absolute security of guests within the parameters of a service centred industry is indeed a difficult one to walk. The unique ability of hotels to be able to strike a balance is essential. Causing discomfort to guests is a dent in the service par excellence that any hotel aspires to provide. It would be crucial for hotels to view security as a service that hotels are providing instead of the binary view that tends to be taken vis-à-vis comfort and security. Just as comfort need not be at the expense of security likewise security need not be at the expense of comfort.

It is essential that all members of staff be trained to be mindful and vigilant at all times. Training on issues of security should not be isolated to the LPOs alone, but staff from the all other departments need to be trained in situational awareness and be instructed with an SOP response to the situation. Marriott International had promulgated a program after the attack in Mumbai, called “See Something, Say Something!” This was an initiative whereby a number of posters were to be placed in the non-public areas of the hotel to increase staff awareness of suspicious activities. This enables each member of the staff to feel that they have a stake in the overall safety and security of the hotel.

**Attack Target**

Speculation was rife after the bombings on the plausible targets for the attack. Jihadist and extremist websites mentioned Manchester United and the group that was attacked in the lobby lounge of the Marriott, the Castle Asia Group as reasons behind the bombings. A former member of JI, Nasir Abbas, noted that the bombings were related to international issues and that the "actions were related to the U.S. action towards Iraq, Afghanistan or Taliban.""23

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The dates on the registration signed by “Nuri Hasdi” indicated that the intended duration of the stay was from 15-17 July 2009. It was hence likely that the direct target of the attacks was the Castle Asia Group with an additional benefit of disrupting the arrival of the Manchester United team who were due to check in on the 17 July.

The target hardening of embassies has led to a renewed focus on soft targets such as hotels. Hotels tend to host group which may become the targets. In this case, the likely target of the attack would have been the Castle Asia Group which had breakfast meetings that convened most Friday mornings at the JW Marriott. In reviewing the CCTV video, the bomber at the JW Marriott exited the lift and went directly to the room where the Castle Asia Group was sitting around a conference table. He passed by the Sailendra Restaurant as well as the lobby. He seemed to be intent on going into the lobby lounge where the group was. After the bombing, a second device was found in room 1808. Some people speculated that the bomb was supposed to detonate before the suicide bomber, bringing people into the lobby where the suicide bomber would detonate his device. CCTV footage showed otherwise.

It is thought hotels have been targeted by terrorists as they are viewed as places of vice; “nest of spies and den of decadence”24 Hotels possess the added value of being economic targets as they are commercial enterprises. At times, hotels possess a target-rich environment, with prominent locals and foreigners amongst their clientele.

Was the JW Marriott brand name the target?

The two hotels were frequented by the elite and prominent local and foreign businessmen, and were “considered to be among the most secure buildings”25 in Jakarta. However, one could argue that other hotels would offer the same prominence. Hotels such as Hyatt, Four Seasons and even locally branded hotels such as Mulia are all well established in Jakarta and equally attractive. By their nature, these hotels attract the most prominent business people as well as diplomats. Locally branded hotels in other countries have been attacked, as evidenced by the November attacks against the Taj Mahal and Oberoi Hotels in Mumbai or the Serena Hotel attack in Kabul. Other western brands such as the Hyatt Hotel in Jordan and the Hilton Hotel in Egypt were attacked.

Could the attacks conducted on 17 July have been expedited after the operations that were conducted in Cilacap on 14 July 2009? On 14 July 2009, a raid was conducted in Cilacap at Baridin’s home. Baridin is Head of the JI Cilacap cell and Noordin Top’s father-in-law.

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24 Jakarta bombings highlight 'soft target' fragility, Sen Lam and Scott Stewart, Vice president Tactical Intelligence, STRATFOR http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/asiapac/stories/200907/s2635957.htm
Noordin married Baridin’s daughter Arinah, his third wife. According to investigations, Arinah was not aware of Noordin Top’s past however it has been ascertained that Baridin was well aware of Noordin’s background and actively assisted in ensuring Noordin’s safety and security. Both Noordin Top and Baridin recruited cadres together for JI operations. Baridin had escaped and was no longer in his home when Detachment 88 conducted a raid on 14 July 2009. “The police raided the building for a second time on Tuesday and found chemicals that could be used to make explosives, as well as what is believed to be bomb-making equipment buried behind the building”26 In his backyard, bomb making material were discovered in a blue plastic oil drum buried in the backyard of his home. The contents and nature of the bomb discovered was similar to the bomb that eventually caused the blasts on 17 July at both hotels. The area was possibly used as a miniature lab to build and assemble the bombs. There appears to be a lack of following up on the perpetrators after the Cilacap Raid on 14 July 2009 where bomb making materials were discovered.

