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Contents

<i>Editor's Note</i>	v
<i>Summaries</i>	vii
Making Peace with Pakistani Taliban to Isolate Al-Qaeda: Success and Failures	1
<i>Rohan Gunaratna and Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari</i>	
Post-Cold War Great Power Security Dynamics in the Asia-Pacific Region	27
<i>S. Mahmud Ali</i>	
Philippines' Counter Insurgency and Terrorism Campaign in Bangsamoro Southern Philippines: Lessons and Practices	49
<i>Taharudin Piang Ampatuan</i>	
South Asia and Regionalism: Searching for an Identity	77
<i>Badrul A. Khan</i>	
Aviation Security: The South Asian Perspective	95
<i>Geoff Harrison</i>	

Editor's Note

Welcome to the second volume of *Peace and Security Review*, a quarterly Journal of the Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS). BIPSS has already established itself as a leading think tank and research institution in Bangladesh for the study of a wide spectrum of peace and security concerns affecting Bangladesh, the region as a whole and beyond. BIPSS continues its endeavor to bridge the prevailing gap between the practitioners, academics and activists at all levels. BIPSS believes that a peaceful and secure world is the precondition for prosperity and growth for mankind. At heart, BIPSS contends that peace and security can be achieved through the sharing of knowledge, ideas and values among the committed stakeholders.

Our first volume received wide acclaim and we intend to continue on with that success in this volume of *Peace and Security Review*. Evident from the quality and depth of the articles adopted for this volume, we are certain that you, the reader, will gain much from the insights highlighted by our esteemed authors and indeed have much to debate. As ever, the wide ranging research focus of BIPSS is reflected in the varied topics covered in each of the articles comprising the current volume, ranging from counter insurgency strategies within Philippines to the significance of aviation security for South Asia.

Both nationally and internationally renowned scholars, academicians and policy makers have contributed to the current volume of *Peace and Security Review*, making it indispensable reading for those interested in the pursuit of peace and security. The current volume is enriched with imitates of the eminent specialists. These are: 'Making Peace with Pakistani Taliban,' 'Philippines' Counter Insurgency and Terrorism Campaign in Bangsamoro Southern Philippines: Lessons and Practices,' 'South Asia and regionalism: searching for an identity,' 'Post-Cold War War Great Power Security Dynamics in the Asia-Pacific Region' and 'Aviation security: The South Asian Perspective.'

We are appreciative of the support lent to us by our international editorial board and are indebted to the authors who contributed to this issue. We are grateful to the reviewers, whose proficiency and hard work has clearly paid off, culminating in the accomplishment of this volume. Having received enormous support, feedback and suggestions from our readers after the publication of the first issue of *Peace and Security Review* we have endeavored to address those thoughts where possible.

Indeed, we hope our readers will continue giving us their support and suggestions. We welcome lively responses on the articles presented in our journal as that can only be positive.

Peace and Security Review intends to be at the forefront of debate on issues that have implications for regional and international peace and security.

Major General ANM Muniruzzaman, ndc, psc (Retd.)
Editor

Summaries

Making Peace with Pakistani Taliban to Isolate Al-Qaeda: Successes and Failures

Rohan Gunaratna and Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan has become the epicentre of international terrorism in recent years. Located along the 2,400 km long rugged border separating Afghanistan and Pakistan, FATA has provided Al-Qaeda, the most hunted terrorist group in the world, with a robust and resilient sanctuary. According to the US Department of State's Country Reports on Terrorism 2007 released on 30 April 2008, FATA has provided Al-Qaeda's leadership with "greater mobility and ability to conduct training and operation planning, particularly that targeting Western Europe and the United States." This paper attempts to analyze the peace agreements signed by the Pakistani government with the Tribes and militants in South and North Waziristan Agencies between 2004 and 2006. It progresses to discussing the post-peace agreement situation arising in the Waziristan Agencies and its impact on the security of Pakistan. Particular stress is laid upon the need for a developmental response including humanitarian projects, to fighting both terrorism and insurgency emanating from the region in question and garnering and sustaining public support for the government's campaign against such elements.

Post-Cold War Great Power Security Dynamics in the Asia-Pacific Region

S. Mahmud Ali

The end of the Cold War and the coterminous implosion of the Soviet Union in the early 1990's marked a dramatic transition at the global strategic 'centre.' The Cold War, which hinged on a nuclear peace, was a potentially unstable system. The fear was that in the event of a temporary superiority, the other could launch a first strike, destroying deterrence and initiating a devastating escalatory chain. The Cold War's sudden and largely unanticipated end robbed the system of that acute clarity and bipolar structure. Uncertainty injected fluidity into the system and the transition to successor architecture is

proving to be long and complicated. This paper explores the effect of that uncertainty on the Asia-Pacific region.

Philippines' Counter Insurgency and Terrorism Campaign in Bangsamoro Southern Philippines: Lessons and Practices

Taharudin Piang Ampatuan

The Philippines, even before the tragic 11th September 2001 terrorist attack on the United States, has had a long history struggling against insurgency. This is the threat from the half century of communist insurgency and the four decades old Islamist inspired Muslim Secessionist Movement also known as Bangsamoro movement in Southern Philippines. The latter movement has a long history, but emerged as a greater, more radical threat as a result of their experience in the Afghan War. Having been exposed to the wider international Islamists movement, the Moros gained an appreciation of their place in the global struggle as well as the military skills necessary to implement their new found shared ideology. These skills were used in destructive attacks in the urban centers in the Philippines, such as the seizing and burning of a progressive Christian town of Ipil in Zamboanga Sibugay province in 1995, the Rizal day Mass transit (LRT) bombing attack in Manila in 2000, the bombing and sinking of Super ferry Inter-Island sea vessel in the off shore of Manila in 2003 and the Davao City international airport Bombing in 2003 that resulted to hundred of civilian casualties. This paper concentrates on the Philippine counter terrorism response to the Bangsamoro secessionist movement. The article argues the need for a comprehensive strategy to dealing with the movement. Otherwise, it is argued that the Philippine government's attempts would remain half hearted and would ultimately result in the perpetuation of the struggle. The article concludes by elucidating appropriate policy recommendations.

South Asia and Regionalism: Searching for an Identity

Badrul A. Khan

South Asia is in the middle of a profound change. This paper analyses the prospect of regionalisation in South Asia. Regionalism remains problematic for the region, which the paper analyses by taking into account its diffused geo-strategic context generated by the hostility between two of its important neighbours—India and Pakistan and the involvement of the USA in regional politics. Difficulties in imagining South Asia as region also remain embedded in the historical grievances and mistrust that countries in South Asia have towards each other. A crucial point in regionalisation debate is its asymmetric nature. India's galloping developmental pace has created new

problems for intra-regional relationship. Most states in South Asia unlike India have not been able to overcome the weight of colonially inherited systems and remain economically backward. This asymmetry has allowed South Asia to acquire a centre-periphery pattern whereby the structural division of wealth and labour has gained a relation of dependency. Asymmetry also manifests in the governance of South Asian countries. A regime with open and liberal economy is crucial in curbing out a strong independent region yet, most South Asian states apart from India lack bourgeoisie hegemony and remains politically vulnerable to non-democratic and dictatorial rule. It however seems paradoxical that despite deep asymmetry no hegemonic power has come to exist in South Asia. This has significantly obstructed the possibility of initiating and maintaining economic and political institutions, designed to deliver collective good. The prospect of regionalisation in the longer term is however not too gloomy. One example of liberal pragmatism is the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) signed in Islamabad at the 12th summit meeting in 2004 and the paper argues that the implementation of the Free Trade Agreement will help overcome the non-tariff barriers, potentially bringing positive changes in areas of trade, finance and indeed regionalisation.

Aviation Security: The South Asian Perspective

Geoff Harrison

The age of modern international terrorism began on 12th July 1968 with the hijacking of El Al Flight from Rome. It could be argued that one of the earliest events of global *jihadi* terrorism was the 1994 hijacking of Air France Flight with the intention of using it in a suicide attack against Paris. The most dramatic terrorist attack in history was the aviation attacks conducted by Al-Qaeda on 11th September 2001. One can trace the development of terrorism as a phenomenon and its tactical development through studying their interaction with international civil aviation. Even as terrorism moves through its organizational evolution, from highly structured organizations to the self generated and operationalized cells, such as those that planned to attack Fort Dix in New Jersey and the plot against JFK, their focus remains on aviation. The paper provides a fresh insight into an ever important dimension of security. Whilst the attacks of September 11th may have brought to the fore, the importance of ensuring aviation security, debate on the topic has lingered since the 1960's. The article provides a sailable method to better evaluate the operational environment faced by civil aviation industry. Through examining the evolution of the threat environment and applying a risk based approach to evaluating the impact on the system, the article provides a rigorous view of the challenges to avian security and posits useful and realistic solutions for threat reduction.

Making Peace with Pakistani Taliban to Isolate Al-Qaeda: Successes and Failures

*Rohan Gunaratna and Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari**

I. INTRODUCTION

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan has become the epicentre of international terrorism in recent years. Located along the 2,400 km long rugged border separating Afghanistan and Pakistan, FATA has provided Al-Qaeda, the most hunted terrorist group in the world, with a robust and resilient sanctuary. According to the US Department of State's Country Reports on Terrorism 2007 released on 30 April 2008, FATA has provided Al-Qaeda's leadership with "greater mobility and ability to conduct training and operation planning, particularly that targeting Western Europe and the United States."¹

Similarly, the EUROPOL's Annual "Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2008" released on 28 April 2008 describes FATA as the "command and control centre" for Al-Qaeda's "remaining core leadership" planning attacks in the EU. According to the report, the foiled plot in Germany, related to Islamic Jihad Union based in the tribal areas and recent cases in UK and Denmark

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¹ Chapter 5: Terrorist Safe Havens: Strategies, Tactics, Tools for Disrupting or Eliminating Safe Havens, Country Report on Terrorism 2007, US Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/>

indicated an increasingly assertive and efficient Pakistani-based command and control of terrorism in EU. The report says that the Afghan Taliban and pro-Taliban groups in Pakistan have links to the increasingly active core-structure of Al-Qaeda. The report further said that while terrorist links between Pakistan and the EU were almost exclusively focused on the UK, they have recently been expanded to the rest of the EU as well.²

The FATA region assumed international significance following the arrival of Afghan Taliban and foreign militants linked to Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organisations after the US-led coalition attack on Afghanistan. Under pressure from the United States, Pakistani military incursions into FATA to hunt the retreating Al-Qaeda leaders and members in 2002-2003 had unintended consequences. The overwhelming kinetic approach adopted by the Pakistani forces mobilized existing militant groups in FATA and Pakistan and spawned new Pakistani groups dedicated to protecting the foreign fighters. To prevent a popular backlash from Pakistani people in general and tribes in FATA in particular, and to dissociate foreign militants from the local Pakistani militant groups, the Pakistani government signed a series of peace agreements with Pakistani Taliban groups in South and North Waziristan Agencies.

Did these peace agreements benefit Al-Qaeda, Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Taliban groups? With the ease on restriction on the mobility of Pakistani Taliban following the withdrawal of Pakistani security forces in the post-peace deals, has the strength and influence of Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda grown? Has sustained and prolonged propaganda politicised and radicalised a segment of the FATA population into believing that the foreign groups including Al-Qaeda are waging a jihad to defend Islam and Muslims? This paper will analyse the peace agreements signed by the Pakistani government with the Tribes and militants in South and North Waziristan Agencies between 2004 and 2006. It will also discuss the post-peace agreement situation arising in the Waziristan Agencies and its impact on the security of Pakistan.

II. BACKGROUND

FATA is located in the north-west of Pakistan along the border with Afghanistan, and is spread over an area of 27,220 square kilometres. It comprises of seven agencies — Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North and South Waziristan. The FATA region has remained autonomous since Pakistan's inception in August 1947, and is governed by the British-era archaic administrative system based on the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR).

² "TE-SAT-EU Terrorism Trend and Situation Report," EUROPOL 2008, http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/EU_Terrorism_Situation_and_Trend_Report_TE-SAT/TE-SAT2008.pdf

The entire FATA region is ruled through an indirect system that involves the tribal elders playing a dominant role. Similarly, the law and order is governed by local tribal forces known as *khassadars* (tribal police) and levies as well as civil armed forces — Frontier Corps and Frontier Constabulary — that fall under the Ministry of Interior.

After Al-Qaeda was dislodged from Tora Bora in Afghanistan in late 2001-early 2002, the terrorist militant organisation retreated to FATA. After relocating to Waziristan, both Al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban linked up with the Pakistan Taliban and other Pakistani groups. There was no other way for these two entities to survive in the post 9/11 period than to accept the traditional hospitality of the local tribes under the local tribal code “Pashtunwali.” Subsequently, Al-Qaeda co-opted local tribal militants in South Waziristan Agency, who later became the Pakistani Taliban.³ Thereafter Al-Qaeda used its tribal affiliations as well as nurtured and built a clerical support base. For instance, after Al-Qaeda’s deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri moved to Waziristan and stayed there during a part of 2002, he eventually moved to Bajaur Agency. As his wife and two children were killed during US attacks in Afghanistan in November 2001, al-Zawahiri married a woman from the Mahmud tribe in Bajaur Agency. This is peculiar of Al-Qaeda leaders as Osama bin Laden also married a woman from Yemen to strengthen his ties to the Yemeni tribes. Al-Zawahiri’s marriage enabled the Deputy Leader of Al-Qaeda to develop strong tribal links to the leadership of a proscribed terrorist group, Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM), in Bajaur Agency. Maulana Faqir Muhammad, also from the Mahmud tribe, leads TNSM in Bajaur Agency. Similarly al Zawahiri built a relationship with Maulana Liaquat Hussein who ran the Ziaul Uloom Taleemul Quran seminary in Chinagai in Bajaur until his death in a pre-dawn helicopter attack, ostensibly by Pakistani security forces in October 2006. Through these contacts, al-Zawahiri was able to avoid arrest and reconstitute a scattered Al-Qaeda in disarray. As the de facto head of the Majlis Shura (consultative council) of Al-Qaeda, al-Zawahiri re-established contact with Al-Qaeda cells in Pakistan and overseas. He also built alliances with groups in the Arabian Peninsula, the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia and Al-Qaeda’s Diaspora in Iran.⁴

³ Khalid Hassan, ‘Tribesmen Fought for Money, Not Al-Qaeda,’ Daily Times, 17 February 2005, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_17-2-2005_pg7_55.

⁴ Some of Al-Qaeda’s top leaders that are believed to be interned in Iran include head of Al-Qaeda’s Security Committee, Sayf al-Adl, head of Al-Qaeda’s Training Sub-Section, Ahmad Abdallah Ahmad alias Abu Muhammad al-Masri, Sulaiman Abu Gaith and Osama bin Laden’s two sons, Muhammad and Saad bin Ladin.

Despite intermittent pressure from the US and Pakistani government, Al-Qaeda and many other foreign and Pakistani militant groups re-established a smaller and more rudimentary version of their Afghan training infrastructure in Shakai Valley of South Waziristan in 2002-2003. Operating out of FATA and the neighboring settled areas, the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Al-Qaeda trained over 100 Westerners of Pakistani heritage to mount attacks in Europe and North America. For example the leader of the July 7, 2005 (7/7) bombers, Mohamed Siddique Khan and the leader of the failed July 21, 2005 (21/7) attacks in UK were both trained in the Dir district of NWFP. Furthermore, the Al-Qaeda leader in the UK, Dhiren Barot alias Abu Issa al-Brittani aka Abu Issa al-Hindi visited Waziristan to consult the Al-Qaeda leadership while planning to attack multiple targets in UK and the US, including the Prudential building, New York Stock Exchange and Citigroup's headquarters in New York, as well as the International Monetary Fund's headquarters in Washington D.C.

Both Osama bin Laden and al-Zawahiri planned, prepared and executed two failed assassination attempts against General Pervez Musharraf, the President of Pakistan in December 2003. After Al-Qaeda targeted the Pakistani leadership, Arab militants including Al-Qaeda faced mounting pressure within Pakistan, since Musharraf ordered the Pakistani military and intelligence service — the Inter-Services-Intelligence (ISI) to hunt Al-Qaeda.

The subsequent military operations in the South Waziristan Agency (SWA) in late 2003 had unintended consequences. The traditional way of dealing with the tribes was hastily abandoned and instead massive military power that was used rendered the local administration and their protégés, the tribal elders, ineffective.⁵ The military officers including the Corps Commander Peshawar took over the responsibility of dealing with FATA and the militancy issue and sidelined the local administration as well as the Governor of NWFP.

The military strategy by the Pakistani government, however, had mixed results. While some foreign militants were killed in various small-scale “search and destroy” military operations, Al-Qaeda’s central leadership remained unharmed and relocated to the North Waziristan Agency (NWA). With military operations becoming increasingly unpopular with the common tribesmen of South Waziristan Agency and the general populace of Pakistan, the government signed a series of peace agreements to isolate Al-Qaeda from the Pakistani Taliban. The Pakistani government’s strategy in signing the

⁵ Interview with Khalid Aziz, former Chief Secretary of NWFP Government and former Political Agent of South Waziristan and Khyber Agency, 17 May 2007.

peace agreements was also aimed at isolating Al-Qaeda from local groups in FATA and to make the local environment hostile for Al-Qaeda and other foreign militant groups.

III. THE THREE PEACE AGREEMENTS

The Pakistani government signed three peace agreements with the three significant tribes inhabiting the South and North Waziristan Agency, namely the Ahmadzai Wazir, Mahsud and Uthmanzai Wazir tribes. All the three peace agreements became a subject of intense debate among academic and policy makers in the world. The peace agreements were the verbal Shakai Peace Agreement with Taliban leader Nek Mohammed and tribal elders of the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe in South Waziristan on April 24, 2004;⁶ the Sararogha Agreement with militant commander Baitullah Mahsud and tribal elders of the Mahsud tribe in South Waziristan on 7 February 2005;⁷ and the North Waziristan Agreement with Taliban commander, Hafiz Gul Bahadur and tribal elders of the Uthmanzai Wazir in September 2006.⁸

Shakai Peace Agreement (April 2004)

After the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in November 2001, the Afghan Taliban and foreign militants belonging to Al-Qaeda, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and other North African militant groups started pouring into the South Waziristan Agency (SWA) of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Subsequently, Al-Qaeda and other foreign militant groups took refuge in the Shakai area of SWA, which is inhabited by the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe, and started regrouping themselves and organising their terrorist infrastructure. The Zalikhel clan of the Ahmadzai-Wazir tribe were the main hosts of the Arabs while the Yargulkhel sub-clan of the Zalikhel clan became the main host of the Uzbeks on the Wana plains of South Waziristan. Nek Muhammad, an Ahmadzai Wazir tribesman and a Yargulkhel known for his long association with Mullah Omar and Afghan Taliban since 1994, organised a handful of pro-Taliban militant in his area, and started giving protection to the foreign militants.

By mid-2003, the Pakistani government began receiving information about the presence of Al-Qaeda and linked terrorist groups in the Shakai area. At the same time, it started receiving international pressure, mostly from the

⁶ Iqbal Khattak, "Army Embraces Wanted Tribesmen" *Daily Times*, 25 April 2004.

⁷ Dilawar Khan Wazir, "Amnesty Granted to Militant Leader," *Dawn*, 8 February 2005.

⁸ Raja Asghar, "Waziristan Deal: Omar's Role Denied," *Dawn*, 26 September 2006.

US, to disrupt the Al-Qaeda infrastructure in the SWA and kill or apprehend Al-Qaeda militants. Subsequently, Pakistan started putting pressure on the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe to handover the foreign militants or purge them out of their territory. On 2 October 2003, the Pakistani government killed an Al-Qaeda leader, Ahmad Said Khadr alias Abdur Rehman al-Canadi aka Abdur Rehman al-Masri, and Hassan Makhsum, chief of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in a gunship helicopter attack in the Shakai area.⁹ The incident marked the first attack by Pakistani security forces in the SWA in which a prominent Al-Qaeda leader was killed.

The subsequent military operations by Pakistan against Nek Muhammad-led Taliban militants from the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe between October 2003 and April 2004 met with stiff resistance from Nek Muhammad. During this period, Al-Qaeda gradually relocated from the Shakai area of SWA to the adjoining North Waziristan Agency (NWA), and took refuge in the Shawal Valley, Saidgai Wazir, Dattakhel, Miranshah and Mirali. The IMU, however, stayed back and fought alongside Nek Muhammad against the Pakistani security forces. In one such operation, Tahir Yuldashev, head of the IMU, was severely injured, but evaded arrest at the hands of Pakistani security forces.¹⁰ Some of the IMU militants also moved to the area inhabited by the Mahsud tribe of SWA.

On 24 April 2004, a verbal agreement, commonly known as the Shakai Peace Agreement, was reached between the Pakistani Government, the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe and Taliban militants led by Nek Muhammad.¹¹ The Shakai agreement, however, eventually fell through due to non-compliance, with each side accusing the other of violating the agreement — thanks partly to the unwritten nature of the agreement.¹² Nek Muhammad was eventually killed in a predator drone strike in June 2004.¹³ The absconding associates of Nek Muhammad revived the Shakai agreement in October 2004 after fresh negotiations between the government and the militants.¹⁴

⁹ "Chronology: Son of Al-Qaeda, Ahmad Said Khadr Killed in Pakistan," *Frontline*, www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/khadr/family/cron.html.

¹⁰ "Uzbekistan Seeks Info About Militants Arrested in Pakistan Tribal Area," *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, Vol. 5, No. 7, 7 April 2004, The Central Asia Caucasus Institute, SAIS, John Hopkins University, US.

¹¹ Iqbal Khattak, "Army Embraces Wanted Tribesmen," *Daily Times*, 25 April 2004.

¹² Iqbal Khattak, "Yargulkhels asked to Surrender Nek and Group within 24 Hours," *Daily Times*, 9 June 2004.

¹³ Ayaz Gul, "Pakistan Military Kills Alleged Al-Qaeda Facilitator," *Voice of America*, 18 June 2004.

¹⁴ Iqbal Khattak and Mujeebur Rehman, "Waziri Militants Agree to Peace Pact," *Daily Times*, 12 November 2004.

Sararogha Peace Agreement (February 2005)

After reaching the Shakai Agreement with the Ahmadzai Wazir Tribe in April 2004, the Pakistani security forces turned their attention to the Mahsud Tribe of the South Waziristan Agency (SWA), where many foreign militants, especially the Tahir Yuldashev-led IMU militants, had taken refuge following the military operations against Ahmadzai Wazir. An extensive military operation was launched in June 2004 against the Mahsud faction of the local Taliban militants led by Abdullah Mahsud and Baitullah Mahsud.¹⁵ On 7 February 2005, the Pakistani government signed the Sararogha Agreement, in the pattern of Shakai Agreement, with the tribal elders of Mahsud tribe and the Mahsud Taliban militants led by Baitullah Mahsud.¹⁶ The Pakistani government, however, refused to grant amnesty to Abdullah Mahsud on account of his abduction of two Chinese engineers in October 2004 from the nearby area of Gomalzam.¹⁷ Both the Chinese were working on the Gomalzam Dam project which was being built by China's state-run Sino Hydro Corp in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP).¹⁸ One of the Chinese engineers was eventually killed in a subsequent rescue operation by the Pakistani security forces, while the other was recovered unharmed. Abdullah Mahsud, on his part, also refused to sign the Sararogha Agreement¹⁹ and preferred to travel to Afghanistan's Zabul province to fight the US-led foreign troops. He was eventually killed by Pakistani security forces in Zhob in Balochistan Province in July 2007, while travelling back to South Waziristan from Zabul Province of Afghanistan.²⁰

North Waziristan Agreement (September 2006)

The North Waziristan Agency (NWA) assumes tremendous significance compared to any other Agency/District of FATA, since most of the leadership of Al-Qaeda and other foreign militant groups are based in NWA and operate from there. Similarly, Miranshah, the headquarters of NWA, is also the meeting place of local Taliban shura (consultative council) where almost all

¹⁵ Ismail Khan and Dalawar Khan Wazir, "Three Die in South Waziristan Action," *Dawn*, 17 June 2004.