Given that reports have indicated that a phone call was made on 10 July for the reservations of rooms from 15-17 July, the operations were already underway for the attacks on both hotels. In the attack cycle depicted below the plan was already in Phase 3 – the Execution Phase.

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**Attack Impact**

The immediate impact to the bombings was felt at several levels. They are explored in brief below. In the aftermath of the bombings, with regards to the sentiments on the ground, there was only one certainty – the impact that was felt was not monolithic as with most of Indonesian society.

**Travel Advisories**

The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) did not raised its travel advice warning level for Indonesia despite the bombings but the overall level of advice remained to be at “reconsider your need to travel”. The New Zealand Embassy had advised its citizens against non-essential travel to Indonesia due to the continued threat of terrorism amidst reports that one of their citizens died in the bombings. Despite the travel advisories for citizen going to Indonesia, the embassies refrained from withdrawing embassy staff from Indonesia. To a large extent on a diplomatic level, it showed the solidarity of countries with Indonesia in the fight against terrorism and extremism.

**Tourist Arrivals**

In 2002, in the aftermath of the Bali bombings, an exodus of foreign tourists resulted with a drop in tourism by approximately 70 percent. In light of the attacks in Jakarta, some hotels in Bali, have reported cancellations of foreign tourist arrivals while the Association of Indonesian Tours and Travel Agencies (ASITA) for East Java noted that a group of tourists from Singapore and Malaysia had also canceled a planned visit. According to ASITA chairman for East Java Haryono Gondosoewito, ASITA was forced to scale down travel schedules from Malaysia and Singapore. The cancellation resulted in a dip in profits by 15 to 20 percent.

The Association of Indonesian Hotels and Restaurants (PHRI) noted that hotel occupancy rates had also dropped. Executive Director of PHRI, Carla Parengkuan acknowledged that

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that room occupancy rates of star-rated hotels in Jakarta may decline by 20 to 30 percent.\textsuperscript{30} Gobel, chief commissioner of PT Panasonic Gobel Indonesia, argued that Foreign chief executive officers are banned by their governments stay at hotels, owned by companies in United States.\textsuperscript{31}

\textit{Cancellation of Manchester United Match}

The impact perhaps felt by most Indonesians was the cancellation of Manchester United’s arrival and their friendly game with the Indonesian All-Star national team. More than 67000 tickets have been sold for the game and it was reported that Manchester United would have made 6 million pounds from their visit to Indonesia.\textsuperscript{32} Manchester United manager, Sir Alex Ferguson noted that the first reaction was one of shock. The need to protect the Manchester United players was the paramount reason for cancelling the trip.\textsuperscript{33}

The Manchester United team was just 36 hours away from checking in to the Ritz-Carlton when the bombers struck. Some support staff including the tour organisers were in the building. None were injured in the attacks.

\textit{Reactions on Extremist Websites}

In the cyber domain, immediate reactions in the Indonesian and Malay language extremist websites to the recent Jakarta bombings reflected ardent support for the act. Several sites even produced articles on legitimacy of suicidal bombings in Islam. Proclamations of victory and success of bombings was rife. This same sentiment resonated in several forums. The pace of news reporting of the incident by the extremist websites was on par with mainstream media. This was especially obvious for extremist websites such as muslimdaily.net and arrahmah.com. However, while there were factions that celebrated the bombings, including a group who attributed the acts as a conspiracy against Islam and

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{33} Tim Rich, Manchester United Cancel Indonesia Leg of Asian Tour after Hotel Attacks, \textit{The Guardian}, 17 July 2009 \texttt{http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2009/jul/17/manchester-united-cancel-indonesia-tour}
Muslims wherein they felt that the intelligence community were trying to project a violent image of Islam through the bombings.

Reactions by the Muslim Community

Varying reactions were both heard and felt in the immediate aftermath of the Marriot and Ritz Carlton attacks on 17 July 2009. While global leaders, international media and terrorism experts were fast to condemn the attacks, reactions in Indonesia itself signalled a different outlook towards how acts of terrorism and terrorists were viewed in the minds of Indonesians.

Five days after the twin bombings, Jemaah Islamiyah leader and radical preacher, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir commented to journalists at his Pesantren Al-Mukmin Ngruki in Solo, that no Muslim activists could be considered a terrorist. He stressed that “they are Islamic warriors with their own ‘ijtihad’ (Islamic legal reasoning)”. He claimed that even if the perpetrators are Muslims, they were reacting to the injustices and evil attacks done by enemies of Islam. In his view the term terrorist should be used to denote America and its allies.