¹⁶ Dilawar Khan Wazir, "Amnesty Granted to Militant Leader," *Dawn*, 8 February 2005.

¹⁷ Iqbal Khattak, "Kidnappers of Chinese Engineers Demand Foreign Militants' Release," *Daily Times*, 11 October 2004.

¹⁸ Oliver August, "Ex-Guantanamo Detainee Threatens to Kill Chinese Hostages," *Times Online*, 11 October 2004.

¹⁹ "Abdullah Mahsud Says He Will Continue Jihad," *Daily Times*, 10 February 2005.

²⁰ "Taliban Commander: Abdullah Mahsud Killed in Pakistan," *Pakistan Times*, 25 July 2007.

the Taliban factions presently operating in North and South Waziristan Agencies in FATA, frequently meet under the leadership of regional Afghan Taliban commander, Sirajuddin Haqqani aka Khalifa, son of Soviet-era Afghan veteran mujahideen commander, Maulana Jalaluddin Haqqani.²¹

Most of the cross-border infiltration of Afghanistan's adjoining province of Khost takes place from NWA territory. Similarly, the two major tribes of NWA — Uthmanzai Wazir and Daur — continue to serve as hosts to Al-Qaeda and other foreign militant groups.

The Pakistani security forces initiated military operations in NWA against Al-Qaeda and linked terrorists groups in mid-2005. The operations started in the Shawal Valley and were later extended to the Saidgai Wazir, Dattakhel, Miranshah and Mirali regions. The Taliban militants in North Waziristan are led by Hafiz Gul Bahadur who is an Uthmanzai Wazir, while his two deputies, Maulana Sadiq Noor and Maulana Abdul Khaliq Haqqani are Daur.

Some of the leading Al-Qaeda commanders killed in government operations in North Waziristan during 2004-2008 include Hamza al-Rabia (December 2005),²² Haitham al-Yemeni (May 2005),²³ Abu Laith al-Libi, Abu Obeida Tawari al-Obeidi and Abu Adel al-Kuwaiti (February 2008).²⁴

However, the involvement of local tribal elders, religious clerics, parliamentarians, as well as a personal initiative by Lt. Gen. (Retd) Ali Muhammad

²¹ Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin's network is commonly known as "Haqqani Network. Jalaluddin Haqqani is considered to be the closest aide of Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar. Haqqani had also remained a prominent militant commander in the 1980s resistance against the Russian occupation of Afghanistan. He remained a minister during the Taliban government and a top consultant to Mullah Omar. Haqqani Network has recently emerged as the most dangerous and challenging foe for the ISAF-NATO coalition forces in Afghanistan and is close to Al-Qaeda leadership and involved in a series of recent attacks in Kabul, including the Serena hotel bombing in early 2008 and attempt on President Karzai during the annual day military parade in April 2008. Imtiaz Ali, 'The Haqqani Network and Cross Border Terrorism in Afghanistan', *Terrorism Monitor*, Volume 6, Issue 6 (March 24, 2008), Jamestown Foundation, http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?issue_id=4431.

²² Hamza Rabia, an Egyptian by nationality, was believed to be No.3 of Al-Qaeda and head of the organisation's external operations. 'A Look at the Predator Drone That Killed Libi', *Daily Times*, 3 February 2008

²³ Haitham al-Yemeni was Al-Qaeda's explosive expert. "CIA Drone Killed Al-Qaeda Operative," *NBC News*, 14 May 2005.

²⁴ Abu Laith al-Libi was the leading figure of Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and the one who initiated the merger of GSPC of Algeria with Al-Qaeda. "Terrorism: Three Al-Qaeda Leaders Killed in US Attack," *adnkronosInternational (AKI)*, 5 February 2008, <http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/Security/?id=1.0.1845929971>.

Jan Orakzai,²⁵ a tribal native from the Orakzai Agency of FATA who was appointed as the Governor of NWFP in May 2006,²⁶ resulted in a ceasefire between the security forces and the local Taliban militants in June 2006.²⁷ It was also reported that the late Mullah Abdullah, acting on the orders of Mullah Omar, the supreme leader of the Afghan Taliban, was instrumental in advising the Pakistani Taliban to negotiate a ceasefire with the Pakistani government. The ceasefire eventually led to the infamous September 2006 North Waziristan Agreement.²⁸ The agreement was signed between the Pakistani government and local tribal elders of North Waziristan, local clerics and the Taliban.²⁹ Unlike the previous agreements, the September 2006 Agreement was a written one.

IV. CONTENTS OF THE PEACE AGREEMENTS

The three peace agreements — Shakai, Sararogha and North Waziristan — consist of more or less the same stipulations. Some of the important stipulations in the three peace agreements are:³⁰

1. Law enforcement agencies, government installations and officers will not be attacked and there will be no targeted killing whatsoever.
2. The Taliban will setup a parallel administration in North and South Waziristan. The Pakistan Government will be the working body. The Political Administration will be contacted for resolving issues. The Administration will resolve issues according to the laws implemented by the respective tribes and Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR).
3. There will be no cross border infiltration into the neighboring country Afghanistan for any type of armed activity. However, there will be no restriction on traveling according to the rules and regulations for the purpose of business, trade and meeting relatives.

²⁵ According to reports, Governor Orakzai was instrumental in the signing of the peace agreement and described the accord as “unprecedented in tribal history.” See Barbera Plett, “Analysis: Pakistan’s Deal With Taleban,” *BBC*, 6 September 2006.

²⁶ Sohail Abdul Nasir, “The Talibanisation of the North-West Frontier,” *Jamestown Foundation*, June 15, 2006, *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. 4, Issue 12.

²⁷ “Local Taliban Announce Ceasefire in Waziristan,” *Daily Times*, 26 June 2006.

²⁸ Raja Asghar, “Waziristan Deal: Omar’s Role Denied,” *Dawn*, 26 September 2006.

²⁹ For an English version of the text of North Waziristan peace agreement, please see “Return of the Taliban: North Waziristan Peace Pact,” *Frontline*, 3 October 2006, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/etc/nwdeal.html>.

³⁰ Evagoras C. Leventis, “Waziristan Accord,” <http://globalpolitician.com/articles.asp?print=true&id=3893>.

4. There will be no incursions into the settled districts of North West Frontier Province (NWFP) adjacent to North and South Waziristan, nor will there be a parallel government.
5. All foreigners should leave the North and South Waziristan Agencies. If anyone is not in a position to leave the area, they will be allowed to stay in the area on surety or guarantee of the local tribesmen. Such foreigners should remain peaceful and honour all clauses of the agreement.
6. Every tribesmen arrested during the military operation by the Pakistani government will be released. They will not be arrested again for what they have done in the past. The Government will lift all the public sanctions.
7. The Government will remove all the new check posts from the roads and soldiers and levis will be stationed at old check posts, as they were in the past.
8. After the pact, the Government will continue routine ground and air operations.
9. For the recovery of those who were innocently killed during the operation and as a compensation for the property that was damaged during the operation, the Government will provide grants.
10. There is no ban on the use of weapons according to the tribal traditions and there is no ban on weapons for the government either; but the ban on large weapons will continue.
11. The implementation of pact will start with the removal of Army check posts.

V. ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM OF THE PEACE AGREEMENTS

The enforcement mechanism of the three agreements consisted of a committee comprising of local tribal elders and religious scholars, which was assigned the responsibility of maintaining constant communication between the government and the respective tribes to review and ensure implementation of the pact. Similarly, in cases of non-compliance, action could be taken against the tribes.³¹

The peace committees formed immediately following the agreements failed to provide a useful mechanism to reduce the threat of non-compliance.

³¹ Evagoras C. Leventis, "Waziristan Accord," *op.cit.*

Made up of tribal elders and the clerics, each tribe and area had its own committee. It was earlier thought that most of the Taliban commanders had come from the seminaries, and therefore the latter would be able to exercise their influence on the former and help in making the peace agreements a success. Similarly, the tribal elders, which exercised considerable influence and were respected within their respective tribes, had become a spent force when the Taliban forced them into submission or acquiesced them to Taliban rule after killing more than 200 pro-government tribal elders between 2004 and 2007. Although the enforcement mechanism did come into play whenever there was an issue between the Taliban militants and the government, it was not effective all the time.

It was observed that the peace agreements failed to rein in the local Taliban and foreign militants in the Waziristan region. Soon after signing the peace agreements, the local Taliban denied the presence of foreign militants in the area.³² They continued their cross-border infiltration into Afghanistan to attack foreign troops based in the country. Similarly, the local Taliban continued to target pro-government tribal elders and individuals with impunity. According to an estimate, more than 200 tribal elders were killed between 2004 and 2006.³³ Also, the Taliban openly flouted the peace agreements and went ahead with establishing parallel Taliban governments in South and North Waziristan regions.³⁴ Since the signing of the September 2006 peace agreement, the local Taliban groups have also begun to extend their influence and activities in the settled districts of the NWFP.³⁵

However, the implementation of peace agreements varied from case to case. In some instances, for example, the Shakai Agreement of April 2004, the peace agreements remained an effective instrument in reining in the Taliban activities while in others, it provided a much needed breathing space to the local Taliban to regroup and strengthen their hold on their areas. While General Ali Muhammad Jan Orakzai, former Governor of the NWFP and FATA, continued to remain optimistic towards the efficacy of the peace agreements, latter developments in 2007 suggested that all is not well on the ground. Having failed to rein in the Pakistani Taliban militants, Orakzai resigned in January 2008.

³² Arthur Bright, "Pakistan Signs Peace Deal with Pro-Taliban Militants," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 6 September 2006.

³³ Pamela Constable, "In Tribal Pakistan, An Uneasy Quiet," *Washington Post*, 28 September 2006.

³⁴ "Taliban Ban Un-Islamic Activities," *Daily Times*, 12 June 2006.

³⁵ Mobeen Chughtai, "Talibanisation of NWFP," *Vista Magazine*, 21 August 2007. The Article can also be accessed at <http://stalin-mao.net/?p=1080>.

At present, the security situation in both the North and South Waziristan Agencies remain precarious. Although a fragile peace exists with the Uthmanzai Wazirs and the Ahmadzai Wazirs since the peace agreements with them were revived, trouble in dealing with the Mahsud militants continues to haunt the government.

VI. POST-PEACE AGREEMENT SITUATION

Security Situation in Ahmadzai Wazir Tribal Territory

The security situation in Ahmadzai Wazir areas in the South Waziristan Agency (SWA) has improved considerably and the Shakai agreement is working effectively. In March 2007, tribal elders and Taliban commanders Malik Khanan and Mullah Nazir of the Ahmadzai Wazir Taliban militants purged Uzbek militants linked to IMU along with their local supporters—Commander Haji Omar, Noor Islam and Haji Sharif—and also put an end to cross-border infiltration into Afghanistan's neighbouring provinces of Paktia and Paktika. The clash between IMU and the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe erupted when IMU militants attempted to assassinate a local tribal elder of the Zariakhel sub-clan in March 2007.³⁶ There were also reports of excesses committed by Uzbeks against the local tribesmen and the former were blamed for involvement in the killing of tribal elders, kidnappings for ransom in the region and attempting to impose their version of Islam—the Wahabi doctrine—on the local people.³⁷

The Pakistani government seized the opportunity and provided material and human resources to the tribal elders and Mullah Nazir to crush the IMU militants. Following the eviction of IMU militants from the area, relations between Mullah Nazir and the Pakistani government improved considerably and the former is now described as a pro-government Taliban leader.

To maintain peace in the region, the government also initiated development schemes in the region, which include building an airport and a highway that bypasses the Mehsud territory, thereby freeing the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe from the threat of blockade and pressure tactics of the Mahsuds.³⁸

However, differences between Mullah Nazir and pro-Uzbek militants as well as Baitullah Mahsud continue to pose threat to the latter. On 6 January 2008, Uzbek militants attacked the office of Mullah Nazir and Khanan

³⁶ Daniel Kimmage, "Central Asia: Has IMU Reached the End of Line?," *RFERL*, 30 March 2007.

³⁷ Kim Barker, "Pakistani Tribes Fight Alleged Al-Qaeda Allies," *The Seattle Times*, 24 April 2007.

³⁸ Iqbal Khattak, "Airport in Wana will cater to civil, military flights," *Daily Times*, 28 November 2007.

separately. However, both survived the onslaught.³⁹ On 13 January, the Uzbek militants launched a second attack on Malik Khanan, which failed to kill him.⁴⁰ The attempt led to a worsening of relations between the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe and the Mahsud tribe since the former blamed the latter for giving sanctuary to the IMU-linked Uzbeks. Some reports have indicated that the government has approached the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe to help the security forces in their ongoing operation against Baitullah Mahsud-led Taliban militants.⁴¹ However, it would be a dangerous move since it may ignite tribal warfare between Ahmadzai Wazir and Mahsud Tribe, which could require every tribesman to come to the assistance of their tribe.

In an effort to help bridge the differences between Mullah Nazir, IMU militants and pro-IMU local militants and Baitullah Mahsud, a three-member delegation of the Afghan Taliban visited the South Waziristan Agency (SWA) in mid-January 2008 to hold talks with Mullah Nazir, the supreme leader of the Ahmadzai Taliban militants.⁴² The topic of their discussion was the return of the pro-Uzbek Ahmadzai Wazir Taliban commanders — Haji Omar, Maulvi Abbas and Maulvi Sharif — and IMU militants to Wana, the headquarters of SWA. These Taliban commanders were purged from the tribe when they supported the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)-linked Uzbeks against the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe and Mullah Nazir in March 2007. The talks, however, were inconclusive when Mullah Nazir reportedly offered to allow the absconding Taliban commanders to return to the Ahmadzai Wazir territory if they pledged allegiance to him.⁴³ On the issue of the return of IMU-linked Uzbeks to Wana, tribal elders of the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe continue to resist the demand.⁴⁴ Apart from discussing the issue of the return of Haji Omar and others, it was surmised that the Afghan Taliban may also be weighting the preparation of the local Ahmadzai Wazir Taliban for their participation in the upcoming “spring offence 2008” in Afghanistan against ISAF-NATO troops. It remains to be seen how Mullah Nazir maintains a balance between the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani government, since he is heavily dependent on the support of the latter

³⁹ “Nine Pro-Govt Militants Slain in Waziristan: Maulvi Nazir Points Finger at Baitullah,” *Dawn*, 8 January 2008.

⁴⁰ “Two Uzbeks Killed in Attack on Pro-Govt Elder,” *Daily Times*, 14 January 2008.

⁴¹ Aamir Latif, “Taliban vs Taliban,” *IslamOnline.net*, 30 January 2008.

⁴² “Wazir Tribesmen Wary of Uzbek Militants’ Return to South Waziristan,” *Daily Times*, 31 January, 2008.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

against Uzbek militants and the absconding Taliban leaders. It also needs to be mentioned that cross-border infiltration across South Waziristan-Afghanistan border has tremendously decreased since May 2007, due to pressure by the government on Mullah Nazir. It was also reported that Haji Omar and other Ahmadzai Wazir Taliban leaders have shifted in December 2007 to the North Waziristan Agency (NWA) from the South Waziristan Agency (SWA) where they had been taking refuge since April 2007.⁴⁵

Security Situation in the Uthmanzai Wazir and Daur Tribal Territory

Following non-compliance of the September 2006 peace agreement by the local Taliban militants of North Waziristan Agency, Pakistani government redeployed security forces in the region in July 2007, and started monitoring the movement of local and foreign militants in the region. The deployment of security forces coincided with the launching of "Operation Silence" against Lal Majsid (Red Mosque) clerics in Islamabad on 3 July 2007. On 14 July 2007, the local Taliban militants threatened to scrap the peace agreement if the government did not withdraw its forces within 24 hours.⁴⁶ Subsequently, renewed clashes took place between the Pakistani security forces and the local Taliban militants. In October 2007, the government used gunship helicopters and airplanes to bomb militants' hideouts in Mirali area of North Waziristan Agency, which killed a large number of militants as well as civilians.⁴⁷ Soon after, a rift developed between the local and IMU-linked Uzbeks, with the locals holding the Uzbeks responsible for the recent killings.⁴⁸ A tribal lashkar (militia) was also raised by the Daur tribe under the leadership of Nek Muhammad Daur alias Nikami to evict Uzbeks and other foreign militants from the Mirali area. However the lashkar failed to achieve much, since the foreigners had the backing of the local Taliban.⁴⁹

With no end in sight, the local tribal elders and parliamentarians initiated efforts to effect a ceasefire between the two warring parties in October 2007. Subsequently, the local Taliban militants led by Hafiz Gul Bahadur in North

⁴⁵ "Omar dismayed at Followers Over Wildcat Actions," *Statesman*, 28 January 2008.

⁴⁶ "Militants Threaten to Scrap Peace Deal with Pak Government," *Himtimes*, 14 July 2007, http://www.himtimes.com/india/india.php?subaction=showfull&id=1184417337&archive=&start_from=&ucat=16&.

⁴⁷ It was reported that nearly 200 Uzbek militants were killed in the operation. Please see B. Raman, "What Sparked the Deadly Clashes in the Tribal Areas," *Rediff News*, 10 October 2007, <http://www.rediff.com/news/2007/oct/10raman.htm>.

⁴⁸ "2 Soldiers Killed in Waziristan Attacks," *Daily Times*, 23 October 2007.

⁴⁹ "ANP Leader among Ten Killed in Suicide Attack," *The News*, 12 February 2008.

Waziristan announced a unilateral ceasefire on 17 December 2007, saying that they would not attack Pakistani security forces till January 1, 2008.⁵⁰ An unnamed militant commander told *The News* that the ceasefire decision was taken in a meeting of senior militant commanders held with tribal militants' central leader, Hafiz Gul Bahadur, in the chair. He said Hafiz Gul Bahadur directed his fellow militants to stop attacks on security forces in North Waziristan till 1 January, 2008. The militant commander also said that militants would have no objection over movement of security forces in the region during the ceasefire. He added that Bahadur directed his fighters to avoid abducting soldiers during the truce and let them travel wherever they wanted to go.⁵¹ The militants twice renewed the ceasefire,⁵² before renewing the September 2006 peace agreement, albeit with slight modifications.⁵³

Standoff with the Mahsud Tribal Militants

The Mahsud Taliban militants are led by Baitullah Mahsud, who has recently emerged as the most dangerous and notorious Taliban warlord in the entire FATA belt. Baitullah was blamed for recruiting, training and conducting a series of suicide attacks throughout Pakistan. In August 2007, Baitullah scrapped the Sararogha peace agreement on the grounds that Pakistani security forces were being redeployed in the area.⁵⁴ The abduction of nearly 300 soldiers near Laddah in August 2007 and demands for the release of 24 terrorists and would-be-suicide bombers being held in the Pakistani jails was perceived as humiliating for the Pakistani government.

Similarly, Baitullah Mahsud was named as a prime suspect in the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, chairperson of Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) on 27 December 2007. Maulana Saleh Shah, a senator from the South Waziristan Agency, reportedly said that Baitullah Mahsud, the leader of the newly formed Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Taliban Movement of Pakistan), had

⁵⁰ "Ceasefire in Waziristan," *Dawn*, 18 December 2007.

⁵¹ "FATA Timeline 2007," www.satp.org/satporgtp/detailed_news.asp?date=12/18/2007.

⁵² "FATA Timeline 2008," <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/Waziristan/timeline/index.html>.

⁵³ In the renewed peace agreement, the Daur Tribe was also included as a party. It is pertinent to mention that foreign militants are mainly based in the Mirali, Miranshah and their adjoining areas which are inhabited by the Daur Tribe, and the September 2006 peace agreement did not include the Daur tribe and hence they were under no compulsion to evict foreign militants from their areas.

⁵⁴ "Militants End South Waziristan Peace Deal," 19 August 2007, <http://newsdirect.wordpress.com/2007/08/19/militants-end-s-waziristan-peace-deal>.

threatened to welcome Benazir with bombs on her return to the country⁵⁵ — an allegation he later denied.

The announcement of the formation of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on 14 December 2007 under the leadership of infamous Baitullah Mahsud, and its threat to conduct terrorist attacks throughout Pakistan if military operations are not stopped in Swat and other parts of FATA was another reason that forced the Pakistani government to contemplate a military operation against Baitullah.⁵⁶ The subsequent terrorist attacks on military installations in the South Waziristan Agency, especially the British-era forts of Spilatoi, Sararogha and Ladha finally forced the Pakistani government to initiate military operation in the Mahsud area in South Waziristan Agency (SWA).

Formed to centralise their command under Baitullah Mahsud of South Waziristan, TTP's stated aim is to enforce Sharia, unite against the NATO forces in Afghanistan and conduct "defensive jihad" against the Pakistan Army.⁵⁷ Baitullah Mahsud was declared the leader of the movement, while Maulana Hafiz Gul Bahadur, commander of North Waziristan Taliban, and Maulana Faqir Muhammad, head of Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM), were declared as the second and third deputy leaders of the militant group. Similarly, Maulana Fazlullah of TNSM in Swat and Maulvi Omer of Bajaur Agency were declared as the Secretary General and official spokesman of the TTP respectively. Considering TTP's relationship to Al-Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban presents a much bigger and immediate threat to Pakistan than the Afghan Taliban.

Furthermore, the TTP's collective membership is assessed at 30,000 to 35,000. It was formed in the lead up to Benazir Bhutto's assassination and different Pakistani Taliban groups throughout FATA, North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and mainland Pakistan that traditionally pledged loyalty to Mullah Omar, the Afghan Taliban leader, united under Baitullah Mesud, to coordinate their militant activities in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

To ward off the threat being posed by Baitullah Mahsud, especially in the wake of Mahsud's attacks on military forts in the South Waziristan Agency in January 2008, the Pakistan security forces conducted a three-pronged military operation in January 2008 against Baitullah Mahsud-led Taliban militants code named "Operation Tri-Star" of which "Operation Zalzala (earthquake)"

⁵⁵ "Baitullah Executes Three Soldiers: Says His Bombers are Waiting For Benazir Bhutto," *Daily Times*, October 5, 2007.

⁵⁶ "Tehrik-e-Taliban Threatens Attacks in Settled Areas," *The News*, 5 January 2008.