He further explained that even if the perpetrators of the suicide bombings are from Islamic groups, he could not find fault in them. He believed that these groups could have performed such acts based on their own deduction of ijtihad. They could be right, and even he himself could be wrong in his own ijtihad. The use of ijtihad as a basis of reasoning is a worrying and dangerous trend that could cloud counter-terrorism efforts in Indonesia. Ijtihad is a foundational methodology in Islamic jurisprudence that details the process of making a legal decision by independent interpretation of the legal sources, the Qur'an and the Sunnah. In an Islamic intellectual heritage built over 1400 years of rigorous classical scholarship, several scholarly criterions have been classified as a requirement for any

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individual to perform ijtihad. He who performs it achieved the esteemed status of a mujtahid. In Islam, ijtihad can never be performed to acquire evil and injustices. Thus through his associating acts of terrorism as ijtihad, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir legitimized suicide acts and placed the suicide bombers on a pedestal in the eyes of the community.

Irfan Awwas, the head leader of Lajnah Tanfidziyah MMI, noted that the bombings could have been a political ploy. By associating the bombings with JI, it would force President Yudhoyono to act against the Islamic parties who are in his coalition. He further reiterated that questions need to be asked and why attacks took place against the Marriot for the second time. He suggested that Marriot could be a transit area where foreigners frequented. Irfan Awwas alluded to the fact that investigations needed to be conducted to ascertain who these foreigners staying at the Marriot were. Din Syamsuddin, Head of the Muhammadyah, was quoted by arrahmah.com. He had suggested that there were 120 CIA agents at Marriot just prior to the bombings.

This negative sentiment towards the Westerners is clear and found extensively among these preachers. The sentiments felt resonate with the “us versus them” dichotomy which the extremist groups have succeeded in portraying. There are many who believe that the bombing should have been conducted in America and not in Indonesia. This is common sentiment heard on the ground. It is thus not surprising that radical preachers such as Abu Bakar Ba’asyir are also justifying attacks to be done on American soils.

Nonetheless, several mainstream scholars rose to the challenge and condemned the attacks and its modus operandi – suicide terrorism. Among them Ketua MPR Hidayat Nur Wahid who noted that the suicide bombers hoped that though martyrdom they will enter

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36 The forming of schools in Islamic law launched the issue of whether anyone at all could perform ijtihad, or only a limited number of people. Al-Amidi (d. 631 A.H./1233 C.E.) and al-Baydawi (d. 685 A.H./1286 C.E.) agreed that only people who satisfy specific requirements could apply ijtihad. According to them, there were two main conditions (syartani) of Mujtahid: firstly, to be an adult and believer in Allah and the Prophet; secondly, to be an expert in all aspects of Islamic law (al-ahkam al-syar’iyah wa aqsamuha) [See Sayf al-Din al-Amidi, al-Ihkam fi Usul al-Ahkam Vol. 3, Matba’ah Syabih, 1347 H, p. 139. and Abu Nur Zuhair, Muzakkirah fi Usul al-Fiqh li Ghair al-Ahnaf, Vol. 4., Egypt, Matba’ah Dar al-Ta’lif, p. 225]. Read Nadirsyah Hosen, Nahdlatul Ulama and Collective Ijtihad, New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies 6, 1 (June, 2004): 5-26.

paradise but in reality “they are causing harm and afflictions to many, disturbing public interest, causing loss of lives to their own Muslim brothers.”\textsuperscript{38} He reiterated that “one of the effective efforts to fight terrorism is to teach good religious values and acts which will assist in the strengthening of the society.”\textsuperscript{39}

### Attack Tactic and Bomb Signature

The attack tactic of using a suicide bomber is not one that is new in Indonesia. Suicide bombings were used as a tactic in the 2002 Bali bombing, 2005 Bali Bombing and even the 2003 JW Marriott bombing. Suicide bombings as tactic create a pervasive sense of fear. Suicide bombers “annihilate the entire logic of power, since no credible threat can be made against someone with no desire to survive”\textsuperscript{40}

In JI’s earlier structure, there was a section dedicated to suicide operations – Laskhar Istimata. Lashkar Istimata or the suicide unit worked in close association with Lashkar Khos the Special Unit in JI that was dedicated to military styled attack operations.