⁵⁷ "Editorial: Tribal Areas Under Centralised Control," *Daily Times*, 16 December 2007.

was one effective part.⁵⁸ The Pakistani security forces made significant gains against Mahsud's Taliban militants and occupied strategic places in Laddah, Makin, Spinkai Raghzai, Kotkai and Tiarza, aimed at encircling Baitullah Mahsud.⁵⁹ A unilateral ceasefire was effected after Baitullah Mahsud extended a truce to the government through Senator Maulana Saleh Shah of the South Waziristan Agency.⁶⁰ Subsequently, a ceasefire was observed amid negotiations that are underway with the newly-elected Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP)-led government in Pakistan and military operations have ceased temporarily.⁶¹

It was also reported that Mullah Omar, the supreme leader or "*Ameer-al Momineen*" (Leader of the Faithful) of the Afghan Taliban disapproved of Baitullah Mahsud's act of forming the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), since the former does not want the Pakistani or local Taliban to conduct fight against Pakistani security forces. Omar, instead, wanted the local Taliban to concentrate their energies and human resource in fighting ISAF-NATO troops in Afghanistan.⁶² While there are unconfirmed reports that Mullah Omar has sacked Baitullah from the ranks of the Taliban, the fact remains that the Afghan Taliban are heavily reliant on the Pakistani Taliban for the crucial support and sanctuary the latter are offering them. Also, the Afghan Taliban do not exercise operational control over the Pakistani Taliban who maintain a separate command and control authority, although the latter have vowed allegiance to Mullah Omar.

According to some reports, the Taliban factions in North and South Waziristan, headed by Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Mullah Nazir have distanced themselves from Baitullah.⁶³ The distancing of Gul Bahadur came in December 2007, when Mullah Omar expressed his disapproval of Baitullah's strategy to form TTP and his decision to fight the Pakistani troops.⁶⁴ Gul Bahadur announced a ceasefire with the Pakistani security forces in late December 2007, which led to the revival of the September 2006 peace agreement. Similarly, there were also reports that Hafiz Gul Bahadur had asked Baitullah in January 2008 not to use the North Waziristani territory for conducting attacks against Pakistani security forces, which could jeopardize

⁵⁸ Zaffar Abbas, "Taliban Ousted, But Spinkai is now a Ghost Town," *Dawn*, 19 May 2008.

⁵⁹ "Waziristan Militant Commander Killed?," *Daily Times*, 27 January 2008.

⁶⁰ "Mahsud Offers Conditional Talks," *Daily Times*, 27 January 2008.

⁶¹ "Govt, Mahsud Announce Ceasefire," *The Post*, 4 February 2008.

⁶² Syed Saleem Shahzad, Taliban Wield the ax Ahead of New battle, *Asia Times Online*, 24 January 2008.

⁶³ Syed Saleem Shahzad, "Taliban Take a Hit, But the Fight Goes on," *Statesman*, 2 February 2008.

⁶⁴ "Omar dismayed at Followers Over Wildcat Actions," *Statesman*, 28 January 2008.

the negotiations leading up to a peace agreement that Bahadur was having at that time with the government.

A deep schism also reportedly exists between the leadership and followers of the TTP over the issue of whether to fight a “defensive” war against Pakistani government and security forces.⁶⁵ Some of the militants and mid-level leadership of Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) in Bajaur and Swat believe that they are more comfortable with fighting the ISAF-NATO troops in Afghanistan instead of waging a war inside Pakistan.⁶⁶ They also claim that they have owed allegiance to Mullah Omar and not to Baitullah Mahsud and therefore, would abide by the instructions of Mullah Omar.⁶⁷

Meanwhile, Baitullah Mahsud continues to strengthen his relationship with the Al-Qaeda leadership presently based in the North Waziristan Agency. Mahsud is reportedly receiving financial and logistical support from Al-Qaeda.⁶⁸ Al-Qaeda also favours attacks against Pakistani government and security forces. As such, the policy of Afghan Taliban and Baitullah Mahsud-led Pakistani Taliban aligning themselves with Al-Qaeda is facing serious problems and is working at cross-purposes with each other. This is also evident from the recent statement by Mullah Omar in which he said that the Taliban movement is not a threat to other countries. According to him, “This is our right to defend our country. We are not a threat to other countries. But we have to use our rights when our country is occupied by foreign forces.” He also emphasised that the people of other countries should pressure their governments not to send troops to Afghanistan.⁶⁹

The peace agreements have had their ups and downs. They influenced the developments in tribal and mainland Pakistan. For instance the cessation of military operations by the Pakistani military led the local Taliban to strengthen their stronghold in the region, which in turn benefited Al-Qaeda and other foreign militant groups taking refuge in the area. A lack of clarity on the part of the Pakistani government and its policy of “one step forward, two step backwards” seem to have given room for the Pakistani Taliban to strengthen itself. In due time, this could benefit their foreign guests, such as Al-Qaeda.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ “Spotlight Falls on Taliban man Accused of Murdering Benazir,” *Daily Times*, 28 January 2008.

⁶⁹ “Taliban no threat to US, Europe: Omar,” *Dawn*, 12 February 2008.

VII. POST-FEBRUARY 2008 ELECTIONS AND THE GOVERNMENT-MILITANTS' PARLAYS

The inauguration of a new government led by the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) in the February 2008 elections gave the impression that the security situation in the country, especially in FATA, would improve. This impression was a result of pre-election statements by various political parties who disagreed with Musharraf-era policies, including that of the "pro-US" policies in the war on terror and vowed to initiate peace talks with the tribal militants. Some of the constituents of the newly-elected government also declared that they would favour the signing of peace agreements to bring an end to militant activities in the country. While militant violence continues in the country in the post-election era, its intensity has gone down considerably.

However, there are signs that the new government's approach may not succeed in bringing an end to terrorist violence and the country may fall back into a spiral of violence. This is because the demands put forward by the Baitullah-led Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) may not allow any future peace deal to stay in place for a long time. Secondly, the new government is comprised of various elements with diverse approaches towards the issue of militancy that may result in differences and finally a lack of consensus in reaching a comprehensive peace deal with the Taliban militants. Thirdly, Pakistan may not be able to sustain the pressure of the international community, especially the US and ISAF-NATO forces in Afghanistan, in the long term if the Taliban militants continue to violate any future peace deal with the government. Also, the TTP's repeated statements to continue their fight in Afghanistan and demands of a withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the Pak-Afghan border and the FATA region as a whole may not go down well with the international community. ISAF-NATO has already expressed their reservations to Pakistan over any future peace deal with the TTP when they announced a sharp increase of more than 50 percent in cross-border attacks compared to the number to attacks in May 2007. According to the ISAF-NATO spokesman, James Appathurai, "the concern is that the deals struck by the Pakistan government and extremist groups in the Tribal Areas may be allowing them to have a safe haven." He said that ISAF-NATO has communicated their concerns to the Pakistani authorities. "We do not want to interfere in internal affairs but we have every right to communicate our concerns."⁷⁰

The recent predator drone strike on Damadola village in Bajaur Agency on 14 May 2008 by the US left dozens of local and foreign militants dead. According to the *New York Times*, an increasing frustration on the part of the

⁷⁰ "NATO Concerned over Pakistan Border Deals," *Daily Times*, 15 May 2008.

US Administration vis-à-vis the new Pakistani government's policy of signing peace deals with the Pakistani Taliban militants and showing little concern over stopping Pak-Afghan border attacks is pushing US Administration to consider cross-border raids into Pakistani tribal areas.⁷¹

The US Deputy Secretary of State, John Negroponte, also made it very clear on 5 May 2008, when he said that the US "will not be satisfied until all the violent extremism emanating from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas is brought under control. It is unacceptable for extremists to use those areas to plan, train for, or execute attacks against Afghanistan, Pakistan, or the wider world. Their ongoing ability to do so is a barrier to lasting security, both regionally and internationally. Pakistan's Government must bring the frontier area under its control as quickly as possible and we are certainly prepared to provide appropriate assistance to the Government of Pakistan in order to achieve that objective." He also said that "a successful strategy in the tribal areas must include the possibility of military operations."⁷²

Finally, any future peace agreement entered into by the new government is more likely to fail in the medium and long-term since the Taliban intends to continue with their Talibanisation drive and have declared an intention to impose their Taliban-style Shariah in the country. According to Maulana Faqir Muhammd of the TTP, "the removal of President Pervez Musharraf, a review of the country's foreign policy and the enforcement of Shariah law in the Tribal Areas are the three demands that are must for lasting peace in the settled and tribal areas of NWFP." He further said that "Islam comes first, then Pakistan."⁷³

It has been witnessed that, since March 2008, the Taliban have intensified their vigilante activities in FATA and the NWFP region. The recent killings of alleged criminals in the Mohmand and Orakzai Agencies in May 2008⁷⁴ as well as religious edicts calling upon people to grow beards are cases in point.⁷⁵

⁷¹ John Perlez, 'Pakistan Defies US on Halting Afghanistan Raids', *The New York Times*, 16 May 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/16/world/asia/16pstan.html?_r=1&sq=Damadola%20Strike%20May%2016,%202008&st=nyt&oref=slogin&scp=1&pagewanted=print.

⁷² John Negroponte's Remarks at the National Endowment for Democracy's Pakistan Forum at Washington D.C., 5 May 2008, <http://www.state.gov/s/d/2008/104366.htm>.

⁷³ "Islam First, Pakistan Later: Maulvi Faqir," *Daily Times*, 19 April 2008.

⁷⁴ Dr. Hassan Isfahani, 'Taliban Shot and Hang Kidnappers in Orakzai and Mohmand Agencies', <http://www.pakspectator.com/taliban-shot-and-hang-kidnappers-in-mahmand-and-orakzai-agency/>

⁷⁵ "Grow Beards or Face Punishment: Taliban," *Express India*, 5 May 2008, <http://www.express-india.com/latest-news/Grow-beards-or-face-punishment-Taliban/305671/>

Similarly, the Taliban have banned NGOs and women's education in some districts of the NWFP and Orakzai Agency as well.⁷⁶

The long term strategic significance of Al-Qaeda successfully carving out a semi-safe-haven in FATA is yet to be realised. In addition to the inaccessible Pakistan-Afghanistan border emerging as the new headquarters of the global jihad movement, Al-Qaeda and its likeminded groups are seeking to change the geopolitics of the region. Using FATA, Al-Qaeda and its associated groups are attempting to indoctrinate self radicalised homegrown individuals in the West and recruit them to conduct attacks in Europe and North America. Operating from FATA, groups trained in that region are mounting attacks in Western China (Xinjiang), Iraq, Algeria, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Central Asian countries and other conflict zones. As the failed assassination attempts on leaders in Pakistan and Afghanistan show, the philosophy of Al-Qaeda and its associated groups is to remove all those leaders that are hostile to the terrorists and the extremists and are viewed by Al-Qaeda as "American assets" who are part of the US-led coalition against terrorism.

Almost all the terrorist and extremist groups that existed in Afghanistan and Pakistan during the Taliban rule in Afghanistan (1994-2001) have reconstituted themselves and maintain a robust presence in FATA. Al-Qaeda is providing the crucial knowledge and methodology to mobilise not only the foreign but also the domestic terrorist groups. The tribes in FATA supported the anti-Soviet multinational Afghan mujahideen campaign between 1979 and 1989. Today, the tribes in FATA perceive Western intervention in Afghanistan as an extension of the past where non-Muslims occupied Muslim lands. Henceforth, the hardline Pashtun nationalists and the Islamists are supporting the fight against the US and their allies. Like Sudan and Afghanistan, which remained a hub for terrorist groups from 1991 to 1996 and 1996 to 2001 respectively, FATA has emerged as the most important terrorist sanctuary in recent history.

VIII. THE FUTURE

Today, FATA is of unprecedented significance to the international security and intelligence community for three reasons.

Firstly, after the US-led intervention in Afghanistan, the ground zero of terrorism has moved from Afghanistan to FATA. Today, FATA is the single most important base of Al-Qaeda's operations, where its leaders, trainers and

⁷⁶ "Taliban Ban NGOs, Women Education in Orakzai Agency," *Terror News Brief*, <http://pbtt.wordpress.com/2008/05/11/taliban-ban-ngos-women-education-in-orakzai-agency/> and 'Taliban Give NGOs 3-Day Deadline', *Daily Times*, 13 May 2008.

planners are located. Similarly, the leadership of Afghan Taliban, Pakistani Taliban, the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Islamic Jihad Group (IJU), the Libyan Islamic Fighters Group (LIFG) and a dozen other groups are located in FATA. Both their operational and ideological leaders are protected by the Pakistani Taliban, a group that emerged after Al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban moved to FATA in late 2001 and early 2002.

Secondly, FATA has become a sanctuary for research and development in explosives, training and directing operations globally. This includes the attacks against not only Afghanistan and mainland Pakistan but the Middle East and the West. As long as FATA is a sanctuary, the incessant attacks against coalition forces in Afghanistan will not stop. Furthermore, the spate of attacks on mainland Pakistan will continue. This includes the multiple assassination attempts on Pervez Musharraf and the successful assassination of Benazir Bhutto. The UK bombings and several operations disrupted in the West such as the liquid plot of August 2006 were planned in FATA. Several arrests in 2008 in Europe, including Germany, Spain and Turkey, involved recruits trained in FATA.

Thirdly, Al-Qaeda, working together with likeminded groups, has invested in sustained propaganda to radicalise the Muslim masses, including the migrant communities. Al-Qaeda has unleashed a home grown threat. In the 12 months ending in December 2007, Al-Qaeda produced 97 videos, or a video every three days. The aim of Al-Qaeda is to politicise, radicalise and mobilise Muslims worldwide into supporting and participating in the fight against the West. In the absence of a robust government response to counter Al-Qaeda's message, Muslims are susceptible to extremist propaganda. Heightened extremism leads to support and participation in terrorism.

The developments in FATA have played the most important role enabling in shaping the post 9-11 threat environment. Operating out of FATA, Al-Qaeda has unleashed a dispersed and vibrant threat by spreading its ideology globally. Al-Qaeda is accepting new like-minded groups seeking to name themselves after Al-Qaeda to adopt its ideology of global jihad and operational tactics of suicide. Al-Qaeda has galvanised and mobilised many disparate Islamist groups in the global south creating an Al-Qaeda movement. With representation from more than two dozen groups, FATA has become the de facto headquarters of the global jihad movement. Furthermore, Al-Qaeda has penetrated Muslim territorial communities in the South as well as Diaspora and migrant communities in the West. Directly and through its associated groups, Al-Qaeda is offering research-intensive training to home grown and other terrorists to conduct spectacular attacks, especially against the US, its

Allies and its friends. Despite being the most hunted terrorist leadership, Al-Qaeda is directing, facilitating, supporting, and approving key operations against its enemies from FATA.

An addition to Al-Qaeda directing the global jihad movement from FATA, this enclave provides sanctuary to multiple groups. Almost all the North African groups now active in Iraq maintain a presence in FATA. Compared to the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistan Taliban has grown significantly in numerical strength, power and influence over the last five years. As most adults are armed on the Afghan-Pakistan border, conducting military operations in FATA is a monumental challenge. Over 1000 Pakistani soldiers have been killed, 350 Pakistani soldiers kidnapped (a few beheaded as a deterrent and others released) and others threatened against intrusion.

The threat complexion in FATA has changed dramatically in the last six years. Over 200 secular tribal leaders have been killed and Taliban-like religious leaders have come to power. Today, there are new groups and new players. TTP has emerged as the most dominant player and its constituents present an unprecedented challenge even to a well-structured and well-led Pakistani military and the US intelligence community. As long as the recently formed TTP and its constituent groups survive, Al-Qaeda, especially its leadership, will survive. Despite efforts by the US, its allies and friends, six years after 9-11, the threat groups that attacked the US on 9-11 including its masterminds have survived. Despite unprecedented cooperation and collaboration by the Pakistani authorities with Western governments, the threat is spreading from tribal Pakistan to mainland Pakistan and beyond. The assassination of Benazir Bhutto and several other attacks initiated in FATA is testimony to the existing and growing threat. In the coming years, the presence of both foreign and local Jihadists in FATA or Al-Qaedaistan will be an enduring challenge to both regional and international security.

IX. CONCLUSION

Terrorism and extremism can be engaged on four fronts, political, military, legal, and social, with each front exhibiting a problem set unique from the others. The first two are self explanatory; legal refers to the need for competent law enforcement and immigration policies and activities. These are necessary in order to impede the threat of community infiltration by terrorist organisations. As in the case of FATA, to prevent the radicalisation of the tribes, the social front is the most crucial. However, sustained US pressure on the Pakistani government to crackdown on Al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban led the Pakistani military to use overwhelming force turning public support for the Pakistani Taliban and the groups it protected.

Winning and sustaining public support through a developmental response is paramount to fight both terrorism and insurgency. Developing a community through Humanitarian Operations plays a vital role in denying a support network and preventing terrorist and insurgent organisations from thriving. Humanitarian development projects assist in reducing these threats and by winning over the hearts and minds of a local populace. This is accomplished by the following means:

- They improve the quality of life for impoverished regions instilling hope.
- Government sponsored events often mean a security presence which can provide a sense of safety in the community, halting any hostile activity (this may also result in a backfire).
- Shuts down extremist propaganda by portraying the host agency in a positive manner.
- The occupying agency is more likely to be viewed as a passive element rather than an aggressive invasion force.
- Aid projects can “soften” an area decreasing hostilities, reducing the likelihood of conflict.
- Allows a foothold for a base of operations inside a given area without resorting to tactical means.
- Can be used to gauge the atmospherics of a community (no takers for free medicine in an indigent society could serve as a likely indicator for opposition).
- Humanitarian project provide opportunity for basic information gathering (census, political polling etc.) which can aid in the planning of future events.
- Improvement efforts in a moderate extremist community give prospect to conversion preventing their further radicalization.
- These ventures give the host agency the chance to educate a community on current events.

A double suicide attack was mounted against Benazir Bhutto on the day she arrived in Pakistan to campaign for the 2008 national elections. On the way to a rally in Karachi on 18 October 2007, two explosions killed 136 people and injured 450, but she escaped. On 27 December 2007, Bhutto was assassinated in Rawalpindi in a double sniper and suicide attack that is typical of Al-Qaeda’s modus operandi.⁷⁷

⁷⁷ The head of Al-Qaeda’s Finance Committee and Tanzim Al-Qaeda fi al-Khurasan, Mustafa Ahmed Muhammad Uthman aka Mustafa Abu al-Yazid claimed responsibility for the death of former

While a smooth transition to democracy has taken place in Pakistan after the successful elections on 18 February 2008, the Pakistani military and the intelligence service continue to remain important in Pakistan in the context of Pakistan's war on terrorism.

Pakistani former prime minister Benazir Bhutto. Yazid in a telephonic call to Adnkronos International (AKI) from somewhere in the Pakistani tribal areas. Yazid said that "We terminated the most precious American asset which vowed to defeat [the] mujahadeen." Please see "Pakistan: Al-Qaeda Claims Bhutto's Death," <http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/Security/?id=1.0.1710322437>.

Post-Cold War Great Power Security Dynamics in the Asia-Pacific Region

*S. Mahmud Ali**

I. INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War and the coterminous implosion of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s marked a dramatic transition at the global strategic 'centre.' The Cold War, with its danger of superpower nuclear deterrence always lying on a knife-edge with each party — the USA and the USSR — seeking to gain a little unilateral advantage and generating that extra *frisson* for members of the Realist school, was a potentially unstable system. There was a constant risk that either party, perceiving a temporary superiority, could launch a first strike, thereby destroying the stability born of deterrence, and begin the uncontrollably escalatory process of global nuclear catastrophe. The fear of that unacceptable horror at the global centre maintained a measure of 'horrible stability' at the core of the security system, but pushed many conflicts to the periphery, or regions outside the trans-Atlantic heartland of global security discourse. The sharpness of the nuclear threat and the acute danger it appeared to represent not only created a whole generation of scholars and an academic tradition focused on the tiniest detail of the Euro-Atlantic strategic dynamic, it also provided a structure and lent clarity to the set of objectives Super- and great-powers could pursue in the periphery without setting fire to the system, as it were.

The Cold War's sudden and largely unanticipated end robbed the system of that acute clarity and bipolar structure. Uncertainty injected fluidity into

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the system and the transition to a successor architecture is proving to be long and complicated. This paper explores the effect of that uncertainty on the Asia-Pacific region through the prism of great power relations.

II. POWER

At the outset, it might be helpful to define what is meant by the word 'power.' In the context of this analysis, power indicates the capacity of state-actors to effect favourable changes in the security environment and/or prevent changes considered unfavourable. Great power indicates very considerable capability to influence the environment, and superpower would suggest almost insuperable strength to maintain a favourable milieu. In that context, it is fair to say there currently is just one superpower, the United States, operating at the apex of a system it leads and manages, while several big powers seem to be jostling each other on the second tier. Foremost among these are China, Japan, India and Russia while a much smaller actor, Australia, under a centre-right government led by John Howard did, for over a decade, act as an activist regional player. Recent political changes there are unlikely to make any immediate dramatic shifts, but Canberra's policy is already reflecting a more nuanced and subtle approach to regional security issues. The steady increase in Chinese capability is the most visible, but not the only element of Asia-Pacific fluidity. Multi-layered interactions among these powers pursuing their own interests while their relative positions change render the Asia-Pacific region a dynamic theatre — by which I suggest a degree of unpredictability which creates both opportunities and risks of misunderstanding and miscalculation.

III. THE 1990s TRANSITION

But the point I wish to make about the Asian version of the Cold War is that notwithstanding what passes as common knowledge, or even history of the period, security relationships have already seen several transitions on this continent, and yet another transition is gelling in front of our eyes, if you will.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Washington and Beijing covertly collaborated against the Soviet Union in such proxy operations as in southern Africa, the Horn of Africa, Central America, Cambodia and, perhaps most successfully, in Afghanistan. This alliance, and the context in which it operated, dramatically changed between 1989 and 1991 when Beijing's Tiananmen Square crackdown, the collapse of the Berlin Wall and intra-European divisions it so starkly represented, the Malta summit between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev, the fission of the Warsaw Pact alliance and, eventually,

the Soviet implosion, transformed the global strategic canvas and left the USA the sole super-power on the world stage. It is against this backdrop that the post-Cold War transition to a period of fluidity took effect.

The key relationship, that between the USA and China, underwent profound change as Deng Xiaoping, China's semi-retired 'paramount leader' pointed an accusatory finger at the USA for having been behind what he described as a counter-revolution. Domestic pressure on the US administration, triggered by popular revulsion, forced President Bush (41st President) reluctantly to impose sanctions on China. But as his envoys, sent secretly to Beijing in July, and slightly more openly in December 1989, suggested, Bush himself was anxious to maintain strong links to Beijing despite turbulence.¹ During the campaign for the 1992 elections, the Democratic Party's presidential candidate, Bill Clinton, strongly criticised Bush's refusal to take tough action against Beijing:

The Bush administration continues to coddle China, despite its continuing crackdown on democratic reform, its brutal subjugation of Tibet, its irresponsible export of nuclear and missile technology ... Such forbearance on our part might have made sense during the Cold War when China was the counterweight to Soviet power. It makes no sense to play the China card now.²

When Clinton took office in January 1993, it appeared he would initiate a break from the policies pursued by his five predecessors and adopt a much more robust line vis-à-vis China. His initial policy statements had reinforced this assumption. However, within 18 months, Clinton was saying:

China occupies an important place in our nation's foreign policy. It is the world's most populous state, its fastest growing major economy, and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Its future will do much to shape the future of Asia, our security and trade relations in the Pacific, and a host of global issues, from the environment to weapons proliferation. In short: our relationship with China is of very great importance.³

It took a lot of efforts before mutual confidence was restored. Several meetings between Foreign Ministers and the two Presidents, and the recognition of the need to work with each other, led to the establishment of a framework entitled 'constructive engagement.' But the emergence of America's military power, especially its technological supremacy evident in the 1991 Gulf War, the rapid destruction of Iraq's forces that could be compared to

¹ S. Mahmud Ali, *US-China Relations in the "Asia-Pacific" Century*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008 (forthcoming), Chapter 1.

² Clinton, Address at Georgetown University, 12 December 1991.