Abu Bakar Ba’asyir claimed that the Jakarta bombings were a warning from Allah and if Indonesia continued to refuse to become an Islamic state, they would continue.\textsuperscript{41}

### Bomb Signature

There were five bombs in total. Each suicide bomber was carrying two bombs weighing approximately 4.5kg-5kg each. The fifth bomb was found in Room 1808 of the JW Marriott. From the unexploded bomb, the unique features of the bomb signature were identified. This led investigators to identify the distinct similarities of bomb expertise.

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid
\textsuperscript{40} Christoph Reuter translated by Helena Ragg-Kirkby, \textit{My Life is A Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombings}, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,2004), p.3
\textsuperscript{41} Al-Qaeda linked to terrorists behind Jakarta bombings, Lindsay Murdoch in Jakarta and Tom Allard in \textit{The Sydney Morning Herald}, \url{http://www.smh.com.au/world/alqaeda-linked-to-terrorists-behind-jakarta-bombings-20090722-dtmx.html}
The main explosive used was flash powder with potassium chlorate, sulphur and carbon with aluminum powder that acts as a booster. The bomb was placed in a plastic container. The container was then placed into a laptop bag, backpack and trolley bag respectively. The shrapnel used in all five bombs were nuts and bolts glued inside the plastic containers. Switches used were push delay switches. The detonator was homemade and 9-Volt dry batteries were used as the power charge.

The IEDs that was found were similar to those found in 2004 Cicurug West Java, 2005 2nd Bali Bombings, 2005 Malang operation where Dr. Azahari was killed, 2008 Palembang group, and the 2009 Cilacap Operation carried out on 14 July 2009. The only difference were that the IEDs use in the 2009 Jakarta Bombings used nuts and bolts, in contrast to ball bearings of the Cicurug, the 2nd Bali bombings, Malang Operation, and those used by the Palembang group. The unexploded bomb found in Room 1808 was closest in similarity to the bombs found in the Cilacap Operations.

Comparing the material across the attacks and Operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suicide (Executed)</td>
<td>Suicide (Not Executed)</td>
<td>Suicide (Executed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type: Black Powder Low Grade</td>
<td>Type: Black Powder Low Grade</td>
<td>Type: Black Powder and TNT Composite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mix: Potassium Nitrate and Calcium Nitrate, Silver Carbon, Detonator, screws and bolts</td>
<td>Mix: Potassium Nitrate and Calcium Nitrate, Silver Carbon, Detonator, screws and bolts</td>
<td>Mix: Potassium Nitrate and Calcium Nitrate, Silver Carbon, Detonator, screws and bolts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Container: 20 litre Travel bag</td>
<td>Container: 20 litre Container</td>
<td>Container: Bag, Vehicle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The material used and the arrangement of the circuitry are indicative of the signature of the bomb maker.
Attack Investigation

Immediately following the hotel bombings, anti-terror forces and emergency teams were at the scene of both blasts. The Forensic Unit Indonesian Police Headquarter arrived at the scene at 09.50am. Police response to the bombings was immediate and guests at both hotels were evacuated and moved to secure locations.

As investigators and policemen secured the scene of the bombings, they discovered what they believe was the “control centre” for the attacks. Police recovered an unexploded bomb and other explosive materials inside Room 1808 at the JW Marriot at 12.46 pm. Police recovered an active bomb which failed to explode, a handphone, a scheme and a laptop from the room.

The police recovered about 7 different parts of bodies that were put inside 12 different bags and gave it to the forensic unit at the Police Hospital (RS Polri) DR Sukanto for identification. Among those 7 bodies were identified as 1 New Zealander, 3 Australians, 2 Dutch and 1 Indonesian. Two dismembered bodies without their heads indicated that they were the suicide bombers. The heads of the two bodies were detached. Images below show attempts at facial reconstruction of the bomber at the JW Marriott.

From the remains found at the scene at the JW Marriott, it is believed that the suicide bomber at the JW Marriott is male in his 20s, approximately 1.9 metres, light skin, black eyes, with short straight hair. CCTV images confirmed that the same man entered the JW lounge just before the blasts. His upper torso was disintegrated completely from the impact of the blast. The fact that his upper torso was disintegrated is indicative of an individual who was carrying the backpack bomb on himself at the time of the impact. Dani Permana, aged 18.

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The remains found at the Ritz Carlton conversely indicated that the bomber had placed his bag down prior to detonating the bomb. As a result his body was mostly intact and not obliterated.