³ Clinton, *Statement on MFN for China*, the White House, 28 May 1993.

elements of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the loss of a countervailing power to America, and domestic challenges in China combined to create a defensive insecurity in Beijing which triggered a dramatic concentration of material and intellectual resources into areas with both civilian and military applications. Although military was the fourth in Deng Xiaoping's list of four modernisations, growing economic strength and political anxiety ensured a new focus on developing both the PLA forces and the scientific-industrial base on which these relied. This was when Chinese military analyses started to discern in untrammelled US power a potential threat to national security. The induction of just over two dozen Russian Su-27 fighter aircraft in the early 1990s led, in turn, to the USAF commissioning studies — leading to a series of special projects on China sponsored by the DoD, JCS, ONA, and branches of forces intelligence and conducted by the DIA, NDU, CIA, RAND, CNA Corporation, and other think-tanks. These and Congressional research built a head of steam in establishment circles sympathetic to the view that China was no longer a strategic partner but a potential challenge.

IV. MILEPOSTS IN THE US-CHINA TRANSITION

The most significant shift in the 1990s was China's transition from tacit strategic ally of the USA to America's near-peer rival. Both Beijing and Washington contributed to the process of change. A set of key markers:

- America's swift defeat of Iraqi forces in the first Gulf War using mobile warfare, massed air- and missile power and networked information technology linking combat data collection, processing, dissemination and fire-platforms — in short the precursor to what came to be called the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) — both awed and worried Chinese Generals. Such military superiority of the lone superpower, and its strained relationship with China, generated strategic insecurity in Beijing.
- In 1991, China's Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) conducted war-games targeting US forces deployed in Japan and South Korea — the first such exercise in two decades, marking the PLA's identification of US forces as the likely adversary in war.
- In 1992, the PLA began developing contingency plans for possible conflict with US forces, most likely over Taiwan. China's order for 30 Su-27 fighters from Russia was the beginning of a modernization-by-acquisition process aimed at building capability.
- In mid-1992, Bush responded by selling 150 F-16 fighters to Taiwan which went on to order another 60 Mirage fighters from France as

well. The USAF commissioned RAND to study China's potential air power as a threat to US forces in East Asia. This was the first of a range of DoD studies examining Chinese military capability, strategic objectives, economic prospects and threat perceptions. Such studies provided the intellectual substance to views hostile to rising Chinese power.

- In 1993, the US intelligence community presented the Clinton White House with a SNE (Special National Intelligence Estimate) on China which stated that China was likely to grow as an economic power and treating Beijing as an adversary could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. It would be more effective, policy-wise, to 'engage' China and persuade it to pursue policies that were congruent to US interests. This forced the change in Clinton's perspective, but conservative unhappiness persisted.
- Later that year, Chinese national security leadership organised an 11-day symposium in which specialists read 60 papers on the global security environment. Key findings — until 2000, America would remain China's biggest threat — infiltrating China's 'upper strata' using Beijing's 'open door' policy. 60% of the analysts believed by 2020, Japan, supported by the USA, would become the main threat; 25% believed the USA would remain the main threat until 2020. The conference report was circulated by the CPC (Chinese Communist Party) Politburo and the CMC (Central Military Commission) among senior Party and PLA cadres and became a foundational document in establishing China's post-Cold War national security perspective.
- In early 1994, the US Naval War College conducted war-games set in 2010. In this exercise, the Chinese navy lured US CVBGs (carrier battle groups) close inshore to be ambushed and destroyed; China attacked US satellites and employed space-based weapons to rout US forces and reinforcements. This scenario caused alarm. In February, America, Russia and Japan held a senior Forum for North Pacific Security at the Deputy Chief of Staff level. The US Defence Secretary and Japanese Foreign Minister ordered their forces to jointly monitor Chinese military developments.
- In late 1994, senior DoD official and China specialist, Charles Freeman, learnt during a visit mere that the 2nd Artillery, China's strategic rocket forces, were preparing to coerce Taiwan by launching a ballistic missile armed with a conventional warhead every day for thirty consecutive days. The material and psychological consequences of such an attack, and the lack of strategic defence, would force Taiwanese surrender.

- In late 1995-early 1996, China conducted a series of land, air and naval exercises, culminating in missile launches close to Taiwan just before Taiwan's first general and presidential elections. In early 1996, America deployed two CVBGs and four attack submarines just east of Taiwan, signalling to Beijing its intent to defend Taiwan. In Chinese view, this was blatant military interference in China's internal affairs.
- A month after those missile tests, in April 1996, Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto signed a set of defence guidelines forming the basis of a deepening and widening of the US-Japanese alliance's remit from the defence of Japan to that of the Asia-Pacific region and encouraging Japan's new assertive diplomatic stance, and the development and deployment of ballistic missile defences threatening to neuter China's modest first-strike capabilities, its strategic deterrent.
- In March 1997, American and Chinese National Defence Universities organised a joint seminar at which military specialists from the two sides discussed respective national security perspectives. PLA delegates made it clear that in the 21st century, they wanted China to exercise greater influence than Japan did, and influence equal to America's in the Asia-Pacific region. Around this time, a joint study by China's Communist Party, State Council (cabinet equivalent), Foreign Ministry, and Ministry of Defence concluded that early in the 21st century, a war with America was possible. This set the strategic context in which each power-elite viewed the other.
- In the spring of 1999, during NATO's Kosovo War against Yugoslavia, a US bomber destroyed the Chinese chancery building in Belgrade, causing massive outpourings of national outrage across China, severely damaging relations. Just weeks later, the 13th joint seminar on 'fundamental issues' organised by the US Naval War College and the DoD's Office of Net Assessment explored the strategic environment in Asia-Pacific in 2025. It concluded that hostile coalitions could arise in a complex environment in which events would occur at a rapid pace, presenting a multiplicity of threats to US interests and giving lesser powers local advantages over American forces in-theatre. The sole superpower, the global hegemon, would seek to prevent this from happening.

The Clinton Administration's anxiety that treating China as an adversary would turn out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy reinforced its 'constructive engagement' with Beijing. However, Washington both engaged and hedged — preparing for contingencies in which China did not meet American expectations.

Clinton not only deepened and widened the alliance with Japan, his Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, engaged India and in 14 meetings with counterpart Jaswant Singh over 30 months following India's nuclear tests in 1998, erected the framework of strategic collaboration that has flowered into a relationship perhaps more extensive and profound than the US-China tacit alliance active in the 1970s-1980s.

What about the 21st century, then? Well, it virtually coincided with George W. Bush's ascent to office. Presidential candidate Bush was as critical of President Clinton's China policy as candidate Clinton had been of senior President Bush's. Clinton changed his views soon after taking office, but just month's after Bush's inauguration, robust Chinese interception of US reconnaissance aircraft led, on 1st April 2001, of the EP3-J8 collision in which the Chinese fighter and its pilot were lost. China detained the EP3 crew for 12 days until America apologised. This early incident set the tone of relations as military contacts came to a virtual end — this time at American behest. Only after President Jiang Zemin offered help following the Al-Qaeda attacks on 11th September, that intelligence and military contacts were revived. But the hedge-and-engage policy became even deeper.

While security interactions experienced vicissitudes, US-China trade figures have grown dramatically with massive annual balances in China's favour, adding yet another issue to the agenda of regular senior level 'strategic dialogues.' Disputes over Beijing's refusal to let the Renminbi float freely, protect intellectual property rights vis-à-vis American products, and ensure the safety of Chinese goods ranging from toys to toothpaste have vitiated exchanges. Since the mid-1990s, then, both American and Chinese governments have sought to build strong economic and commercial ties and diplomatic collaboration while their military forces and intelligence agencies have prepared for war. PLA organisation, acquisition, training and deployments have reflected a belief that a conflict with US forces, probably supported by Taiwanese and Japanese combat units, in early 21st century, would be unavoidable. Similarly, having detected both doctrinal and material changes in Chinese forces, Washington identified Beijing as a near-peer competitor, and began redeploying 60% of its expeditionary forces, and expanding alliance-building activities to counter a putative challenge to its hegemony.

V. WARRIORS RETURN

Recent events have sustained the momentum of a mutual 'hedge-and-engage' stance. On 31st August 2006, Bush issued a new space policy emphasizing a determination to maintain autonomy of military options in space. This statement of intent to control space, couched in peaceable language, denied

potential adversaries similar benefits.⁴ The policy proclaimed America's right to extra-terrestrial dominion while decrying arms races in space. Since 2002, Washington had thwarted Sino-Russian efforts at the UN Conference on Disarmament to enact a Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) treaty. Now, there could be no PAROS. In September 2006, Washington noted US reconnaissance satellites over-flying China being hit with "high-power lasers" causing temporary impairment. In October, Beijing issued its own space plans, focusing on non-military projects. Satellite programs and lunar and other missions revealed the scale of China's ambition.⁵ Then, in late October, as the Kitty Hawk strike group deployed near Okinawa, a PLAN attack submarine surfaced five miles from the carrier proving its ability to approach undetected within torpedo range. The disclosure embarrassingly coincided with the first visit to China by Admiral Gary Roughead, Commander, US Pacific Fleet. Beijing gave no explanations, nor expressed any remorse.

As the leading edge of America's forward deployed military muscle in the region, the US Navy may have been more sensitive to geopolitical dynamics than others. At a Current Strategies Forum at the Naval War College in June 2006, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Michael Mullen noted that unlike recent focus on sea control, strategy 'must recognize that the economic tide of all nations rises not when the seas are controlled by one, but rather when they are made safe and free for all.' Ensuring freedom of sea-lanes — global commons — was the goal. To that end, America would establish lily-pad-like Global Fleet Stations (GFS), affording political freedom and operational flexibility. But the task was too big even for America. Only a '1,000-ship navy' uniting partners could meet the 21st century maritime challenges. That was Mullen's strategic objective.⁶ Roughead's visit explored the possibility of recruiting Beijing to this vision. In September, a PLAN destroyer and an oiler visited Honolulu and San Diego, conducting the first USN-PLAN exercises. In November, US marines and sailors aboard a destroyer and an LPD joined PLAN colleagues in another SAREX (search-and-rescue exercise) near Zhanjiang, headquarters of China's South Sea Fleet, enabling the two groups to study each other's hardware, procedures and techniques, and make collaboration potentially feasible.

However, strategic mistrust stood in the way. It generated self-serving circularity as US intelligence and conservative think-tanks played up China's

⁴ US National Space Policy, the White House, 31 August 2006; Background briefing, State Department, 24 October 2006.

⁵ China 's Space Activities in 2006, State Council, October 2006.

⁶ Admiral Mike Mullen, "We Can't Do It Alone," Honolulu Advertiser, 29 October 2006.

'threat' potential, encouraging American military action which persuaded Beijing to take counter-measures which, in turn, led to further US action. American 'exaggeration' of China's strategic nuclear arsenal was one example. DoD reports regularly noted China's new missiles were mobile, allegedly posing greater threat, ignoring the fact that a majority of Chinese missiles had always been mobile and targeted accordingly by DoD. Scientific estimates suggested a Chinese attack on 20 American cities with 20 ICBMs would cause 40m casualties, blanketing much of North America in radioactive fallout.⁷ A US first-strike on China's 20 ICBM silos would inflict 11m casualties with similar radioactive outcome. Mutual deterrence would be easy to achieve. Unlike America and the Soviet Union, China was moving very slowly in modernizing its nuclear forces, and was unlikely to go beyond credible deterrence. Washington and Beijing needed to cooperate in reducing mutual threat-perceptions and maintain strategic stability.

Beijing's view of the international security environment appeared to be less anxious than it had been in recent years. It expected progress in addressing 'the serious imbalances' in power alignments. "The major international forces compete with and hold each other in check,' but they also cooperate and coordinate, and 'draw on each others' strength."⁸ China would modernize its military in keeping with scientific-technological developments and the changing strategic environment, but only to secure its own defence — 'Security issues related to energy, resources, finance, information and international shipping routes are mounting,' Beijing noted. The PLA launched a three-stage programme to build networked forces capable of winning modern wars by 2050, three decades after China becomes a 'well-off society in an all-round way.' So, only defence of the homeland ground, air and maritime spaces until mid-century. By then, China would be a different country. That is Beijing's narrative.

America's security discourse partially resonated with this view. A Defence Science Board (DSB) task force reviewing US nuclear stockpiles, production complex, management systems and transformation of 'the nuclear enterprise' reported that a possible confrontation with Russia — not China — was the most important reason for retaining a robust nuclear deterrent: 'Russia retains the capability to destroy the US in 30 minutes or less.'⁹ Moscow's emphasis on nuclear war-fighting capability, its difficult democratic transition and foreign policy differences with Washington on matters of important national interests warranted close attention. China, too, merited watching; given tensions

⁷ Kristensen, Norris, McKinzie, 2006, pp.1-13.

⁸ China 's National Defence, State Council, December 2006.

⁹ Report on Nuclear Capabilities, DSB, December 2006, p.12.

over Taiwan, it was 'prudent to take China's nuclear capabilities seriously.' However, China was mentioned along with North Korea and Iran as potential challenges. Russia posed a different category of threat.

VI. STRATEGIC TRIANGLES

For the US-led security system, though, the long-term challenge to its perceived interests lay in China's rapid economic growth and military potential. Washington and its allies raised very similar questions about China in 2007. A few quotes will demonstrate this convergence:

- One key question for the US, Japan, and all of Asia is: how will China use its newfound capabilities and resources as it matures as an economic and military power?¹⁰ *Armitage-Nye Report*
- China's military modernization, with sustained double-digit growth in its defence budget for over a decade and continued upgradation of its nuclear and missile assets, development of infrastructure in the India-China border areas and its growing defence links with some of India's neighbours continue to be monitored closely ... We have also taken note of the recent destruction by China of one of its own satellites.¹¹ *Indian MOD*
- China's leaders have yet to explain adequately the purposes or desired end-states of the PLA's expanding military capabilities. China's actions in certain areas increasingly appear inconsistent with its declaratory policies. Actual Chinese defence expenditures remain far above officially disclosed figures. This lack of transparency in China's military affairs will naturally and understandably prompt international responses that hedge against the unknown.¹² *DoD*
- China, a regional power with tremendous political and economic influence, has been continuously boosting its defence spending and modernizing its military forces ... There are also concerns about the lack of transparency regarding China's military capabilities.¹³ *Japanese MOD*
- The pace and scope of (China's) military modernization, particularly the development of new and disruptive capabilities ... could create misunderstandings and instability ... Trilateral cooperation between

¹⁰ Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye, *The US-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right Through 2020*, Washington, CSIS, 2007, p.3.

¹¹ Annual Report 2006-2007, Delhi, MOD, 2007, p.6.

¹² Military Power of the PRC, Washington, DoD, 2007, p.1.

¹³ Defence White Paper, Tokyo, MOD, 2007, p.2.

Australia, Japan and the US will be increasingly important in this context.¹⁴ *Australian DoD*

VII. HEDGE, AND ENGAGE

Trends begun in 1996 following China's missile 'tests,' and formalized in 2001 after the EP3-J8 collision — Washington engaging Beijing while hedging against China becoming a peer-rival, cultivating regional allies in a "neo-containment" enterprise, and both America and China devoting ever-larger shares of national wealth to the military as a key strategic tool — reached culmination in 2007. Parallel military-diplomatic strands saw blocs coalescing, building the potential for future contention. Following revelations of China's new Type-093 SSN being commissioned and Type-094 SSBN being launched, Beijing began 2007 by introducing the J-10, an aircraft comparable to the US F-16 fighter and, then, on 11 January, mounting a direct-ascent ASAT strike on an old satellite without notice or explanation. DoD had been reporting Beijing's ASAT endeavours for years; still, this demonstration of the PLA's ability to threaten military use of space caused both anger and anxiety. American visitors — CJCS General Peter Pace in March, Commander PACOM, Admiral Timothy Keating, in May, Secretary Gates in November — asked what China's intent was. Beijing's assurance that this was a "scientific experiment with no military import" and that China remained committed to non-militarization of space convinced few critics.¹⁵

Still, high-level meetings allowed candid exchanges. PLAN Commander Wu Shingli and CMC Vice Chairman Guo Boxiong in turn visited and hosted US commanders, stressing interest in deepening military ties. PLA intelligence Chief Zhang Qinsheng met Pace and Gates in Singapore in June, pledging greater transparency and accepting US requests for a military hotline.¹⁶ DoD critique was discreet but others were forthright. Vice President Richard Cheney, visiting Australia, praised Beijing's role in securing Pyongyang's agreement to seal its nuclear reactor and allow IAEA inspections in exchange for fuel-oil. 'Other actions by the Chinese government send a different message,' Cheney noted. 'Last month's anti-satellite test, (and) China's continued fast-paced military build-up are less constructive and are not consistent with China's

¹⁴ Australia's National Security, Canberra, DoD, 2007, p.19.

¹⁵ James Mulvenon, "Rogue Warriors? A Puzzled Look at the Chinese ASAT Test," *China Leadership Monitor*, no.20, 2007.

¹⁶ The Author attended the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2007 in Singapore where these comments were made.

stated goal of a peaceful rise.”¹⁷ Other US officials warned of Beijing’s ‘deliberate effort ... to mask the nature of Chinese military capabilities.’ This is why ‘we must plan and prepare for the worst. It is an area of intense concern and we’re giving it due attention from the highest levels.”¹⁸ In contrast, Beijing calmly equated the two actors. Responding to Pace’s ASAT worries, Guo said America and China were ‘great powers with responsibilities to safeguard world peace and stability.’¹⁹ Two months later he similarly refuted Keating’s ASAT concerns. Keating’s visit triggered controversy when it became known that he had offered to help China build aircraft carriers while noting that it would be a complex and expensive undertaking.²⁰ Equally troubling for America was Admiral Wu’s suggestion that PACOM take care of eastern Pacific while PLAN guarded the west. Keating refused to cede control of any part of the ocean. This was not surprising; that Wu broached a division of maritime labour was.

While military diplomacy cushioned the dichotomy between American anxiety and Chinese confidence, Washington’s second strategic prong rapidly advanced. In March 2007, America’s closest regional allies, Japan and Australia, signed a defence pact during Prime Minister John Howard’s visit to Tokyo, creating a triangular alliance framework. In April, US and Indian navies moved their annual Malabar manoeuvres from the Arabian Sea to the South China Sea, with Japanese warships joining up in a dramatic expansion of naval collaboration in waters close to China in another triangular link-up. These exercises were so successful that plans were laid to expand the scale, inviting other regional powers in an encore. In May, ministers from India, Japan, Australia and America, meeting in Manila, launched a Quadrilateral Initiative, dubbed the Quad. This was the culmination of a process begun in the wake of the December 2004 ‘core group’ leading post-tsunami relief operations with their naval assets operating as a cohesive fleet. Two years earlier, in an address to the Diet, Bush had asked Japan to initiate building an Asia-Pacific ‘democratic front.’ In 2006, Japan’s future Premier, Shinzo Abe, published a book in which he adopted this theme as his own. Abe’s initiative finalized the Quad.

This ‘value-based’ democratic coalition was founded on strong bilateral ties between America and the other three members. The new element was the rapid development of security ties among Japan, Australia and India parallel

¹⁷ Cheney, remarks to the Australian-American Leadership Dialogue, Sydney, 22 February 2007.

¹⁸ Richard Lawless, House testimony, 13 June 2007.

¹⁹ JiefangJun boo, 22 March 2007.

²⁰ VOA, 12 May 2007.

to a deepening of their bilateral alliance with America. Japan and India formalized a 'strategic and global partnership' during Manmohan Singh's December 2006 visit to Tokyo.²¹ The partnership specified strong 'political, defence and security cooperation.' Three months later, Howard and Abe signed their accord. In April, Tokyo hosted talks among US, Japanese and Australian defence officials on BMD collaboration, linking up existing US-Japanese and US-Australian ABM mechanisms. The three allies would jointly develop the SM-3 ship-borne system, to be successfully tested in December with a Japanese ship-borne interceptor shooting down an American target missile. India was not to be left behind. The final string to this bow was tied in July when Brendan Nelson, Australia's Defence Minister — fresh from a trip to Beijing where he assured his hosts Australia and its Quad partners only sought peace and friendship — arrived in Delhi and formalized defence cooperation with his Indian counterpart, A.K. Antony.

Japanese Premier Shinzo Abe and Defence Minister Yuriko Koike followed Nelson to Delhi to reinforce ties. Abe described to India's legislators his vision of an 'expanded Asia' combining countries on the shores of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. 'By Japan and India coming together in this way, this broader Asia will evolve into an immense network spanning the entirety of the Pacific Ocean, incorporating the USA and Australia.' Now, the Quad's diplomatic-political superstructure was underpinned by a fine-mesh of bilateral and multilateral security and defence agreements. Reinforcing ideological unity were shared security concerns, especially vis-à-vis China, reflected in surprisingly similar terms in reports issued by the four military establishments in 2007, as noted above.²² What Chinese commentators described as the 'Asian NATO,' was born.²³ The Quad's emergence may have potentially been the decade's most significant strategic development in the Asia-Pacific area.

The pace of pieces falling into place picked up in the summer of 2007. Australia and America launched their Joint Combined Training Capability facility in Queensland, deploying 27,000 personnel from the two forces to try out interoperability in their annual 'Talisman Sabre' exercise. Manmohan Singh signed a defence cooperation accord with his Vietnamese counterpart,

²¹ Abe and Singh, Joint Statement: Towards Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership, Tokyo, 15 December 2006.

²² See notes 11-14.

²³ Zheng Yongnian, "Japan-Australia pact amounts to East Asian NATO aimed at China," *Lianhe zaobao*, 27 March 2007; Pralul Bidwai, "Five-Nation Naval Drill Presages 'Asian NATO'?" *Inter Press Service*, 7 September 2007; "China concerned by 'alliance of democracies'," *ABC Online*, 24 June 2007.

Ngyuen Tan Dung, during the latter's visit to Delhi. India began building another network of roads, airstrips and bridges near its disputed Himalayan border to 'match' Chinese activities across the 'Line of Actual Control.' US Marines started training with Indian troops in sub-Himalayan forests. America offered to sell its futuristic F-35 Joint Strike Fighter to India as the two governments announced the 'final' text of their nuclear cooperation agreement — although Delhi later denied this. While Abe toured India, General Pace told US troops in Japan that he constantly monitored China. 'If you look at Chinese military power and you look at ours, you get pretty comfortable, pretty quickly,' he said. 'Chinese capacity is increasing, our capacity is increasing, and the overall delta between their capacity and ours remains huge in our favour.'²⁴

Beijing's concern became clear in its diplomatic demarches to all four capitals on the Quad's launch, asking what the group's objectives were. The responses, conciliatory and emollient, assured Beijing the group aimed at boosting regional peace and security through cooperation and amity; it targeted no country. As with China's response on its ASAT test, this was not reassuring. On the margins of the G-8 summit in Germany, Hu Jintao asked Manmohan Singh what the Quad's security parameters were; Singh told him there were none! The military in the four countries made no secret of their anxieties over China's growing capabilities. Admiral Mike Mullen, testifying as the future CJCS, echoed Quad views. He noted that China had 'the greatest potential to compete militarily with the US and field disruptive military technologies that could, over time, offset traditional US military advantages.' His recommendation? 'We do not want to overreact but at the same time, we must not under-react. Our strategy seeks to encourage China to make the right strategic choices for its people, while we hedge against other possibilities.'²⁵ This perspective informed the Quad's collective approach to China.