Amidst the chaos, attempts were made to collect additional information and to streamline information dissemination to the media and the public. On 18 July, the National Police had set up an information centre about the Jakarta hotel bombings at its headquarters, where the public could contribute information on the bombing. The public also could reach the information centre via phone or short message service (SMS) at 081382739874/-75/-76.47 The Jakarta administration had also set up a media centre at The Bellagio Mall, South Jakarta. The media centre was made available to both the local and international media and continued operations until 24 July 2009. On the first day, the media centre conducted three press conferences, i.e. by Jakarta Governor Fauzi Bowo, State Minister of Tourism Jero Wacik and by a National Police officer. 48

In principle the notion of streamlining the channels of communication was ideal. Strategic communication is essential at a critical juncture when investigations are underway failing which the ongoing investigations would be compromised. Senior officers involved in the investigations had indicated their frustration at the speed to which the media was able to receive information. The media in this instance was on more than one occasion uncooperative with the attack investigators who had their operations compromised by the media.

On 22 July 2009, police released and distributed flyers as seen on the right. The flyers displayed two sketches of the suicide bombers. On the flyers, the police describe that the suicide bombers at the Marriott hotel as male, 16-17 years old, short straight hair, height around 180-190 cm, with shoes size number 42-43. The suicide bomber at the Ritz Carlton is described as male around his 30s to 40s, short straight hair, brown skin colour, and height is around 1.65m. 49

On 23 July 2009 police raided Ibrahim’s house. Ibrahim is believed to be a nodal point in the investigations for his role in the attack operation. CCTV footage of Ibrahim was shown by the press. CCTV showed Ibrahim entering the employee entrance with a man suspected to be the suicide bomber along with a trolley carrying white cardboard boxes and flowers. Ibrahim was registered as employee of Cynthia who owned the florist shop since 2006. He was also believed to have working experience in the same industry at Hotel Mulia, another five star hotel in Jakarta. Ibrahim is believed to have left a letter at the florist office for friends and family. His letter asked the family to pay his debt to his office. His office mate told the media that his debt was for the birth of his fourth child. Ibrahim was later killed in police raid on 9 August 2009.

The Australian Federal Police sent a team of bomb experts to aid investigations in the 2003 JW Marriott bombing. The members of this team were the same experts who had aided and participated in the 2002 Bali bombing investigations. During the current attack investigations, unlike past bombings, the assistance by the U.S. and the Australians were turned down by the Indonesian authorities who had indicated their preference to handle the investigations on their own.

Suspects

Who are the plausible perpetrators of these attacks? There are distinct similarities between the bombs found at Cicurug in 2004, the Bali Bombings in 2002 and 2005, JW Marriott in 2003 and Palembang in 2008 and most recently in Cilacap on July 2009, and the bombs that were used in the recent hotel attacks. Gauging from the bomb signatures, it is indicative that JI and its radical splinter led by Noordin Mohamed Top are responsible for the attacks.

In 2002, JI had formed a special unit known as Laskar Khos. At least one individual from every cell of JI was assigned to Laskar Khos. When operations are planned, individuals will be chosen from across the various units sometimes without the knowledge of their direct commander. Laskar Khos was actually a much bigger unit which was directly operating under Zulkarnaen's command. Within Laskhar Khos there was specialised subsection known as Lashkar Istimata (Suicide Unit). Hence Laskar Khos did not was not a suicide unit per se, because other people were involved in the operations who were not suicide

bombers. However when individuals were recruited as suicide bombers, they were recruited into Laskar Khos.55

In early 2006, after the 2005 Bali Bombing, Noordin Top had declared the formation of Tanzim Qaidatul jihad. The group led by him goes by two other names as well namely, Anshorul Muslimin and Brigade Firaqul Maut. According to Nassir Abbas, a former leader of Mantiqi III – a provincial division in JI structure – who now works with the police in counter terrorism in Indonesia, the Brigade Maut or Death Brigade was used when Noordin and Dr. Azahari planned in the Australian Bombing in 2004.56 Dr. Azahari was later killed in the 2005 Operations by Detachment 88.

On 21 June 2009, the Specialist Counter-Terrorism Unit Detachment 88 arrested two suspected Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorists in Central Java. One of those arrested was identified as Saefuddin Zuchri alias Tsabit. He was believed to have been associated with Noordin M. Top, the most wanted JI fugitive. Saefuddin was arrested after attending a Koran recital session in Tritih Village, Cilacap, Central Java. He is believed to have supplied a gun and explosive materials to Abdurrahman Taib, a man involved in the Palembang terrorist group. Zuchri admitted his involvement in Palembang by facilitating the working relationship between the Palembang Group and Noordin Top. Acceding to the instructions given by Noordin Top, Zuchri sent a bomb making trainer from Cilacap and potassium chlorate to Palembang in 2007. Zuchri’s assertions were later confirmed by Abdul Rahman alias Musa, a convicted terrorist from Palembang group. He said that the explosives for the 22 ready-to-use bombs that were found at Palembang are supplied from Central Java.57