Meanwhile, US-Russian disputes over America's Euro-BMD plans and US-Chinese rows over allegedly sub-standard Chinese goods exported to America and elsewhere triggered overt responses to muscular assertions of US interests. Russia and China, smarting under similar unipolar pressures, have pursued a 'strategic partnership' whose strength has been apparent in the transfer of military hardware and technology to China and growing diplomatic consultations on key global issues. While Russian unhappiness with the US-led order has been known for sometime, it became evident since

²⁴ Jim Garamore, Pace Discusses Chinese Military During Japan Troop Visit, American Forces Press Service, 19 August 2007.

²⁵ Admiral Michael Mullen, Senate testimony, 31 July 2007.

early 2007. In February, Vladimir Putin told an international conference on security:

Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of force, military force, in international relations, force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflict ... We are seeing greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of international law ... We must seriously think about the architecture of global security ... One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way. This is visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations. Well, who likes this? Who is happy about this?²⁶

After attacking US policy, Putin invited US Defence Secretary Robert Gates to Moscow where Gates, despite his considerable diplomatic sophistication, failed to allay anxiety and unhappiness over Washington's determination to pursue strategic objectives apparently challenging Russia's core interests. Bush invited Putin to an informal summit at the family home in Kennebunkport, Maine, and sent Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Moscow for talks. But America's decision to install ten BMD interceptors in Poland and an ABM radar in the Czech Republic, and its support for Kosovar independence against Serbian refusal to renounce sovereignty over the province, ensured these talks failed. With the Russian economy forging ahead in a bullish energy market and Putin acquiring almost dictatorial control over the country, resurgent Russian nationalism found new expression in a conventional and nuclear force build up, notably since 2005 when large budget-increases were announced. One aspect of that robust military response was the Sino-Russian "Peace Mission 2005" exercise in China's Shandong peninsula which tested the two forces working together against an imaginary common enemy in the western Pacific region. This was the foundation on which a more extensive effort would be built two years later.

Under the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) rubric, Chinese and Russian forces — with token Special Forces teams from other member states — conducted a series of complex exercises in Xinjiang and the Ural Mountains. As the six SCO Presidents formally ended "Peace Mission 2007" after their summit in Bishkek, Putin announced the resumption of Russia's strategic bomber missions, suspended in 1992. British and US fighters were soon intercepting and turning back "Bear" bombers near Britain and Guam while BMD talks among America, Russia and Azerbaijan sputtered on. Denying any warlike intent, Putin ordered strategic rocket forces to prepare for defensive action while asserting a revived Russia would no longer tolerate challenges to its core interests. Just before his United Russia party won a landslide

²⁶ Vladimir Putin, International security: Russian perspective, Munich, 10 February 2007.

victory in parliamentary elections in November, Putin suspended participation in the CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) Treaty. Days later, Moscow announced a resumption of its Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea naval patrols, suspended in 1992. As 2007 came to a close, Russia tested a new ICBM and an SLBM. Chinese commentary, critical of America's "domineering" stance, was understanding of Moscow's position.

While "Peace Mission 2007" put Russian and Chinese forces through their paces, Quad defence leaders arrived in Delhi to work out the details of "Malabar-07-2," the first display of the group's military muscle. In the biggest such gathering in the Indian Ocean, an Indian and two US carriers, two dozen other ships, a nuclear-powered submarine, over 150 aircraft and 20,000 personnel from US, Indian, Japanese, Australian and Singaporean navies conducted the spectrum of operations in the Bay of Bengal for six days in September. All five senior commanders aboard insisted they were building interoperability for action against terrorist, pirates and WMD-proliferators and had no strategic designs against anyone;²⁷ but the firepower and technology brought to bear against imaginary enemies challenged their choreographed protestations. As the composite fleet tested itself, John Howard hosted George Bush and Shinzo Abe at their first-ever trilateral summit in Sydney. Talks focused on how to deepen strategic collaboration with each other and with India. The two putative blocs appeared to be preparing for uncertain — possibly unhappy — times.

VIII. A FLUID FUTURE

As the Bush era drew to a close, Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye issued their second paper on US-Japan relations. It recommended strengthening Japan's capacity and will to assert itself internationally as a key American ally and a global player, boosting US security ties to other regional allies to erect a democratic network across Asia-Pacific, and engaging China to encourage tendencies supportive of US interests while preparing for less benign outcomes. Given Washington's proclivities, the paper reinforced existing trends. America had identified Okinawa, Guam and Singapore as key operational hubs, redeployed two-thirds of its expeditionary resources to the Pacific, and fashioned the Quad as a democratic diplomatic-military coalition. Rotating deployments of F-22 fighters to Japan, and F-16s to South Korea, concentration of submarine, surface and air-combat units to Guam, and replacing the carrier Kitty Hawk, home-ported at Yokosuka in Japan, with a nuclear-powered successor, revealed

²⁷ The author, observing the proceedings from onboard the USS Kitty Hawk and the INS Viraat, was able to question the US and Indian Vice-Admirals in-charge.

the cutting edge of a major build-up. The hegemon, intolerant of competition, would fight to maintain its position.

Beijing, having devoted significant resources to military modernization since the mid-1990s, demonstrated a capacity to surprise and disappoint. Rapid expansion of the PLAN and PLAAF inventories especially during Bush's second term showed what PLA reforms had achieved. By mid-2007, Chinese air forces comprised around 2,325 air-defence, multi-role, ground-attack fighters and bombers. With around 450 transport and 90 surveillance/reconnaissance aircraft, PLA air forces comprised a powerful armada with 700 aircraft capable of operating over Taiwan without refuelling.²⁸ China's naval modernization was even more striking.²⁹ PLAN's North, East and South Sea Fleets commanded 72 destroyers and frigates, 58 submarines, around 50 amphibious-lift ships, and 40 missile patrol-craft.³⁰ In 2007, there was much commentary by Chinese analysts on the need for PLAN to build aircraft carriers although confirmation of such a decision remained ambiguous. Nonetheless, Admiral Keating's controversial offer of help to Admiral Wu Shingli highlighted US awareness of Chinese thinking.

America and its allies acknowledged Beijing's anxiety to secure Chinese national economic, commercial and maritime interests driving PLAN's expansion.³¹ In that context, Hu Jintao's articulation of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC)-dependent China's "Malacca dilemma" sounded reasonable. China was anxious to prevent its energy and commercial lifeline being choked off by adversaries but robust action, however defensive, threatened to incite negative reactions. The Quad's promotion of the 'string of pearls' theme — Beijing's alleged building of naval facilities in Bangladesh, Burma, Pakistan, and elsewhere — cast China's maritime activities in a threatening light. The Quad appeared torn between appreciating the challenges facing China's emergence as a trading nation dependent on secure SLOC for commerce and energy supplies, and feeling threatened by Beijing's efforts to protect these. This ambivalence was the Bush Administration's legacy on US-China relations.

The fortunes of America's allies proved mixed. In Japan, Shinzo Abe's twin-track — reviving a *modus vivendi* with China while building Japan's military-diplomatic stature — suffered a dramatic turn as the LDP lost control over the Diet's Upper House in July 2007 polls. Ichiro Ozawa's *Minshuto*

²⁸ Military Power of the PRC, op. cit., p.38.

²⁹ ONI, China's Navy, Washington, 2007.

³⁰ Military Power of the PRC, p.40.

³¹ William Tarry, "Preface," China's Navy, p.vii; author's interview with Japanese and Indian military analysts in Singapore and London in 2007.

party vowed to block renewal of Japan's anti-terrorism law authorizing the refuelling of US-led coalition vessels in the Arabian Sea by Japanese naval vessels. Faced with rapidly declining popular support, ministerial scandals and health concerns, Abe abruptly resigned in September, throwing Japanese politics and diplomacy into confusion. His successor, Yasuo Fukuda, moderated Tokyo's nationalist focus, promising to work towards achieving reconciliation with China. A Bush-Fukuda summit in November aimed at strengthening the strained alliance, but domestic constraints drained its energy. Fukuda's efforts to resume refuelling OEF (Operation Enduring Freedom) coalition vessels were blocked by Ozawa's refusal to endorse an extension. Both Fukuda and Ozawa met China's leaders in Beijing, inviting Hu Jintao to Tokyo. Differences over energy- and territorial disputes in the East China Sea notwithstanding, an apparent Japanese consensus on a conciliatory stance toward China stood in sharp contrast to the polarization over support for US strategy. Whether this dichotomy would impact on the essential import of the US-Japan alliance remained a key question for the region's strategic future.

India, with strong economic performance and growing military capabilities, expanded its influence across the Indian Ocean littoral and beyond. Its listening posts on Madagascar, airbase in Central Asia, plans to invest \$40bn in arms procurement over the next decade, strategic influence in Burma, Iran and Afghanistan, and diplomatic activism transformed Delhi into a player on the global stage. The linchpin of its 'strategic partnership' with America, the nuclear cooperation agreement, however, proved contentious. Manmohan Singh's coalition government, dependent on parliamentary support of Left-wing parties, faced temporary setbacks over that accord, the expanded Malabar exercises, and India's deepening integration in America's global strategy these represented.

Domestic divergences notwithstanding, Delhi pursued policies designed to expand its systemic autonomy. Indian leaders engaged in summitry with US, Russian and Chinese counterparts, building variations of 'strategic partnerships' with all. This included modest military exercises with Chinese and Russian forces in parallel to the much bigger Quad ones. Delhi's pursuit of relations with Iran and Israel, Burma and Vietnam as well as with great- and lesser powers hinted at an agenda of its own. The assertiveness of its security policy and the confidence of its elite suggested Delhi believed it was close to achieving its right place at the world's top table.

India's flexible approach to the 'Eurasian heartland' raised potential questions about its not-so-tacit alliance with America. Russian leaders saw Delhi as a 'balancer' that encouraged the development of a multipolar systemic architecture, more in concert with Moscow and Beijing than with

Washington.³² Russia's ambivalence toward China and Japan complicated the picture. In energy terms — a crucial leverage — Moscow appeared to play for the affections of both Beijing and Tokyo, alternately sounding favourable to one over the other in assuring long-term delivery. In strategic cooperation, Russian ambivalence was even more pronounced. Complex, long-distance collaboration between Chinese and Russian militaries suggested a political consensus over concerted action and interoperability. But the reality was more convoluted. Russia remained the pre-eminent supplier of military hardware to China and India — whose security perspectives differed. Moscow raised the price of key items being delivered to Delhi, renegotiating, for instance, the cost of refurbishing the carrier, Admiral Gorshkov — the future *INS Vikramaditya*. But in transferring technology, Russia sold its most advanced weaponry to India, not to China.³³ Still, the pitch of Moscow's anti-US vituperation rose as Putin's presidency neared its end.

China-India relations, too, demonstrated a degree of dynamism. While their long-standing border dispute showed little sign of being resolved, despite intermittent high-level talks, Beijing acknowledged Sikkim's incorporation into India and even issued a visa to an academic from Arunachal Pradesh, another disputed state under Delhi's control. Perhaps more significantly, China changed its stance toward the US-Indian nuclear cooperation agreement. After months of muted objection to this 'challenge to the NPT regime,' Beijing received the leader of India's ruling Congress party, Sonia Gandhi, in late 2007, and following detailed discussions, withdrew objections from the '123 agreement.'

John Howard's Australia, the other Quad member, a steadfast 'deputy sheriff' to Bush's America, pursued a clearly-defined security policy. Deepening Quad ties, Howard announced plans to export uranium to India following the US-India nuclear agreement. This was a major shift from the established position barring such trade with non-NPT signatories. At the same time, Defence Minister Nelson assured Beijing Canberra was a reliable partner. Australia-China trade burgeoned while Canberra strengthened its defence ties to Quad allies. However, Howard lost the November 2007 polls. His Labour Party successor, Kevin Rudd, maintained the alliance with America, but took a more nuanced stance toward China. Soon after taking office, Rudd called Premier Wen Jiabao, offering his Mandarin-speaking good offices as a

³² Evgeniy Revenko, "Rossiya, Kitay, India: Novaya os monogopolyarnogo mira," *Vesti Nedeli*, online, <http://www.vesti7.rulnews?id=1645> accessed on 29 March 2007.

³³ Russia's decision to sell China the Su-30MK2 fighter while transferring the more advanced Su-30MK1 to India was one example.

bridge between China and the West. In short, the Quad's military capacity was evident but the political will directing that capacity looked fickle. Meanwhile, Russian assertions forced America to retain greater military capability in Europe than Washington had planned.

As the mismatch between America's military prowess and its moral authority, driven by the consequences of and reaction to the Bush Administration's muscular policy in the greater Middle East and elsewhere, widened, the balance of opinion marked a subtle shift. Even DoD-funded analyses began noting China's growing capacity to target US vulnerabilities. Most China-watchers recommended America maintain its military-technological edge; many also suggested a change in emphasis if not in policy — to hedge less and engage more — as the most effective way to integrate China into the US-led security system and guide its evolution in directions consonant with America's strategic interests.³⁴ US policy, however, remained ambivalent, possibly reflecting a mixture of intellectual laziness and genuine misunderstanding. Senior officials criticized Taiwan's attempts to seek UN membership and to hold a referendum on the subject despite sharp Chinese warnings. Beijing praised this "sensible stance" but was perplexed by DoD's planned sales of 12 P-3C ASW aircraft and 144 SM-2 missiles worth billions of dollars³⁵ to Taiwan from Washington's \$14bn-worth 2001 arms package. Continuing its military-diplomacy with growing vigour, China despatched its destroyers and oilers to exercise with warships from Australia, New Zealand, Britain and Spain. In late-2007, a PLAN destroyer even visited Tokyo! However, a planned return visit by an Aegis-equipped Japanese destroyer was cancelled, reportedly under US pressure triggered by fears of possible breaches of security.

Evidence of the incendiary potential of apparently innocuous incidents arrived in late 2007 when the first family hosted the Dalai Lama at the White House before the god-king received the Congressional gold medal, to Chinese outrage. When, a few days later, the Kitty Hawk Strike Group sought a Thanksgiving port-call in Hong Kong, permission was denied. Although Beijing later relented, the strike group refused to return and, citing stormy weather, sailed to Japan through the Taiwan Strait, eliciting even more agitated Chinese protests. Senior PLA and DoD officials, holding a DCT (Defence Consultative Talks) session in Washington, managed to restore calm, but the escalatory risks were not lost on anyone. Around the same time, Beijing also

³⁴ Roger Cliff, "China's Challenge," San Diego Union-Tribune, 29 July 2007; Dennis Blair, "What to do about China," Citizen Special, 28 April 2007; David Shambaugh, Karl Inderfurth, "China and the US: To Hedge or Engage," YaleGlobal, 11 April 2007.

³⁵ Xinhua, 16 September 2007. ³⁶ Nye to author, Oxford, 17 May 2005.

incorporated its naval facilities on the disputed Spratly Islands as an administrative unit under the Hainan provincial government, thus formalizing its control over parts of an archipelago also claimed, to varying extents, by five ASEAN member states. Protests only came from Vietnam where demonstrators marched in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City with no overt official support, but Sino-Vietnamese tensions had risen in tandem with growing intimacy between Hanoi, Washington, Delhi and Tokyo.

As the Bush era climaxed, Washington's robust stance to Beijing looked only partially effective; using a shrewd combination of soft and not-so-soft power, China has unthreateningly expanded the boundaries of its autonomy. Subordinate-systemic uncertainties notwithstanding, this would continue. Joseph Nye's observation that after Beltway rhetoric had crossed its febrile peaks, Washington often oscillated back to sensible moderation vis-à-vis China looked increasingly prophetic.

What of the future, then? If the past is any guide, America's systemic dominance could persist for decades, simply because the bases of its mutually-reinforcing economic, military, scientific and diplomatic mettle—despite recent erosion—remain insuperable. Even its democratizing zeal retains powerful attraction among reformists and victims of repression. No single power or coalition appears capable of rolling back US imperium. However, no effective barrier to the accretion of Chinese power beckons either. Given America's unassailable position at the top of the hierarchy and the almost inevitable growth of Chinese capability, a time will come—probably in 2030-2050—when their fungible in-theatre power will match up. The cooption competition mix at the time will determine if they can work out a *modus vivendi* or not. Decisions taken by the occupants of the White House and *Zhongnanhai* over the next few years, and the support they garner from Moscow, Tokyo and Delhi, will shape that mix. The world waits.

Philippines' Counter Insurgency and Terrorism Campaign in Bangsamoro Southern Philippines: Lessons and Practices

*Taharudin Piang Ampatuan**

I. INTRODUCTION

The Philippines, even before the tragic 11 September, 2001 terrorist attack on the United States, has had a long history struggling against insurgency. This is the threat from the half century of communist insurgency and the four decades old Islamist inspired Muslim Secessionist Movement in Southern Philippines. The latter movement has a long history, but emerged as a greater, more radical threat as a result of their experience in the Afghan War. Having been exposed to the wider international Islamists movement, the Moros gained an appreciation of their place in the global struggle as well as the military skills necessary to implement their new found shared ideology. These skills were used in destructive attacks in the urban centers in the Philippines, such as the seizing and burning of a progressive Christian town of Ipil in Zamboanga Sibugay province in 1995,¹ the Rizal day Mass transit (LRT) bombing attack in Manila in 2000,² the bombing and sinking of Super

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¹ "Abu's Commander Global captured in General Santos City Sun * Star Zamboanga, http://www.lazamboangatimes.com/abu_sayyaf.html.

² Clamor, Ma Concepcion, "Philippine Perspective" cited in Rohan Gunaratna, "Terrorism in Asia Pacific" (Singapore: *Times New Media*, 2003), p. 211.

ferry Inter-Island sea vessel in the off shore of Manila in 2003³ and the Davao City international airport Bombing in 2003⁴ that resulted to hundred of civilian casualties.

These acts of terrorism bring to the general awareness of the public about the evolution of the Southern Philippines based secessionist threat. From what used to be a ethno-Islamist liberation struggle, it evolved into a radical Islamist movement, with global influence especially from the Middle East. The threat challenged the efficacy of the national security infrastructure of Philippine government and demonstrated a major flaw in the coordination of efforts among Philippines public institutions. A case in point is the problem of achieving unity of efforts of intelligence agencies such as those of the military and police in synchronizing operations to predict and prevent terrorist attack. The Philippine experience of deadly terrorist attacks made it a good subject of counter insurgency and counter-terrorism studies. Hence, this paper seeks to understand the Philippine counter terrorism response. It generally looked into the question on why Philippines has not contained the nearly half a century Bangsamoro secessionist movement? The paper postulates that an absence of a comprehensive strategy and plan will lead to an inadequate, and perhaps unsuccessful, counter insurgency and counter terrorism campaign. To answer this question, this paper examines, assesses, and analyzes the Philippine Counter Terrorism response to the Bangsamoro secessionist movement. It identifies counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism lessons learned and determine suitable policy recommendations needed.

II. THE BANGSAMORO ARMED STRUGGLE IN SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES

In order to understand the Islamist inspired Terrorism in the Philippines, it is important to appreciate the Bangsamoro Secessionist struggle, its historical perspective, context and factors that affect its evolution. In doing so, this will help to identify inconsistency and inappropriateness of response of the Philippine government.

The Evolution of the Moro Secessionist Movement

This understanding could mirror the evolution that can best be described in at least three waves. The first wave is "Islamization," which came by way of

³ Colonel Juanito Dalmas, Director for Operations, ATTF, "Anti-terrorism Task Force Briefing (ATTF)," 2004.

⁴ *Ibid.*

Arab missionaries and Muslim traders that sprung the formation of Sultanates in Sulu and Maguindanao in early and late 14th Century, respectively. The second wave is "Islamic revivalism movement," which came by way of the influence of the Islamic movements in the post colonial Middle East from 1900 to the late 1960's. The third wave is the Islamic radicalism which came by way of the *Mujahideens* that participated in the Afghan *Jihad* against the Soviet invasion and from the overseas contract workers in the Middle East, who were either former Christian converted to Islam or those exposed to *Wahabi* doctrine of Islam, prominent in the oil boom in the 1990's.

The First Wave of Islam and the Moro Resistance to Foreign Colonizer

The first wave of "Islamization" came by way of Arab missionaries and Muslim traders that sprung the formation of Sultanates in Sulu and Maguindanao. The Sulu sultanate was founded by Sultan Sayyed Abu Bakr (pronounced Abubakar), known as Sharieful Hashem an Arab missionary⁵ and Maguindanao Sultanate founded by Sharif Kabungsuan, another Arab missionary in the later part of 14th Century.⁶ The critical component of the Sultanates were the formation of Islamic based politico-administrative system that provided a system of governance and defense structure. This provided the focus for resistance to foreign, Spanish or other expansion in the Moro territories for almost 300 years.

A proof of an already existing developed political and administrative structure in the Moro territories were the Kiram- Bates Agreement of 1899 signed by Brig. General John Bates and Sultan Jamalul Kiram II of Jolo. The agreement was a mutual non-aggression pact which obligated the Americans to recognize the authority of the Sultan.⁷ This agreement provided opportunity to the United States to gain a foothold in the Moro territories, which open the Moro society to the more liberal and democratic American system. This eventually brought about the decline of Sultanate influence. In less than 50 years American had accomplished what 300 years of Spanish occupation had failed to do, contain the collective resistance of Moro's under the Sultan against foreign rule; and with relatively little violence.

The relative harmony ended in 1936 when under protest from the Moro's, the US ceded Moro territories to the new Philippine Commonwealth government and supported a policy of national integration. US Congressman Bacon

⁵ Website of the Royal Hashimite Sultanate of Sulu, accessed on February 25, 2008.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

bill (HB 12772)⁸ that support Mindanao remained a US protectorate and be given separate independence was denied, instead, US supported a policy that would expedite Moro integration. A massive resettlement program of Christian was organized thereafter providing incentives to Filipino settlers with bigger land (16 hectares lot) compare to the Moros (8 hectares), despite the latter's ancestral claim to the land. Before the turn of the 20th century, ninety eight percent of the lands in Mindanao and Sulu belonged to the Moros. In 1918 Moros were still 64 percent of the population, but by the 1970s Muslim only have about 37 percent of their original territories.⁹ The US and Filipino government failed to understand that the Sultanate institution was more than just a political structure, but a part of Moro Islamic identity. Its deliberate disenfranchisement was bound to have a wide ranging and negative impact.

Table 1 Muslim and Non-Muslim Populations of Cotabato

	1918	1939	1948	1960	1970
Non-Muslims	61,052	135,939	284,507	672,659	711,430
Muslims	110,926	162,996	155,162	356,460	424,577
Muslims (%)	64.53	54.53	35.29	34.64	37.37

Source: O'Shaughnessy 1975, p. 377.

Second Wave of Islam-Islamic Revival and the Re-assertion of Moro Identity

It was in the context of changing population demographic landscape and decline of Sultanate in Moro territories that power and identity vacuum existed. The space was filled through a reconnecting with the dormant Islamic consciousness that made possible through the return of Islamic scholars from the Middle East Islamic Universities. Chief among them was Ustadz Hashim Salamat, an Al-Azhar alumnus. These scholars not only brought new political thinking but also the Middle Eastern culture. Customary rituals perceived deviant to Islam were prohibited. The Ustadz (religious scholar) slowly replaced the Pandita (Traditional Muslim preacher). Political and religious thinking began to echo contemporary Islamic thinkers in the Middle East; Hashim Salamat admitted drawing influences from Hassan al-Albani, Sayed Qutub, Abu Ala Maududi and Imam Khomeini.¹⁰

⁸ HB 12772, 69th Congress, 1st session, May 6, 1926. Vol. 67 no 164 (June 24, 1926), pp. 11956-11964.