Zuchri met Noordin Top several times since 2005. The last meeting was in May 2009 in Cilacap. Zuchri has brokered Noordin Top’s marriage to the daughter of Baharuddin aka Baridin, his uncle in September 2005 in Cilacap. The couple have 2 children, a boy and a girl.58 Noordin Top reportedly used a name of Ade Abdul Halim and was working as staff of a pesantren in Makassar, South Sulawesi.59 Arina reportedly met with Noordin Top last in March 2009.60 After 7 days in police detention, police confirmed that Noordin’s third wife, Ariani Rahma alias Arina, was not involve in the attacks. 61 Noordin Top and Baridin are believed to have actively recruited cadres for their cause. Baridin and his group fled after the arrest of Zuchri and have remained at large since early July 09.

55 “Interview with Sidney Jones,” Four Corners, http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2003/20031103_still_at_large/int_jones.htm
57 Misteri Noordin Top, Tribun Timur, 20 July 2009.
58 Polisi Probolinggo Tangkap “Mertua” Noordin M Top, TVOne, 27 July

59 Banyak Kemiripan Suami Arina dengan Noordin M Top, TVOne, 29 July 2009.
60 Arina Akui Suaminya Mirip Noordin M Top, TVOne, 28 July 2009
In their recruitment strategies, it is pertinent to understand the type of personnel that Noordin Top might have recruited. Noordin Top’s vast network and charisma has enabled him to recruit from both mainstream JI and from other groups sympathetic to his cause. The Palembang case had indicated that FAKTA members were tapped by JI’s members with affiliation to Noordin Top to support their cause. The virulent ideology and the ability of other groups to be further influenced by the violent ideology of the Noordin Top and his faction is an alarming trend. The ability to recruit across groups highlights the ability of the Noordin Top to sustain his support base as a resource pool for further attack operations in the future.

**Lessons and Way Forward**

As investigations are ongoing, these are preliminary lessons that can be gleaned from the attacks.

*Dismantling the Network*

One of the first things that will need to be undertaken will be to dismantle the network created by Noordin Top. Especially after his demise, it is important to monitor the situation closely in the coming months. A charismatic leader with the ability to bring together the organisation will strengthen its sustenance as a force to be contended with in the future. Although the capacity of the group to conduct attacks has been reduced in the immediate aftermath of operations, the group has been known to have the ability to rest, recover and strike back.

The police success will clearly diminish the group’s capabilities for some time to come. The death of a senior bomb maker in the raid will compound the operational disruption. Compounding this, the capture of documents and a laptop could lead to a wider attack on the group and will force the group to focus on their internal security rather than operations for the immediate future. The wider information trove will help the Indonesian authorities to gain valuable insight into the group and to answer critical basic questions on the capability, size, and other operational information of the group. This should be cited as one of great achievements of the Indonesian government.

The armed threat has not ended. Noordin’s faction was able acquire perhaps as much as 600kg’s of explosives, place them in safe houses and to plan a spectacular operation against the President of Indonesia, and the 17 July attacks in Jakarta. All of this while being under intense scrutiny. This is clearly a dangerous organization.

Additionally, there are several important actors in JI circles that are still at large. Two names have been mentioned in the aftermath 17 July Jakarta Bombings, Syaifudin Jaelani
and Muhammad Syahrir alias Aing. Syaifuddin Jaelani is believed to be the recruiter of the two suicide bombers in the 17 July Jakarta bombings, while Muhammad Syahrir is suspected of having provided a house in Jati Asih, Bekasi – the safe house for the preparation the second attacks after the 17 July Jakarta bombings, which was foiled by a raid on 8 August 2009.

JI has demonstrated an ability to replenish its ranks, and particularly its leadership level over the years. Noordin’s faction will have to accomplish the same if they are to survive. Whomever replaces Noordin will have to have the charisma to lead the faction, the connections to sustain the group, as well as an ability to bridge the gap between JI and this faction.

Though their capability in bomb making will not be as sophisticated as their master, Dr. Azahari, they can still conduct operations. The critical factor in sustaining JI and its many splinters and associates is the unchallenged ideology that fuels the extremist movement. JI has taken the vanguard position within the armed portion of the extremist’s movement, but it rests on a wider interlocking network of schools, publications, charities and other groups that, while in most cases not violent, serve as the recruiting ground for JI and help provide a wider and deeper support and sympathy network for the extremists.