⁹ McKenna, Thomas M. *Muslim "Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines,"* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, p. 16. See <http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft0199n64c/>.

¹⁰ ICPVTR data base, "MILF Profile," dated 27 December, 2008, p. 2.

The evolution of Islam provided the ideological foundation to the simmering frustrations of Moros against the Philippine government. For instance, the traditional leaders, whose power had waned due to the Christian political dominance, found a means to justify their call for the return to the old glory of Sultanate system. The converging religio-political feelings needed a spark, which was provided by the Jabidah Massacre in 1968. Although had conflicting narratives, literatures about the incident agree that the massacre was a result of the Marcos administrations failed effort to forcibly retake Sabah. The Muslim youth recruited for the effort, were trained in *Corregidor, Bataan* (Northern Philippines). When the youths discovered the mission was to attack a fellow Muslim country, they refused, and were massacred to cover up the operation.¹¹ Not only did Malaysia's discover the plot, but they armed and trained the Bangsamoro.

Significant in this development was the alliance among the traditional leaders (*Sultan*), the Islamic religious sector and the progressive Moro secular educated youth to re-assert Moro Islamic identity. Although the alliance reflects differences of interest among these major stakeholders, what unifies them is their aspiration to establish a Bangsamoro Homeland that reflects its Islamic heritage. This was reflective of the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM) manifesto given by Datu Udtog Matalam emphasizing the political objective of establishing an Islamic Independent State in the Moro territories,¹² the fact that it was an Islamic state was critical. It permitted the emergence of a radicalized and more *Wahabi* tendency to take root in the area, and solidify the religio-political nature of the conflict.

The MIM-MNLF Intramurals

The unity was not to last. The first cracks in the Bangsamoro Independence Movement unity emerged between the traditional leaders and the progressive youths, led by Nur Misuari. Misuari have strong resentment to the traditional leader's leadership of the movement, accusing it of feudalism and being oppressive.¹³ In 1973, Nur Misuari and his company held a plenum meeting in Sabah, hosted by the then Sabah Minister, Tun Mustapha and established the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) without the traditional leaders representation. The traditional leaders responded by accepting the Marcos government's offer of general amnesty and surrender in mass with their

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Salah Jubair.

¹² *Ibid.* p. 111.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Chapter VIII.

supporters. This split was significant, as it set the stage for a lasting distrust among the Moro leadership that still remains to this day.

The MNLF-MILF Intramurals

Despite the earlier factions, the influence of Islam was not entirely affected by the rivalry and division, but instead eases its way within the movement. In fact the subsequent cracked of disunity in the Moro rebellion was led by the clergies, this time by Hashim Salamat. A *Maguindanao-Maranao* tribe, led faction of the MNLF, accused Misuari for betrayal and nepotism due to his preferential treatment of Tausug in MNLF key appointments. Among others, Misuari's lack of consultation in agreeing to the pressure of Libya and the Organization of the Islamic Conference to accept an autonomy solution to the Moro problem was highly resented. This faction was formally organized in 1984, which called itself the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) to emphasize its being Islamic movement.¹⁴ Offered a suitable base by the *Jemaati Islamiyah* and taking advantage of the opportunity offered by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Ustadz Hashim Salamat relocated his base from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan.¹⁵ Significant to the forming of the MILF was the manifest strength of Islamist influence to the Moro rebellion. This cracked to the unity of Moro stakeholders created an open competition for supremacy in the Moro Muslim communities, among the traditional and political leaders, who control the local politics with armed followers; the religious leaders mostly leading the MILF, and the MNLF Nationalist identified with Misuari.

Third Wave of Islam: Radical Islam and the Afghanistan Network¹⁶

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the oil boom in the Middle East in the 70's provided a catalyst for resurgent and the trans-nationalization of Islamist movements in the Middle East to the rest of the Muslim world. Firstly, in the case of Afghanistan, the participation of Saudi and Pakistan aided influx of international *Mujahideens* from Middle East and Southeast Asia to name a few, to drive the Soviet Union. Its significant implication is the building of international networks that catalyses the trans-nationalization of Afghan type *Jihad* movement that co-opted most ethno-Islamist liberation movements. Secondly, the oil boom of the 70's also attracted Muslim all over

¹⁴ Krisna Gaerlan and Mara Stankovitch (eds), "Rebels Warlords and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines," (Quezon City: Institute of Popular Democracy, 1999) pp. 152-58.

¹⁵ Ustadz Hashim Salamat profile, ICPVTR, 2008.

¹⁶ Please refer to Appendix 1: MILF profile for detail.

the world to work in the Middle East especially Saudi Arabia. These groups of people not only adopted the Arab culture when they returned to their countries but also introduced the puritanical interpretation of Islam that the Saudi *Wahabi* Islam practiced. This convergence of influence provided a healthy environment to provide a strong foundation for the development of radical Islamist movement in many areas. Southern Philippines is a case in point.

MILF-Al-Qaeda Interactions

MILF Chairman, Hashim Salamat stint in Pakistan provided the MILF with well trained 4th generation of *Mujahideen* fighters, (others previously trained in Malaysia and Libya). The exposure to the Soviet struggle, and the multinational reach of Islam and the global *jihad*, had a profound impact on Salamat and his supporters.¹⁷ This stint in Pakistan and his previous association with the Muslim Brotherhood at Al Azhar gave him the network of the Middle East and Southeast Asia. In an interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Chairman Salamat Hashim admitted that Osama bin Laden had sent financial support to Muslim secessionist in Southern Philippines. Although the MILF clarified that this financial supports were legitimate and coursed through charitable institutions, such as the International Islamic Relief Organization and others. Evidenced of significant network the MILF created from its experience in Afghanistan is the substantial boost of its capabilities. In the year 2000, all out war with the Philippine government, the MILF had shown the presence of Anti-Armour recoilless rifles in its inventory. It is not only they have the capability under its inventory but also innovatively self-manufactured similar type of recoilless rifle (RPG 7) using locally available metals.

Jemaah Islamiyah

Another aftermath of the Afghanistan experience was the building of collaborations among armed militant Islamist movements in the region. For instance the MILF was able to build a strong network with the Southeast Asia armed Islamist militant — the Jemaah Islamiyah. Among the prominent captured JI leaders was Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi, who is a classmate of MILF Field Commander Muklis Yunos in Afghanistan, and reported to have admitted links to the MILF. The Jemaah Islamiyah was responsible for the bombing of the Philippine ambassador's residence in Indonesia in the year 2000 and

¹⁷ Ampatuan and Llorca, (2000), "The Camp Abubakar Seize: the 4th Infantry Division Story." Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations J3.

involve in the retaliatory attacks believed orchestrated by the MILF in 30th December, 2000 LRT bombing in the Philippines' capital Manila.¹⁸

Abusayaf Group

Another resultant effect of the network made in Afghanistan is the acquaintances between the personalities that became leaders of various Islamist armed militant in Southeast Asia. Cases in point are Abdulrajak Janjalani who became the leader of Abu Sayaf group, Al-Ghozi in Indonesia's JI and Muklis Yunos of the MILF. This network maintained and became healthy after the Afghan war. For instance the MILF has also been reported to have provided sanctuary to the US and UN designated terrorist group — the Abusayaf Group (ASG).¹⁹ This terrorist designation was a product of the group propensity to attack civilian targets especially Christians. The group received national prominence after attacking a progressive Christian town of Ipil in Zamboanga (Southern Philippines) that killed scores of people and destroyed civilian properties.²⁰ The link between the ASG and the MILF was reportedly the charismatic ASG leader, the late Abdulrazak Janjalani whose mentor in the Al-qaeda camp in Afghanistan, Abdul Rasul Sayaf was Ustadz Hashim Salamat classmate in Al Azhar.²¹

The third wave of Islam articulated in this paper exhibits strict adherence to Islamic dogmas evidence by its propensity to emphasize on Shariah, the strict puritanical interpretations of Islam, such as the strict implementation of Islamic dresses for Muslim women, and prohibition of traditional practice perceived deviant to Islamic teaching.

Despite all the splits and personality clashes there are three constant themes in the Bangsamoro secessionist movement. First is the primacy of Islam, particularly an increasingly radical expression of the faith. Second, there are various factions representing ideological, tribal, and social division within the Moro community, such as the traditional leaders, the religious sector and the progressive new elites brought by the armed struggle. Thirdly, Moros marginalization widespread poverty and disenfranchisement are also major factors. This in a nutshell is the Moro problem that the Philippine

¹⁸ "Indonesia Backgrounder: How The Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates", ICG report. 11 Dec 2002, http://www.crisisweb.org/library/documents/report_archive/A400845_11122002.pdf.

¹⁹ "MILF gives refuge to Abus," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 10 May, 2003. http://www.inq7.net/nat/2003/may/10/nat_5-1.htm.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*, (ICPVTR).

government has been addressing for decades. It is interesting to understand how these factors played in the counter-insurgency and counter terrorism approach of the Philippine government.

III. COUNTER INSURGENCY-TERRORISM IN BANGSAMORO SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES

Lessons of successful counter-insurgency or counter terrorism campaigns historically adhered to the fundamental axiom that combating an insurgency is not exclusively a military endeavor, but involves parallel, socio-economic, and diplomatic efforts. For what Desker and Kumar (2002) aptly described as a calibrated military approach in which political, economic, and ideological measures are emphasized—elevating non-military instruments of policy over military options.²²

Lack of strategic vision is not only the factor marring the Philippine government response in the Bangsamoro Secessionist Movement. Lack of coherent political strategy and an absence of clear political resolve and commitment are the other factors. A winning counter strategy requires a political will, commitment and perseverance. In counter-insurgency, winning the public confidence including the insurgents is tied to the counter insurgency establishment rather than the insurgents. In the case of the Philippine government, it failed to take the window of opportunity provided by the GRP-MNLF peace agreement ushered by Indonesia in 1996.²³ Four years after the peace agreement in the year 2000, instead of sustaining the peace, Philippine government under President Estrada waged an all-out war against the MILF that not only wasted the gain of peace agreement but partly blamed for the failure of Misuari's ARMM government.²⁴ As a result, Nur Misuari abrogated the peace agreement and renewed hostilities against the government in 2003,²⁵ and the Abusayaf Group was at all time high in strength, number of attacks and high profile abductions. The Philippine government wasted years of negotiations and lost opportunities.

This is in stark contrast of the approach adopted by the British government with its Northern Ireland insurgency. In the case of United Kingdom, the

²² Desker Barry and Ramakrishna, Kumar, "Forging an Indirect Strategy in Southeast Asia," *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2002, p. 167.

²³ Rasul Amina (eds), "Broken Peace?," Manila: PCID, 2007, Chapter 1.

²⁴ Marco Mezzera, "The Camps of the Sun: The MILF's Strongholds after the Military Offensive," *Global South*, 5 March 2001, <http://www.philsol.nl/A01a/Focus-MILF-mar01.htm> accessed 20 February, 2008.

²⁵ *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, accessed on 26th February, 2008. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view_article.php?article_id=66928.

British government had the “will to settle” the Northern Ireland Conflict, which meant that “neither Labor nor the Conservatives exploited the issue for partisan gains.”²⁶ In the case of the Philippine government the peace agreements entered into by the government was hijacked in congress through majority Christian Philippine Congress, and watered down. While the MNLF participated and governed the Autonomous Region created for the purpose, in 2003 the MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari withdrew from the Peace Agreement, accusing the government of deceit and lack of commitment to the peace accord, and orchestrating the split in the MNLF leadership, and privy to the creation of pro-government, Council of 15-MNLF faction. This development not only wasted the peace process but only strengthened the negative perceptions of the Moros about the Philippine government sincerity and commitment in resolving the issue peacefully.

The Philippine government counter-terrorism campaign has suffered because of flawed metrics. Instead of addressing the problem, it accused the MNLF of inefficiency and charged Nur Misuari of graft and corruption, over and above the charges of rebellion it brought against him. In other words, the process of analysis at the higher level appears to be emanating from political considerations rather than any objective approach. One of the things that allowed Great Britain to attain success in Malaya, according to John Nagl, was its willingness at all times to admit failure.²⁷ A winning counter-insurgency strategy requires an independent strategic assessment from time to time, and those whose careers are contingent on the success of a campaign can never evaluate it with brutal objectivity.²⁸ Using Hoffman and Taw basic elements of successful counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, this paper will examine the Philippine counter insurgency and counter terrorism campaign in the Bangsamoro Southern Philippines.

Unified Command and Control Structure

Hoffman and Taw (1992) suggest unity of command, as one of the key elements in an effective counter-insurgency and counter terrorism.²⁹ The argument posed is that an absence of such a structure leads to diffusion of authority and

²⁶ A.G. Noorani, “Irish Lessons for Kashmir,” *Frontline*, Volume 20, Issue 7, March 29-April 2003.

²⁷ John Nagl, “Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife,” (West Port: Praeger, 2002), p. 192.

²⁸ Steven Metz and Raymod Millen, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century; Reconceptualizing Threat and Response,” Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, November 2004.

²⁹ Hoffman and Taw: p. v.

competition among security forces, inadequate collection and poor dissemination of intelligence, a dangerously stultifying bureaucracy, and inefficient tactical operations. The history of counter-insurgency warfare shows that the full integration of all government agencies under unified control (and preferably unified command) is the only way to synchronize the elements of power. Unified command and control structure is considered one of the prime reasons for the British success in Malaya. The British did not start off this way in Malaya, during the first three years of the emergency, the British army had alienated vast majority of the population with large military sweeps, and indiscriminate destruction and killings.³⁰ The primary reason Nagl argues of the lack of the Army's direction is disunity of command: the police commissioner was nominally, but not actually, in command of all forces, and there was no overall integration of civil-military efforts.³¹ A successful implementation of Malayan Counter insurgency plan in 1952, however, effectively solved the problems of bureaucratic rivalries, disconnects, and infighting in Malaya, thereby permitting effective coordination of the civil administration, the military and the police; the coordination of intelligence; and, most critically, the flexibility to respond quickly, often with novel policies and tactics, to the problem at hand.³²

Marcos Martial Law Military (hard) Approach

As mentioned in part 2, the 1968 Jabidah massacre and Malaysia's support initiated the open hostility between the Philippine government and the Moros that caught the Philippine government by surprise. It was basically for the first three years from 1971 to 1973 that the Marcos government response was totally uncoordinated. With only the 4th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army stationed in Mindanao defending the area for three years until 1973, the MNLF captured significant areas in Mindanao.

The Philippine government was able to regain momentum in 1973 when it hastily established the Central Mindanao Command (CEMCOM) to organize a campaign against the secessionists in Central Mindanao.³³ With this development, two Divisions of the Philippine Army from Luzon (Northern Philippines), the 1st Infantry Division and the 3rd Infantry Division were

³⁰ Nagl, p. 195.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Bruce Hoffman, "Insurgency and Counter-insurgency in Iraq," occasional paper, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 2004, p. 7.

³³ Abat, Fortunato U, "The Day we nearly lost Mindanao: The CEMCOM Story," (Quezon City, Philippines: SBA Printers Inc, 1984), p. 36.

transferred to augment 4th Infantry Division. All three divisions were placed under the Operational Command of the CEMCOM.³⁴ These three Divisions did not defeat the MNLF, but it provided sufficient time for the government to organize a unified response. Part of the effort was to consolidate the organizational ease provided by the declaration of Martial Law on September 11, 1971. This provided the Marcos government the ability to place development agencies directly supporting military campaigns under a central command.

One tangible offshoot of this policy was a massive reconstruction program, dubbed the "Reconstruction and Development Program in Muslim Mindanao" that provided an inter-agency coordinative framework for development initiatives.³⁵ Marcos has not only succeeded in luring the MNLF through its Chairman Nur Misuari to sign a peace agreement³⁶ in 1976 at Tripoli Libya, but also succeeded in taking advantage of the internal rift between the traditional leaders and the MNLF Moro progressive leaders led by Nur Misuari to rift animosity.

Marcos like the US, used the Datus and their influence in both the military and non-military campaigns to assist the Philippine government. The Philippine government introduced the Barangay Self-Defense Unit (BSDU), a community based para-military forces that allowed the armed supporters of the Datus (traditional leaders) to legally acquire firearms and defend their communities. In the political front, Marcos implemented his own interpretation of the Tripoli agreement in 1976, and unilaterally established two autonomous regions in Mindanao — Region 9 and 12. This policy was complemented by a massive infrastructure development, such as roads, schools and scholarship for Muslims.

Marcos used the Martial Law regime to make the Philippine Constabulary and the Integrated National Police as a fourth major service command of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), alongside the Army, Navy and Air force. To further establish a unified command structure, Marcos created the Armed Forces of the Philippines Southern Command which created a unified command structure for the whole Mindanao Island. Marcos had the opportunity to defeat the insurgency, but failed to deliver on the promised political and development issues. Some suggests that temporary success of divide and rule will finally calmed the secessionist movement. Instead, he further

³⁴ Ampatuan, 2002.

³⁵ Presidential Task Force on the Reconstruction and Development of Muslim Mindanao, Vol. 1, 1973, pp. i-iii.

³⁶ "The Tripoli Agreement," MNLF Website, accessed on 25 February 2008, http://mnlf.net/The_Tripoli.htm.

alienated the Moro population making future peace efforts difficult. So while there was a unified command, there was no political will to implement necessary reforms.

Post Martial Law

Until the attack and burning of a progressive Christian town of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay in 1995, perpetrated by the ASG, the command structure of the AFP was seen to be effectively addressing the patches of conflict posed by the MILF (Islamists). However the emergence of radical Islamist Abu Sayaf Group and its alleged connections with trans-national terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and the Indonesian Jemaah Islamiyah put the security infrastructure of Philippine government to test. The new operational threat posed by deliberately targeting civilians caught the government off-guard. The Abusayaf activities, which crossed the line between political violence and criminality, challenge the coordinative structure of the Philippine government. The Philippine National Police, which has been made independent of the AFP and placed under the newly created Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) in 1998, proved to be no match for the highly experience, well armed Moro rebels. The breaking of the unified command structure did not help matters.

This latter problem was a reversion to the past. The military, police, and local government all had problems coordinating responses to the crisis. For instance in the burning of Ipil Town by the ASG, under the existing arrangement, the Police is supposed to be responsible for addressing act of terrorism under the Peace and Order Council framework.³⁷ However, since the burning of Ipil town resulted in deaths and disaster, this incident could be seen as a National Disaster Coordinating Council mandate,³⁸ which is headed by the Department of National Defense, whose operating arm is the Armed Forces of the Philippines. These problems can only be solved through legislation, however, none of the existing agencies wants to initiate reforms as they could lose responsibility for areas and hence turf. Thus the confused status quo remains.

In the Martial law period, the Philippine National Police was under the Armed Forces of the Philippines; hence deployment of police to support insurgency campaign was easier. After the Martial Law, the Philippine Police operational supervision was transferred to the Department of Interior and Local Government. This is further complicated by the Local Government

³⁷ Executive Order_309 "National Peace and Order Council and Republic Act 7260," Local Government Code of 1998.

³⁸ PD 1566, "Philippine Disaster preparedness program," issued on 11 June, 1978.

Code³⁹ that provides authority for the Local Government Unit (LGU) Officials' supervision over police in their localities.⁴⁰ Hence, a Chief of police of town, city or a police provincial director has two masters: the Mayor or the provincial governor and the nationalize police hierarchy which is part of central government.

As Hoffman and Taw explain, although the dependence of the police on security forces—including the army in combating insurgency cannot be denied, the police should play a major role in maintaining internal security.⁴¹ This was the British experience in dealing with the deteriorating situation in Northern Ireland in 1972. The deployment of the army clothed with special powers of surveillance, head check, arrest, search and seizure, while bringing impressive gains in material terms made little headway in winning the support and cooperation of the population.⁴² The situation improved only when British replaced the senior army officer who was in charge of the overall direction of security operations with a chief constable; strengthened and reorganized the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC); and halved the number of troops deployed in the operations.⁴³

In the Philippine experience, this was not the case—but the experience suggest that there should be a correct overlap of military and police functions, and a clear framework of "Military primary role-police support role or vice versa." An example would be insurgent groups that claim large military formations and territorial influence requires bigger security force presence than the police can normally provide. Additionally police are often at greater risk than the military, as policemen are most often members of the community they serve, unlike the Army who is rotated into the area. Another factor is to remember the nature of the insurgency. It is a socio-political conflict where some portion of the population may share the objectives, and may even support the methods of the insurgents. This may include the police as well. Finally, although the police are loyal, and can be protected, they are simply not equipped or trained to fight insurgents. The police are oriented towards crime fighting, where force is the last resort. While the police role is indispensable in counter insurgency and counter terrorism, there is a need to determine the right operational condition wherein the police take a primary

³⁹ Republic Act 7260, "The Local Government Code."

⁴⁰ Republic Act 6795, "Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1998."

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

⁴² Chaman Lal, "Terrorism and Insuregency," available at: <http://www.punjabbilok.com/terrorism/10.htm>.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p22.

role or supporting role. As experienced, military can be trained as community organizers and perform limited law enforcement role. One should not forget that a counter insurgency campaign is an internal security operations — a socio-economic and political conflict. One should not see military involve in counterinsurgency as the one conventionally portrayed in the movies as seize and destroy individuals because in insurgency situation he is an organizer, social worker and the representative of the government rolled into one.

In an effort to address the lack of unity of command, and to recognize the nature of the conflict, the government upgraded the counter insurgency to a cabinet level activity, removing it from the sole authority of the Defense department. This allowed the national development agencies to synchronize and integrate its programs with the overall national security establishment. The idea is to pen a whole-of-government approach, which requires the whole mechanisms of government in addressing the insurgency for both the communist and secessionist movement or terrorism. A National Internal Security Plan (NISP) was also crafted that outlines and defines agencies responsibilities.⁴⁴ The NISP contains a comprehensive plan to address the communist insurgency but not the Bangsamoro secessionist movement. NISP identified the critical question as a socio-economic land reform issue that confused the objectives of the communist insurgency with the political demand of the Moros for self determination (autonomy). Hence, the plan could not be implemented in the Moro areas, except for the military component.

Another flaw was the attempt to establish an Area Coordination Center (ACC) in every province, especially in the Muslim provinces. It was a noble attempt of the central government to synchronize programs, but it failed because the framework runs counter to the decentralization policy which is constitutionally mandated and under the Local Government Code. The government should have initiated a legislated policy that combines all councils from local to strategic level, rather than creating a structure that only undermines existing institutional mechanisms in placed.

The whole idea of whole-of government approach is novel but it must be tailored to the existing structure. Instead of duplication and redundancy, it must strengthened existing structure or provide mechanisms for convergence and collaboration. For instance, instead of creating an area coordinating centre, the Peace and Order Council should have been strengthened and since the Local Executive has power as chairman of all local boards and councils, a comprehensive plan should have integrated the basic function of public

⁴⁴ Executive Order No. 21 (19 June 2001), "Creating a Coordinative and Integrative System on Internal Security."

safety, development and disaster management in a local counter-insurgency plan. The local police status needs to be clarified; they cannot have two masters and expect them to perform efficiently. If there is a need to amend the law, it must be amended.

Effective Anti-Terrorist Legislations Combined with Confidence Building Measures

History shows that successful counter-insurgency campaigns acknowledge that the people are the centre of gravity in insurgency warfare, and that the key to winning strategy lies in enlisting the help of the inhabitants. When the government effectively meets its people's political and socio-economic needs, insurgency has a less fertile breeding environment. In Northern Ireland, for instance, where trouble erupted in 1969 because of decades of discrimination against the Catholics over jobs, housing, education, the British government shifted the emphasis from defeating terrorism by force to providing political concessions to the Catholic minority, ensuring fair employment and job availability through anti-discrimination legislation, and redressing genuine grievances about the allocation of public housing, the provision of social services, etc.⁴⁵ Britain actively pursued measures aimed at improving relations between the community and security forces, and between the community and the government.⁴⁶

In Bangsamoro Southern Philippines there has been a long history of using a mix of force and policies to address development. It was the Estrada administration (2000) who had shown total disregard for confidence building in its all-out war policy against the MILF. It did not only force the death of a peace agreement signed by the government in 1996, but also renewed resentment and hostilities with the Muslim population. Not only did it show insensitivity to religious symbols, by allowing soldier to post a Philippine flag on a Minaret of a bombed mosque, but the President himself feasted on pork with soldiers inside a captured Mosque.⁴⁷ This law (Martial Law) and acts remind that of Britain's anti-terrorist legislations in 1983, Lord Jellicoe's pertinent observation that the measures that were most likely to violate civil liberties were also the least valuable.⁴⁸ It also holds especially in Southern

⁴⁵ Hoffman and Morrison Taw, p. 56.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Minda News*, accessed 30 March 2008, http://www.mindanews.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=382&Itemid=70.

⁴⁸ Andrew Blick and Stuart Weir: "The rules of the game: Terrorism Bill 2005," http://www.jrrt.org.uk/rules_of_the_Game_leaflet.pdf.

Philippines context, where repressive state policies and laws have proved counter-productive.

This realization seems to reflect the approach taken by the government of President Aquino (1987-1992), which negotiated for peace with the MNLF and ensured that in the 1987 Philippine Constitution⁴⁹ provides for the creation of the Muslim Mindanao Autonomous region. This was sustained by the Ramos administration (1992-1998) that concluded a peace deal with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) with the signing of the GRP-MNLF 1996 peace agreement and the passage of the autonomy law. The administration of President Arroyo (2004) is currently negotiating with the MILF and has a successful cessation of hostilities agreement through the help of foreign military monitoring team led by Malaysia. It has also recently passed an Anti-terrorism law.⁵⁰ The Human Security Act (RA 9372) reflects the government resolve to address the threat of terrorism but also ensures accountability for law enforcers to avoid excesses in implementing the law.

Even the Philippine Armed Forces have developed a civil-military relations strategy (Salaam—Special Advocacy for the livelihood assistance for the advancement of Muslim).⁵¹ This campaign strategy to win the hearts and minds of the Muslim population not only establish mechanisms for convergence of efforts of peace initiatives and development efforts between the security component of government (Army) and the national development agencies, but also a face-to-face information operations that encourages the Muslims to develop and understand Islamic values, distorted by the rebels. This strategy brought with it the US Army's humanitarian efforts in Muslim communities. For most Muslims in Southern Philippines—psychologically and emotionally scarred by pervasive violence—these “healing touches” are either too little or too late or both.

While there are serious efforts to address the Moro problem at the strategic level and has had a favourable policy environment, the Philippine government has mostly failed in implementation of policies and programs. In the ten years since the implementation of the 1996 peace accord, the people of the autonomous region are worse off than before. This can be attributed to the lack of political will from the government. In addition, corruption and public accountability, economic mismanagement, and peace and order problem are the major issues related to the failure of governance in Southern Philippines.

⁴⁹ Sec 15, Art X, (Autonomous Region) 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.

⁵⁰ Republic Act no. 9372, “Human Security Act of 2007.”

⁵¹ Ampatuan, 2002.

Corruption and Public Accountability

The sitting President's legitimacy remains a question after allegedly being caught on a "wiretap" speaking to an election commissioner of Mindanao in the 2004 Presidential elections. She won with a slim margin of little more than a million votes with almost half of it in ARMM. The Philippine government has difficulty proving its sincerity because of legitimacy issue. A report by the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) cited corruption as the major reason for the slow delivery of social services in the region, quoting Commission on Audit report which said that 294 infrastructure projects worth P49.54 Million (USD 1.98M) inspected, 213 were not implemented,⁵² and this is only a fraction of billions of pesos given to ARMM.

Economic Mismanagement

ARMM is the poorest region in the country with more than half of its families classified as poor. Poverty incidences, according to the 2006 Official Poverty Statistics, reached 55.3 percent, a 9.9 percent increase from 2003's 45.4 percent. Statistics showed that the incidence of poverty in the predominantly Muslim region is more than two times the national average of 26.9 percent. The high poverty incidence in the region can be attributed to the volatile peace and order situation because "the conflict has displaced many families."⁵³ An average of USD 380 annual income means that people in ARMM subsist into a hand to mouth daily living on an average daily income of USD 1.5.⁵⁴




Figure 1: Annual Poverty Incidence

⁵² Marites D. Vitug. "Misauri faces Big headaches in ARMM", accessed on www.pcij.org.ph.

⁵³ abs-cbnNEWS.com/Newsbreak, accessed: <http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/storypage.aspx?StoryId=111303>.

⁵⁴ National Statistics Coordination Board: http://www.nscb.gov.ph/poverty/2006_05mar08/table_2.asp.

Peace and Order Problem

The Philippine government and the MNLF signed a peace agreement in 1996, in which prospect of peace and economic development would finally be brought to ARMM. However, statistics shows an average of 30 percent decrease in annual per capita income from 1997 to 2006. This can be attributed to the governments all out war policy in the areas of *Maguindanao* (2000), *Basilan* (1998-2001). Castillo explained that alleviating poverty is difficult if you have so many displaced families.⁵⁵ Partly to be blamed is the absence of rule of law wherein clans and family feuds were settled through cycle of vendetta (Rido). There are 218 recorded rido from 1970 to 2004 and there might have been more since most ridos were not reported to the police.⁵⁶ As mentioned earlier in part 2, this conflict can largely be attributed to the unsettled differences between the traditional leaders and the armed group (MNLF and MILF), of which their supporters compete for supremacy and power in their areas of influence.

The autonomous status given to the Muslim provinces has failed to improve the economy of Muslim Mindanao, in fact it has worsen. It is a lost opportunity due to un-sustained and inconsistent policy of government, ARMM dysfunctional governance and absence of rule of law, where guns and goons are un-checked.




Figure 2: Annual Per Capita Poverty Threshold in USD

Given this scenario, it is hardly surprising that Moro youth — poor and jobless — decide to join militant outfits, such as the ASG and the MILF.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ Abhoud Syed Linga, "Dynamics and Management of Rido in the province of Maguindanao," cited in RIDO, W. Magno Torres III, (Manila: The Asia Foundation) Chapter 2.

Significant portions of the youth drop out of college and become easy prey for revolutionary movements. In sum, only by addressing the problems of corruption, inadequate infrastructure, economic stagnation and peace and order problem can the government hope to effectively undercut a significant source of militancy — poverty and joblessness, failure to do so mean a steady supply of local recruits to militant outfits.

If the Philippine government wants to win the “Moro hearts and minds,” the government needs to give Moros hope. Accommodating popular Moro demands for genuine political autonomy and facilitating the process toward full revival of the democratic governance and public accountability would help to rebuild Moro public confidence in the Central government. Facilitating the return of displaced Moros in other neighboring country such Malaysia and to the neighboring provinces for example, would help resolved most of the social and political grievances. The Philippine government should also try to re-examine its security policy in the region by giving preference to Moros qualified to lead military command units in ARMM. Implementing the provision of the peace agreement on the creation of regional command⁵⁷ that provides opportunity for the people of the autonomous region to be involved in its security can bolster public confidence.

Coordination within and between Intelligence Services

History suggests that intelligence and equally important, counter-intelligence, is central to success of counter-insurgency warfare and counter terrorism operations. After examining seven case studies, Hoffman and Morrison-Taw found that in each campaign, success was directly proportional to the emphasis placed on intelligence.⁵⁸ That effective intelligence is most dependent on the effective functioning of two critical elements of a successful counter-insurgency and counter terrorism campaign: a well organized command and coordination structure, and recognition of the public’s role in the struggle.

In Northern Ireland, for instance, the government’s poor relations with the population, and the bureaucratically entrenched command and coordination structures hindered intelligence efforts.⁵⁹ This is more or less the case in the counter insurgency and counter terrorism efforts in Bangsamoro Southern Philippines. The unified command is anything but unified, and the people are alienated both by the inconsistent government policies and, (most

⁵⁷ RA 9054, section 11.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

importantly) by the government's inability to provide them with better and secured lives.

Intelligence (especially the critical and accurate human intelligence), consequently, is sparse and dissemination ineffective. A unified command (Western Mindanao Command) and several task forces such as the "Task Force Comet" for counter terrorism specifically organized to hunt less than 400 hundred members of the Abu Sayaf Group for close to ten years, and yet the military has failed to curb and neutralize the terrorist group. While the government managed to kill some of its key leaders — recent beheading of 6 civilians and an ambush that cause the lives of 29 soldiers was seen by government critics reason enough to confirm that contrary to the claim of the AFP, ASG is still a force to reckon with.⁶⁰ Had the policy makers or the security officials looked to the successful counter-insurgency campaigns for strategic guidance, they would have realized that the solution to poor intelligence lay in re-building the local police capability in ARMM to support effectively the counter insurgency operations. Muslim Moro Military and police conducting operations is better than a gun-totting soldiers from the Christian Philippines, who are always seen as occupier.

At present, the ARMM police are ill-equipped — organizationally, materially, and mentally — to combat the terrorists. While the peace agreement caused the integration of 2,500 former MNLF fighters to the police force, they were not used to help curbed the terrorist threat, but mostly underutilized as they remain distrusted. Another 5,000 former MNLF were integrated in the Armed Forces of the Philippines were also underutilized. The vision was a locally recruited security force working to establish peace and order in the region. The vision has failed to materialize as most of the forces have been stationed outside the region.

On the problem of synchronizing and achieving intelligence coordination, National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA), which is a coordinating agency at strategic level, should have left the operating units of the military and police to collect intelligence. Instead, it is operating at tactical level through its regional offices, and creating a structure that affects the military and police chain of command and communication. Strategic intelligence should focus on providing support for tactical intelligence and complement it with strategic intelligence response. It should have formulated the priority intelligence tasks, and use the regional offices for monitoring its implementation, coordination and synchronization.

⁶⁰ ICPVTR 2007 Annual Report, Philippine Portion.

Foreign Collaboration

If there is strength of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), it is its ability to acquire foreign support in both its military approach and non-military measures, including collaboration in dealing with the Bangsamoro Secessionist Movement. The 57-nation Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), Libya, Indonesia, Malaysia — all OIC member countries, and United States, Australia and United Kingdom are among the countries that directly supporting and providing resources to the GRP to resolve the Moro problem peacefully.

Peace Process

In 1976 the Marcos administration took the opportunity to resolve the Moro problem, when it had convinced Libya, and later the OIC to mediate the conflict while maintaining the territorial integrity of the Philippines. Instead of implementing the Tripoli Agreement in 1976, Marcos was accused by the MNLF of deceit by hiding under the cloak of Philippine Constitution by conducting plebiscite, invoking the constitutional provision of democratic process. Marcos not only rejected the concern of the MNLF but unilaterally implemented his own form of autonomy by creating two autonomous regions — Regions 9 and 12. Marcos might have succeeded militarily by dividing the ranks of the MNLF but failed to arrive at a just and acceptable political settlement. The Marcos administration wanted to win a war, not the peace, as some pundits explained later.

Another successful effort of which the GRP worked hard and lost is the 1996 Peace agreement mediated by Indonesia. This was a case of a diplomatic coup on the part of the Philippines when it had inked a peace deal accepted by the MNLF. To this day, the MNLF has three factions — the MNLF under Misuari currently waging a war against the government, the MNLF Council of 15 composed of MNLF senior Commanders who have accepted positions in the government, and the Abu Sayaf group. Politically the GRP had again succeeded in dividing the MNLF ranks, but it seems to have not learnt lessons from the experience of the Marcos Martial law administration. The government wasted time and money letting a peace process fade through lack of support to the MNLF government in the autonomous region.

Among the most successful collaborations is the Malaysia's mediated peace process between the GRP and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, which lead to a cessation of hostilities being monitored by a Malaysia led International Monitoring Team (IMT). Participating countries in the IMT includes teams from Brunei, Libya, Japan and Canada. This monitoring team

reduced the number of military engagements between the MILF and the GRP by 98 percent. The IMT has also effectively prevented even the tribal and clan conflict in the Muslim communities.

Global War on Terror

In 2003 the United States designated the Philippines as a major non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally. The total U.S. military assistance from 2001 to 2005 was US\$316 million, which made the Philippines the fourth largest recipient of US foreign military assistance.⁶¹ This support is over and above the support provided by US through the USAID programs. US also shifted its traditional military exercises from Luzon to Mindanao with the Balikatan Exercises re-directed in Sulu and Basilan since 2002. The US Operations are part of US CT Campaign in Asia-Pacific aptly called "Operation Enduring Freedom." The US, aside from enhancing the capability of the Philippine Armed Forces in Counter terrorism through provision of training and equipment, has also actively pursued humanitarian operations to "win the hearts and minds of the Muslim communities."




Figure 3: US Fund Support (million \$)

After the United States, Australia is the second largest foreign provider of training to the Philippine military. The Philippines and Australia signed two MoUs for CT and Trans-national crime in 2003, during Australian Prime Minister John Howard's visit to the Philippines. Australia pledged a three-year, A\$5 million package for counter-terrorism assistance, which was doubled in October 2004 to A\$10 million over a five-year period.⁶² A Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is currently pending in the Philippine senate, which will allow Australian troops on the Philippine soil.

⁶¹ Philippines Profile 2006: Security, accessed <http://fatatlas.com/node/1000004170>.

⁶² Cesar Ben Basan Baroña, "Australia Steps Up Military Aid to Philippines," *Bulatlat.com*, 2004.

While the assistance of the United States created a favourable environment for support for the AFP to neutralized top Abu Sayaf group leaders, this is temporary, without the just and acceptable political settlement. In a larger context, it is just like “ping-pong ball” because not only did the Misuari led group of the MNLF renew their hostility against the government, threatening to undermine the gains of US-Philippines collaboration in Counter terrorism, but chances are not remote that a tactical alliance or unification maybe possible between the MNLF and the ASG and worst of maybe the MILF if the peace process breaks down.

Security experts saw that since US has formed a significant influence to the problem and its close relationship with the Philippine government, it should instead of just strengthening the military capability of the GRP that may only create more violence than peace; it must actively get involved in reaching a just and acceptable political solution to the problem. A delay in the peace process is only giving the hardliners in the MILF grounds and support, Al Haj Murad Ibrahim⁶³ have said after the peace process hit a snag. No one wants a situation that resembles that of Afghanistan or Palestine.

Intelligence and Border Security Arrangements

The Philippines has also created several multilateral border security arrangements with Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei that provides joint patrols between and among the member countries. From 2003, after the Malaysia Sipadan resorts abductions, there was no reported incident of terrorist activities in the region. Other countries that have foreign intelligence exchanges with the Philippines include Singapore, Saudi Arabia and recently Pakistan.⁶⁴

IV. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As discussed in part three, the Philippines response to the four vital counter-insurgency elements leaves much to be desired. The present unified command and coordination structure in the Moro territories is largely ineffective, which in turn has led to a great deal of confusion, competition among security forces and intelligence agencies deployed in operations. The issue is not the absence of coordination, but too many coordinative structures and doctrines. The government has also failed to effectively meet the political and socio-economic needs of the Bangsamoro people, and has been unable to win their support in the struggle. On intelligence, the Philippine case showed not wanting on

⁶³ www.luwaran.com.

⁶⁴ NICA Briefing, 12 December 2005 at the Anti-Terrorism Task Force (ATTF), NSC.

intelligence coordinative structure but too many un-synchronized intelligence collection efforts, as in the case of NICA, which should supposedly coordinate intelligence at strategic level, but rather it is operational and at the tactical level. This led to security forces without sufficient actionable intelligence or burn-out intelligence operations. To its credit though, the government has been reasonably effective in enlisting the assistance and cooperation of other governments and foreign-security agencies in the campaign.

Based on the detailed assessment and analysis of the Philippine counter-insurgency and counter terrorism strategy, the paper has following recommendations:

- At policy level, the problem of synchronizing the disaster management and crisis response with two major agencies of government (DND and DILG) involved, suggest a legislative initiative to harmonize their structure and allow for seamless overlap and identification of specific agencies' functions.
- The military and police coordination is integral to the success of the campaign. The Philippine experience suggests that there must be a mechanisms in place at all levels of command that would identify the principal-support relationship role for the military and police. While Philippine military personnel, both officers and enlisted, have since 1987 been trained in community organizing and disaster and rehabilitation management. This and their extensive efforts in nation building, must not implement as stand alone efforts, but as part of both local government and national government agencies, so that all are involved in these critical operations.
- The socio-economic and political dimension of counter-insurgency and counter terrorism suggest an inter-agency effort at all levels of command from local to strategic level, which suggest a whole-of -government approach. This can be achieved by strengthening the pillars of the criminal justice system. It must also allow participation of private sector and civil society in the affairs of government by improving transparency in governance.
- The wisdom of the peace agreement in creating an ARMM regional command led by Moros both in the police and military must be implemented to reinforce government rhetoric of giving the Moros self governance with actionable program.
- Mobilizing and increasing the capability of local police of Moro territories through training. This must be coupled with the provision to adequately arm locals who are familiar with the customs and traditions

so they will be seen as protectors, rather than police for other parts of the country that will always be considered occupiers.

- To enlist the support of the population, the Philippine government and the Regional government in the autonomous region should jointly strive to create an environment where the Moros can live with security, stability and dignity. For its part, the central government should make every effort to build a national consensus to grant a genuine autonomy to Bangsamoro people. The Philippine government should consider compensation of those displaced by the Christian settlers if only to prevent further animosity for the settler Christians and the native Muslims.
- The Philippine government should ensure that the Autonomous region will have the rule of law. It should make the Autonomous government accountable for its actions and corruption must not be left unpunished.
- There are four stakeholders that evolved through decades of conflict in the Moro areas: the traditional leaders (datu/sultan), the MNLF, the MILF and the Christian settler's leaders. There must be a political dialogue, consultation and consensus among these leaders in order to achieve peace.
- On the diplomatic front, United States should consider being involved in the peace process by either complementing the efforts of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) or by itself should make proactive efforts to reach out a just and acceptable political settlement.

V. CONCLUSION

"In the absence of a comprehensive national plan, the individual application of selected tactics and policies can prolong a conflict or even result in outright failure," conclude Hoffman and Morrison-taw.⁶⁵ This observation aptly sums up the Philippine approach in the Bangsamoro Southern Philippines. The government's sustained emphasis on military measures without the corresponding socio-economic initiatives and political strategic objective has prolonged the conflict. Incoherent and inconsistent government policies have negated the impact of several positive initiatives taken in the campaign. The Tripoli agreement of 1976 and 1996 Peace Agreement were lost Philippine government opportunities to end the conflict.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

In the end, the Bangsamoro people — the center of gravity in this warfare — remain unconvinced about the government's ability to provide them with better and secure lives and hence are still alienated from the regime. The Philippine government may well start looking at identifying what best options left and craft a strategic objective to attain it. It could either be a genuine political autonomy, a Bangsamoro federal state or even an independent state.

Thus, it would only be fair to conclude that lack of a comprehensive and coherent counter-insurgency strategy in the Bangsamoro combined with an absence of clear political resolve and commitment to end the insurgency has led to the campaign failure. A holistic counter-insurgency strategy is hence extremely essential in the Bangsamoro areas. Equally essential are the correct metrics employed to judge the campaign's progress, and a clear political resolve and commitment to end the insurgency and terrorism. It bears repeating that a winning counter insurgency and counter terrorism strategy requires political will and perseverance. The Philippine government should abandon strategies that bring short term political gains at the cost of long term strategic interests and work in greater harmony toward the larger goal of winning peace with Bangsamoro rather than continuously aiming to win the war against the Bangsamoro. Further study is recommended that would examine options, such as autonomy, federal or independence.

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South Asia and Regionalism: Searching for an Identity

*Badrul A. Khan**

I. INTRODUCTION

It has become customary to highlight the importance of regional identity and regionalism in international relations in recent time. Region centric characterisation of the world seems to have taken a stride in world politics so that viewing the world as “a world of regions” (Peter Katzenstein in Kohli *et.al.*, 1995, pp. 14-15) is taking precedence over the global. Notwithstanding the usual rhetoric surrounding regionalisation, its success remains all too varied. In Europe it has taken a formal existence based on markets, military alliances and linked financial securities, however in other regions such as South Asia, attaining the same level of success has remained problematic. As a result integration between states remains markedly low. One generic difficulty in regional integration has come from culture highlighted by the issue of Turkey’s inclusion into European Union or Australia’s inclusion into the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) conglomerate. However, this difficulty is hardly applicable to South Asia, which enjoys a sense of common root due to the homogenous nature of its history, culture and social past. Hence, what makes South Asia’s integration so painfully slow and complex remains an interesting area of investigation.

To understand the complexity influencing regionalism it is necessary to take into account the diffused geo-strategic context of South Asia. It is a dangerous flashpoint of hostility between two of its important neighbours — India and Pakistan, both in possession of nuclear weapons and India’s emergence

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“as a catalyst of regional and international change in a volatile and dangerous strategic environment” (Kapur, 2006:1) has hardly changed South Asia’s image as a hotspot of Islamic terrorism and violence. The significance of this can barely be underestimated when South Asia hosts more than half a billion Muslim population. Resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan and disgruntled Kashmir where the unresolved tension lurches unpredictably influencing the “long war” which the US expects would secure its victory “against Islamic revolutionaries” (PINR, 1 February, 2006) have added extra weight to its significance in terms of global security. A major part of this Islamic terrorist/fundamentalist continuum is Bangladesh which, although territorially small, commands the 3rd largest Muslim population in the world. Further to this, the protracted ethno-religious tension between the Tamils and the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka expands the shadow of regional instability and insecurity throwing the issues of regional and hence global security into an uncharted territory.

South Asia’s strategic complexity does not end here. A new cleavage of tension has emerged from the region’s contiguity to East Asia, where the rise of China has led to a major reorientation of the world toward the East (Ikenbury, 2008: 1). This reorientation has given new meaning to the ongoing strategic contest between China and the USA and the contest has taken a new turn after the signing of a long-term strategic partnership between India and the United States, one, which is set to provide the USA, now a beleaguered superpower, with some vital manoeuvring power. Detrimental to China’s strategic aspiration, this agreement is designed to offset China in the region not least to reinvent America’s own geo-strategic importance amid a dispersion of its power across the globe. Adding to this is the other strategic value South Asia has, related to the importance attached to the Indian Ocean, which links oil rich Middle East with the new Economic powerhouse, the East Asia. Apart from being the vital trade route used to transport nearly 40% of world oil, it also straddles the hotspots of world politics, connecting Africa, Middle East, South East and East Asia, not to mention the intense militarisation that the Indian Ocean is itself undergoing.