Until that is addressed, there will be important tactical victories against, but no strategic defeat of JI. In the medium term, efforts have to be undertaken to dismantle the ideological infrastructures present such as publishing houses and radical clerics.

**Legislation**

Drawing lessons from the attacks, it is critical that that tougher laws are put in place. After the 2003 JW Marriot attacks the Indonesian cabinet had strengthened their call for a tough internal security law to mimic those in Singapore and Malaysia. More importantly, the internal security law was thought to be a more effective counter terrorism measure. This received the backing of the military chief. However, this was met with great opposition from human rights activists who saw the law as potentially providing a leeway for human rights abuses. 62 Legislation against terrorist and extremist groups is an essential element in counter terrorism.

Since the bombing took place barely a year after the Bali Bombing in 2002 the security infrastructure that was established and strengthened then was still in place. The anti-terrorism special detachment unit, Detachment 88, continues to be at the forefront of counter-terrorism efforts. From a legislative point of view, there is still no concrete and

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precise terrorism law or bill on which terrorist(s) or terror linked groups could be effectively charged without trial if supported by credible intelligence.

**Role of the Media**

In the recent attacks, the media had compromised operations on several occasions. The competitive nature of the reporting and the interference with operations is an obstacle that needs to be overcome. While there are no quick and dry solutions, the Media needs to maintain its independence and its credibility as the fourth estate while ensure that it does not overtly interfere in the operations conducted against the perpetrators.

**Networked Intelligence**

It is critical that the intelligence infrastructure of the government is networked. Information sharing is critical with the security and law enforcement personnel. Detachment 88 is an elite yet small unit. Separate agencies are responsible for various functions. Although the State Intelligence Coordinating Agency (BAKIN) represents the coordinating node, most agencies work autonomously with little coordination amongst their partner agencies. It is important that the agencies work together and information is shared through active coordination horizontally across agencies.

**Franchises and its effects on security infrastructure – Burden of Responsibility**

First established by American John Willard Marriott 60 years ago in the U.S., the Marriott brand was thrust to an empire by Bill Marriott, CEO of Marriott International and son of John Marriott. Marriott International encompasses 3,200 hotels and resorts located worldwide. Both the JW Marriott and the Ritz Carlton Hotel in Jakarta is owned by Tan Kian "by licensing the Marriott trademark." In the aftermath of these attacks, Marriott International is reviewing all of their security procedures at both hotels and is working on a "total security solution". Physical security enhancements include new, expensive X-ray machines and explosive sniffing dogs. New entry barriers have been built. Bill Marriott addressed the issue on his blog, noting that the company is "committed to do our best to implement tough and effective security procedures working with our associates, outside security experts and the authorities."**

As the Ritz Carlton and the JW Marriott hotels increase their security procedures of both of these hotels, it will become increasingly important for other hotels in Jakarta to do likewise. All of the hotels will need to work together to establish a strong front against

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terrorism, by utilizing physical security measures as well as operational security measures. But, all the security in the world will not be enough until the Indonesian government creates an environment, first through legislation, then through an effective intelligence and police force to stop terrorism in the country.

Who speaks for Islam?

Two important features need to be closely examined to determine the right voices of Islam in Indonesia. First, who are the individuals and organisations that represent the voice of Islam in Indonesia? Second, what is taught in pesantrens, madrasahs, and universities about Islam. The media’s portrayals of the reactions from Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Front Pembela Islam and other radical preachers have portrayed the attacks on the JW Marriott and the Ritz Carlton in a positive light.

Religious leaders and preachers such as Hidayat Nur Wahid, Din Syamsuddin and KH Hasyim Muzadi from the influential Nahdhatul Ulama should be engaged to address and discuss the realities of such acts of terrorism. Moderate voices need to be brought to foreground. At presence the voices of the radical preachers dominate. Mainstream national and religious leaders must be engaged to diminish the conspiratorial mentality that is evident among the public when attacks such as the 17 July bombings occur. Ex-JI members such as Nasir Abbas and Abu Rusydan have emerged to champion the cause of to review the aims of JI’s struggle and objectives.

The Religious Ministry should introduce and enforce in their educational curriculum an innovative subject that deals with realities of terrorism and the need to safeguard Islam from being hijacked by these terrorists and groups. Indonesia needs to come to terms that radicalized ideas based on misconstrued Islamic concepts preached by radical schools and preachers can never be the forefront of Islam in Indonesia.

Such task albeit never easy one due to the geographical size of the educational plateau in Indonesia; such initiative could be highlighted in popular media such as through forums engaging mainstream religious leaders and preachers to address outwardly such issues.
The International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) is a specialist centre within S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. The Centre seeks to integrate academic theory with practical knowledge, essential for complete and comprehensive understanding of threats from politically motivated groups. Its research staff comprises functional and regional analysts from South Asia, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, Oceania, Africa, Europe, North America and the Middle East. The research staff is drawn from academia and government agencies and also includes Muslim religious scholars. The Centre seeks to maintain its unique cultural and linguistic diversity. More than fifty percent of ICPVTR staff is Muslim.

Mission
ICPVTR conducts research, training and outreach programmes aimed at reducing the threat of politically motivated violence and at mitigating its effects on the international system.

Core Objectives
To conduct sustained research and analysis of terrorist, guerilla, militia and extremist political groups and their support bases. To this end, the Centre collects and analyses literature seeking to politicize, radicalize and mobilize the public into supporting extremism and participating in violence. To identify the strengths and weaknesses of international, state and societal responses in managing the threat of political violence. To provide high quality instruction and training for officials and future leaders engaged in combating terrorism and other forms of political violence. To advise government and inform societies affected by political violence on how best to manage the current and evolving threat.

Core Projects
A. Database

The ICPVTR terrorism database – the Global Pathfinder - is a one-stop repository for information on current and emerging threats.

The database consists of profiles of terrorists and terrorist groups, significant incidents, as well as profiles of training camps and individuals and institutions involved in terrorist financing. It also hosts primary and secondary documents including original documents collected from Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Bosnia, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines amongst others. Our special collection includes more than 250 videos recovered from Al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan, videos and training manuals from various conflict zones and over 400 jihadi websites.

B. Capacity Building
In addition to teaching courses at the Masters level, ICPVTR threat specialists conduct various levels of specialized courses for Singaporean and foreign law enforcement personnel from agencies like the military and police forces. The ICPVTR capacity building programme is geared towards providing world-class education and training for serving and future leaders in counter-terrorism.

C. Strategic Counter-Terrorism Projects
ICPVTR’s strategic counter-terrorism projects include ideological, legislative, educational, financial, media, informatics and developmental initiatives. These strategic projects seek to create an environment hostile to terrorist groups and unfriendly to their supporters and sympathizers. ICPVTR seeks to build a norm and an ethic against politically motivated violence, especially terrorism. As terrorists and extremists emerge from the community in which they live, the ICPVTR popularized the phrase “Communities Defeat Terrorism” in Singapore. Our staff actively participates in the work of the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG), which is engaged in counseling and rehabilitation of Jemaah Islamiyah detainees in Singapore.

For more information on ICPVTR, visit www.pvtr.org
The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) was established in January 2007 as an autonomous School within the Nanyang Technological University. RSIS’ mission is to be a leading research and graduate teaching institution in strategic and international affairs in the Asia-Pacific. To accomplish this mission, RSIS will:

- Provide a rigorous professional graduate education in international affairs with a strong practical and area emphasis
- Conduct policy-relevant research in national security, defence and strategic studies, diplomacy and international relations
- Collaborate with like-minded schools of international affairs to form a global network of excellence

Graduate Training in International Affairs
RSIS offers an exacting graduate education in international affairs, taught by an international faculty of leading thinkers and practitioners. The teaching programme consists of the Master of Science (MSc) degrees in Strategic Studies, International Relations, International Political Economy and Asian Studies as well as The Nanyang MBA (International Studies) offered jointly with the Nanyang Business School. The graduate teaching is distinguished by their focus on the Asia-Pacific region, the professional practice of international affairs and the cultivation of academic depth. Over 150 students, the majority from abroad, are enrolled with the School. A small and select Ph.D. programme caters to students whose interests match those of specific faculty members.

Research
Research at RSIS is conducted by five constituent Institutes and Centres: the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), the Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies, and the Temasek Foundation Centre for Trade & Negotiations (TFCTN). The focus of research is on issues relating to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and their implications for Singapore and other countries in the region. The School has three professorships that bring distinguished scholars and practitioners to teach and do research at the School. They are the S. Rajaratnam Professorship in Strategic Studies, the Ngee Ann Kongsi Professorship in International Relations, and the NTUC Professorship in International Economic Relations.

International Collaboration
Collaboration with other Professional Schools of international affairs to form a global network of excellence is a RSIS priority. RSIS will initiate links with other like-minded schools so as to enrich its research and teaching activities as well as adopt the best practices of successful schools.

For more information on the School, visit www.rsis.edu.sg