Given all these, regionalism it seems is a tough task for South Asia where constraints and refrains appear more potent among member countries than perhaps in any other regions. Will South Asia in this complex environment be able to balance the duality of regionalism— on one hand, incorporating (Rostow, 1990, p. 7) cooperation between the region and the global and become a site of resistance to the hegemonic powers? Will it be sufficiently capable to overthrow the existing image of being undemocratic, hostile to each other and a hub of “worst Islamist terrorist network” (Markey, 2007: 1)? What role would India, the most powerful state in the region, play towards a regional

identity? In this paper I analyse these issues within the ongoing dynamics of the region. Firstly, I discuss the difficulties in imagining South Asia as region, which remain embedded in the historical grievances and mistrust that countries in South Asia have towards each other. Secondly, I delve on the complex strategic context in which South Asia remains situated, which offers both positive energies and negative constrains.

II. DEFINING SOUTH ASIA

It is convenient and indeed less dangerous to split South Asia from the rest of the world and recast it as a discrete region geographically than the intent to make it look homogenous in political, social and cultural terms. The reason is — Western Orientalists' definition of South Asia, despite being widely criticised, even derided, appears more justifiable compared to how other regions such as the Middle East, Central Asia or East/South East Asia had been defined. While in the latter cases the priority had been on the position occupied by those regions in relation to Britain, contrastingly, a far more naturally identifiable settings in terms of definition and physical location marks South Asia's identity. This is reflected in the way the Himalayan mountain range separates the region in the north while the Indian Ocean creates the kind of enclosure necessary for such a definition to work. Comprised of the seven countries — Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and the Maldives — the region carries a common history of colonization both by the European powers, as well as the common invaders from Central Asia, Persia, the Arab world and even Greece for thousands of years. As much as it is continuous, this history has also been witnessed to the rise and fall of civilizations and accompanying social-political institutions and ideologies impacting on the whole of South Asia evenly. Hence, its culture, politics, economics share more than they separate and despite diversity, a common thread of unity binds all of them together into a single whole.

It is also possible to highlight Indo-centrism as the main trait of South Asia, although it is apparently hard to justify why state like Myanmar falls out of this Indo-centric characterisation, while Maldives and Afghanistan do not. However, it may be necessary to accept the arbitrary nature of any definition whether it is a region or any other entity, in which the process of exclusion and inclusion remains quite elastic, if not flexible. Despite this lapse South Asia as recognised widely is what used to be the British India, ubiquitously shaped by the syncretic medieval heritage created from the confluence of Hindu, Buddhist and Muslim civilisations, and accompanied by other minor streams of culture. Hence, it is with more ease that common

parlance equates and identifies South Asia as a blend of Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam despite the differences in their teachings and mores. And across South Asia this coexistence of religious faiths has kept all states incorporated in the conglomerate despite natural borders dividing them. It is in this broader sense that a unified entity called South Asia may be conceived.

However, in regions where development has been arrested, especially by the experience of foreign domination and its aftermath, the past may well continue to haunt the present, "weighing like a nightmare," as Marx graphically remarked (1970:79), "on the brain of the living." Any adequate understanding of South Asian's complexities therefore, must address the psychological cleavages, which its people have inherited from their history tied with British rule. And paradoxically, challenges to regionalisation remain far deeply rooted in this past, more specifically in South Asia's modernity, which grew within the microstructure of British colonial state than the division and fragmentation which India had experienced during the medieval time. Essentially rooted in Indian medievalism South Asian modernity gave way to a complex interplay of forces, passing through the dialectics of union and partition, whose causes remained latent in the past but gained credence as India transformed into a centralised political structure with numerous princely states herded into one rule. The economic integration during the early period of British conquest, which according to Subhas Chandra Bose "gave the feeling "that she had been conquered" (Bose and Jalal, 1998: 12) allowed the social and economic deprivation of Muslim population to become more vivid as the widening gap between Muslims and Hindus went on to be politically institutionalised by the Indian Councils Act of 1909 with constitutional recognition to separate electorates for Muslims and non-Muslims.

The arbitrary division and articulation of spatial units taking the parochial form of nation states based on religious identity that today constitute South Asia was designed to accommodate the policy of religion-communal division. However, the displacement of 15 million people from their homes to administer this division known as the greatest human migration in history with Hindus in Pakistan moving to areas in Punjab and other bordering areas, while Muslims leaving India to succeed in Pakistan ("Land of the Pure"), and marred by large scale violence with death of a million (some estimate it up to 1.5 million) citizens and countless others suffering was a "concentrated metaphor of violence, fear, domination, difference and separation" (Tan and Kudaisya, 2000:8). And a fall out from this traumatic history has been the emergence of a regime of perpetual hostility between the nation states that keeps previous unity disrupted, and changes the face of Bharatvarsha — once an unified entity. This divide has been so powerful that South Asia's alleged

unity is virtually paralysed by it, giving way to a situation which may only be described in terms of civilization clash between the Hindu and the Muslim communities.

In a narrower sense, this twisted history often permeates specific forms of hostilities that have typically earned binary form of disjuncture. Irreducible in its potency its impact has allowed a redefining of independence beyond its political category, perhaps transforming the notion of liberation into an indefinable psychology of hatred and hence, a permanent source of revisiting and reinventing. As a result, many fault lines have appeared "breaking up centuries of old social order in which communities lived in mutual coexistence" (Tan and Kudaisya, 2000:8). Just like medieval Europe, today's South Asia is riddled with internal borders once defined by German philosopher Fichte in his *Reden an die deutsche Nation* (Balibar, 2002) as "inner borders" (*innere Grenzen*). In this design Pakistan remains internally divided by the presence of a large Hindu and Sikh population including Muslim refugees from India known as Muhajirs, "an estranged minority in the land of their adaptation" whose position remains downgraded. A similar picture can be drawn for India and Bangladesh where Muslims and Hindus live within numerous mutual borders separating each minority religious group from the majority. The slaughter of half a million people from either of the sides and the largest human displacement during the partition in 1947 that history has accounted for have allowed this division to remain animated and internalised as irreducible and permanent and remains a difficult act both for the Muslims and the Hindus.

More importantly, these internal borders influence state institutions as well as human communication, cultural symbols, spiritual world and above all, physical borders. The peculiar psychology of division and accompanying hatred controls human movement, defines ethical and moral standpoints of individuals, and national security issues. As a result, religions, which had once provided unity and integrity to the region (Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism), have turned into a corrosive and divisive force. Various pockets of conflict that South Asia is riddled with find legitimation in the name of religion. Non-cooperation between nations in promoting normative projects such as regional organisation, free trade, collective self-reliance, and common security is influenced by the social and political wreckage carried over from this tumultuous past. Kashmir issue separates the two states of India and Pakistan and has led them to war three times since independence in 1947. The dismembering of Pakistan from its Eastern part, now Bangladesh, also had India's support and nuclear showdown with nuclear bombs is named as Islamic or Hindu bombs. This carried over hatred is also manifested in the

water dispute between India and Bangladesh so that it is defined as Hindu attempt to subjugate Muslims in Bangladesh.

The power of this past has acted as the main fetter to yet another area — secular nationalism that had a hold in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh in the late 70s. Seen as the most prominent shift in South Asian politics, this period oversaw the assassination of Indira Gandhi, the Prime minister of India at the hand of Sikh militants, the demise of Bhutto, the populist, secular and socialist Prime minister in Pakistan and the rise of military theocracy in Pakistan. A similar trend was experienced by Bangladesh where a replacement of ethnic nationalism by an alliance of military and theocracy ideally sympathetic to Pakistan gained quite a momentum in the late 70s. The sustainment of religious revival has given way to further tension between the Hindus and the Muslims in all three nation states of South Asia such as the incident surrounding Babri Mosque (1992), terrorist attack on Indian parliament, Gujrat riot in India (2002), attack on train carrying Hindu pilgrims (27 February 2002), deepening the scar of historical hatred. Uncompromisingly aware of their doctrinal position this religiously motivated hostility, irreducible in its nature, has turned South Asia into an arena of contested interests. Hence, although expected to be a natural process between geographically contiguous states and peoples, the task of getting countries closer into a community of nations has become arduously difficult. The deep level of integration characteristic of Europe has been attained by its reliance on a common past derived from Enlightenment, which oversaw the emergence of modernity, common system of governance, discourse of individual freedom and the overbearing presence of liberalism — all contributing to a unified European mind. South Asia too has a common history, yet its effort remains constrained by the same past in an age described euphemistically as the second phase of regionalism (Bhagwati, 1994).

III. PAINFUL ASYMMETRY: A THREAT TO REGIONAL COHESION

A crucial point in regionalisation debate is the asymmetric nature of South Asia. It begins with India, which occupies 85% of South Asia territorially and contributes more than 90% to South Asia's GDP. Compared to India most other nation states lie on the fringe. This asymmetry is far more exposed in terms of socio-economic and political reality of South Asian countries in relation to India. Once a vastly underestimated country India has attained a phenomenal economic success and is now a new regional powerhouse. Having shrugged off its past policy of closed economy characterized by high planning that many would identify with socialist slumber of the Nehru era, India has

moved to a more privatized economy with input from an ever expanding IT industry and lucrative investment opportunity. There are suggestions that by 2050 India will overtake China and Japan in gross national product.

However, India's galloping developmental pace has created new problems for intra-regional relationship. Most states in South Asia unlike India have not been able to overcome the weight of colonially inherited systems and remain economically backward. The asymmetry is so extensive that South Asia may well have acquired a centre-periphery pattern whereby the structural division of wealth and labour has gained a relation of dependency. While in the past the relationship between the global and the local as a philosophical problem of the general and the specific would be explained from a structural-systematic division of the global order, regions and South Asia in particular may well be coopted in the same paradigmatic framework so that a localised version of centre — periphery relation with India as the centre while the rest as the periphery takes place. A regional division of labour with periphery as the supplier of raw materials and centre exporting manufacturing good to the extent that periphery is dependent upon centre is now unfolding. This micro-political change complicates the traditional region versus centre or centre — periphery relationship of the global and with it the very integrative process of South Asia.

Apart from economics two more areas may be identified as relevant in the extension of this asymmetry. India's military is one of the largest in the world (PINR, 2004) and presently undergoing a quantum leap in modernization. Modernization plan has placed specific focus on reshaping India's air defence system (S-300VM), with nuclear capable long-range bombers and technology such as unmanned reconnaissance aircraft and air launched munitions, supplied mostly by Russia and Israel. Earmarked for the next 15 years, the \$95 billion allocated for the modernisation will fund project "Seabird" consisting of the Karwar naval base, "an air force station," a naval armament depot, and missile — silos, all to be realised in the next five years (PINR, 2005). More importantly, perhaps is the strategic 10-year defence agreement, which India has signed with the US setting itself distinctively away from its regional competitors. The regional countries have always been apprehensive of being swamped by Hindu religion, by which India is described culturally and which acts as a powerful tool of restless disjuncture for other countries where identity relies on religions other than Hindu (Islam and Buddhism). This fear had found further reflection in the cold war politics played out between states during the early post-colonial period. India's policy of friendship towards Soviet Union in the 50s had led Pakistan to ally with China and the USA, which further intensified this fear by the continuance of

hostility over Kashmir dispute, ethno-separatist movement in Sri Lanka and dispute over Ganges water and tribal insurgency in areas that were contiguous. This widening rift between states helped in a very direct way to overshadow the common cultural and civilisation bond that South Asia remained in inheritance of and blocked all ways of achieving a common value that would have a binding role.

Asymmetry manifests in the governance of South Asian countries. The salience of a regime with open and liberal economy (Kindleberger, 1976) is crucial in curbing out a strong independent region as the classics of international relations confirm. Most South Asian states apart from India lack "any established bourgeoisie hegemony" (Cox, 1987: 218) and hence remains politically vulnerable to non-democratic and dictatorial rule, demonstrated in the history of Pakistan and Bangladesh. India's deep-rooted liberal tradition, embedded in its political system has given leverage to India in contrast to others. This liberal order upon which India's politics and the location of power remains embedded, favourably allows it to develop a political order in which politics replaces confrontation. Military dictatorial rule endemic to Pakistan has put an enormous constrain on the process of democratic changes in Pakistan. Underpinned by a long spell of military rule in its earlier history, democracy in Bangladesh has faltered, and the growth of political participation and representation, accountability and transparency remain suffocated. Ethnic issues, which remain unresolved in Sri Lanka, have also led the country to a long drawn civil war between the Tamils and the Singhalese, de facto dividing the nation into two parts. Nepal's new found democracy remains immature and uncertain and Bhutan where monarchical system still prevails, remains politically tensed by simmering disagreement between supporters of liberal democracy and the rule of the king. This asymmetry between democracy and non-democratic regime tells upon the management of terrorism and violence regionally; in signing treaties of non intervention between Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, and make South Asia reliant on various unknown and contesting factors.

IV. ASYMMETRY AND THE HOBBLER REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS

It however seems paradoxical that despite deep asymmetry no hegemonic power has come to exist in South Asia. This has significantly obstructed the possibility of initiating and maintaining economic and political institutions, designed to deliver collective good. While India's economic, geographic and socio-cultural preponderance has been beyond doubt; such overwhelming presence has not resulted in any hegemonic role for her to exercise. Its long

held policy of non-alignment and refusal to commit to a policy of engagement with either of the super powers during the cold war has made it a passive aspirant for that role, significantly impacting on the development of locally based institutions. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) for example had come into being without the initiative from India. India's reluctance to develop or effectively engage in regional organizations partly came from the anti-Indian rhetoric, which most South Asian leaders had been engaged in.

Hegemony involves prestige and status that a country must enjoy in international political system in order to claim support of other states. Most countries in South Asia seem to despise India for being a power, which they think is divisive and whose commitment to South Asia's regional concerns are not spelled out properly. To a greater extent India has failed to insulate from petty debates and bickering that characterizes its relationship with neighbours. The impression that India eschews a regional commitment is also enforced by a multiplicity of sub-continental concern left either unattended or poorly negotiated by India. Tamil revolt in Sri Lanka affects India's South; inability to resolve the enclave issue with Bangladesh, tension with Nepal and Bhutan and military clashes with tribal and indigenous people of Nagaland and Mijoram have been protracted affairs, which though parochial and idiosyncratic, have undermined India's strategic purpose questioning its ability to administer South Asia judiciously. When the exercise of responsibility rather than domination or isolation or abandonment of secondary states is what is commonly believed should be hegemonic role, India has remained oblivious to it, even resisting changes that might have helped to resolve the many difficult issues that past has left for South Asia to settle. This has provided a leeway for other regional powers particularly China to cash in and exert divisive influence over those countries, which are disappointed at India's attitude towards them.

Because of this, the underlying strategy of India's foreign policy has remained shy of undertaking regional initiatives. Issues related to region's economic and social growth have therefore received little attention compared to the issues that are highly political. South Asia's failure to appreciate the potential of regional and bilateral trade in the promotion of economic growth and regional peace has meant that no visible change in the thinking of individual governments to create a collective self, which South Asia has always felt short of during the past years, has enunciated. Contrarily, India's regional economic diplomacy has aimed to bypass SAARC rather than develop it further as it now contemplates to go ahead with a divisive post-SAARC arrangement "with a new regional economic grouping BIMST-FC that brings

together Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand" (Kumar, 2006: 5). Lack of hegemony in South Asia and India's inability to understand the role of a hegemony has been the reason why cultivating good neighbouring relationship between the countries leading to a cohesive South Asia has failed. In most instances it has been India's condescending attitude that aims to punish more than it offers to help its neighbours, that has remained the major stumbling block. Water sharing with Bangladesh or trade and transit for Nepal and Bhutan or Kashmir issue with Pakistan or imposition of NTBs (non-tariff barriers) for other countries are the examples of this failure.

However, at times South Asia gives an impression that economic regionalism is indeed not a lost case. The increased salience of cultural and civilisation identities as against promotion of western value may bring a major shift in the mindset of South Asian political leaders, who now have begun to envision the prospect of an inclusive globalization for South Asia. The meaning that it carries may still be vague, yet, the expectation it raises may allow regional concerns being highlighted more than the global. This potent yet latent desire to "address individual country's need and adequately reflect them in regional forums" (Ahmad, 2007) has developed, from bitter experiences, which South Asia had drawn from the past. It is evident that South Asia is beginning to appreciate the benefit of regional trade and interstate dealings, which is at least evident from a recent study suggesting that "Pakistan stands to save between \$400 million and \$900 million from import bill if it would expand the positive list and allow imports from India that it presently does with other countries at a higher cost" (Bishoyi, 2006). One example of liberal pragmatism is the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) signed in Islamabad at the 12th Summit meeting in 2004. The implementation of the free trade agreement may still be sketchy on how it will overcome the non-tariff barriers and trade documentation issues but it has the potential to bring profound change into areas of trade, finance and investment.

However, regional economy is dominated by India and three smaller countries — Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. India accounts for 77% of total South Asian trade (PINR, 2006). And the scope of economic cooperation seems to be limited due to overlapping interests such as textile export, which remains a major item for Bangladesh and Pakistan, while Sri Lanka and India compete for tea market and all compete in the labour market in the Middle East. Parallel with and within free trade regime, India's role remains vital in offering preferential treatment to countries which may contribute to the making of South Asia as a region. For example, a huge trade imbalance that currently exists between Bangladesh and India (Bangladesh imports from

India US\$1022 million against exporting to India to the value of US\$50.28 million) may be resolved if a preferential treatment arrangement with Bangladesh is signed. Duty free access to pharmaceuticals, toiletries, cosmetics, steel and plastic furniture and copper wire, which India has offered to Bangladesh to reduce the said trade imbalance has not been enough, as the deficit has not come down but jumped to US\$971.72 million in 2001-2002 compared with US\$332.12 million in 1992-93. Preferential treatment could also help to overcome the trade deficit which other countries of the region suffer in trade with India. Trade may be one way of finding a way to resolving political issues ranging from illegal immigrants to Islamic terrorism, and lead to a process of cooperation between countries.

V. THREADING A DIFFICULT GEO-STRATEGIC TERRAIN

Any enquiry into the prospect of regionalism in South Asia must take into account an extremely complicated strategic context in which South Asia is in today. Two distinguishing trends need highlighting. One — the rise of India and China, both from the same continent and both with superpower ambition seem to constitute the major underlying condition, upon which the shape of South Asian's future would take place. This trend has the potential to influence the procedures of South Asia's regionalism either positively or negatively and how far regionalism will succeed may depend firstly on how South Asia is able to balance between the dialectic of the global and the regional. Second, world politics in a post cold war era has become dispersed into a number of centres driven by issues such as Islamic militancy, nuclear issue and global trade. "The movement of political ideas, military and economic power in the post cold war world" as Kumar explains, "has an inter-regional character" (Kumar, 2006: 12) affecting international alliance and agendas. And South Asia remains at the cross road of all those major issues such as Islamic militancy, nuclear and missile proliferation; global trade and drugs, illicit arms and human migration. It is therefore an important aspect in South Asian politics to balance between the issues and the interested stakeholders who belong to various regions (Kumar: 12), a significantly departure from the kind of scenario which the uni-centred world of the post-cold war had provided.

Clearly, this dispersion of power in various centres has underscored the uni-polar arrangement (PINR, 02 February 2006) that came into effect immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union forcing to reshape US geo-strategic policy. The absence of cold war threat has visibly destabilized the previous alliance and cooperation premised on that threat that kept the past bi-polar system functioning (Mearsheimer, 1990). And to reinstate its previous dominance within the context of China's rising power the USA has to make a

policy shift amid decline in its power. The reduction in US influence in the world in general and South and South East Asia in particular is evident from a number of factors — the loss of strategic nuclear monopoly (China's ability to destroy satellites in space) which the US has suffered, decline in conventional military capacity (Vietnam and Iraq), and loss of reliable majority in global institutions such as the United Nations, and finally, loss of preeminence in the knowledge industry (India's overwhelming grip on IT sector). All these indicate that the durability of US hegemony has suffered setbacks and its ability to embed the rules and institutions associated with the running of a hegemonic system "into the wider structures of politics and society" (Ikenberry, 1999: 124), which the USA previously had is under threat. Common factors which many associate with hegemonic power such as high military expenditure, failure to provide global public good and the pursuance of faulty domestic economic policy have also contributed to this as well, although apparently the US economic, military and cultural power still appear unscathed and the decline may not as a result appear as much vivid as expected.

However, in order to revamp its image the USA strategy has targeted South Asia. The selection of South Asia as the new fortress for US hegemony is dictated by two conditions. The continuance of US hegemony hinges on how the USA is able to challenge China's long-term strategic priority — to keep Asia uni-polar and the world multi-polar. Accordingly, the US policy has to aim to undercut China's rise to superpower, and to downgrade if possible its capacity to challenge or even compete for a similar role, which the US had enjoyed in the region. Secondly, South Asia has India with a democratic credential, which makes it a good candidate to work as conduit in the US policy shift. The US cold war policy was built upon containing India and was premised on the notion that maintaining hegemonic pre-eminence in the region depended on how well the United States was able to form alliance with small powers such as Pakistan. Cold war saw the region divided into zone of influence where India with its policy of nonalignment became close to Soviet Union. Nehru's policy of nationalisation and state capitalism played its part in India's selection of friend, whereby it received aid and international support from Soviet Union. This had helped more than anything else to draw Pakistan into the US fold and an alliance between Pakistan and the US emerged to counter India. With the end of the cold war however, the policy of containment has undergone revision and a positive shift has occurred towards India.

The other rationale behind American engagement with India is to undercut its own presence in the region and limit the exercise of its own power without undermining the continuance of its hegemonic power. Any such common ground can be theoretically validated as long as hegemonic state, in this case

the US, "gets commitments by secondary states to participate within the hegemonic order" (Ikenberry, 1999: 124) and it seems that such commitment has been agreed upon by India and the US during the brief yet meaningful partnership that both states have been able to build. Because of liberal commonality that both the countries have, the fear of being dominated by the US appears to be of lesser concern to India, as the enforcement of compliance over India by the US equally looks more and more meaningless. Hence, democratisation in the South Asian region has been the new shibboleth employed by the USA, which include countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan.

However, as the backwater of global politics such a move will make South Asia the site of a "great game" involving not just the USA and China but also, the smaller nations of the region. India's strategic partnership with the USA as stated by Manmohan Singh is "based both on principle as well as pragmatism" (Batra: 2006) and intended to serve partially India's strategic interest in relation to China. The rationale in this instance is clear. Indo-China relationship permeates rivalry and involvement of the USA will also drag other countries into this geo-political equation. Being close to the region, China is India's economic rival, however overcoming its formidable challenge that overshadows as much as it jeopardizes India's strategic interest, has proved to be a stupendous task. With a population of 1.28 billion and an impressive growth rate of 9%, China outsmarts India by a great margin. Compared to India's 406 million, China's labour force is 706 million and is free from trade unionization, one that tend to keep China immune from any major labour unrest. Foreign investment, a key to measuring economic success, has found in China a safer destination despite its authoritarian structure of power, which although incompatible with the democratic set-up that India has, has hardly been any obstacle to the massive multinational investment, which China is able to draw (44 billion a year compared to India's 3.4 billion a year). Besides trade and investment it is indicative that China has developed a better infrastructure, which now provides 247 for every 1000 people with fixed telephone and mobiles lines compared to India's 44 (Business Week Online, 2005). To international business community China appears to be less bureaucratic compared to India where red tape and poor infrastructure hamstring business incentives.

By this, India may be viewed as a client state, a dependent power unable to act on its own. And although India-USA alliance may benefit India by creating for her a condition of relative autonomy, it will affect the greater issue of regionalism in earnest. After all, global security appears to be more 'the sum of its regional parts rather than as a product of global logic' (Ayoob, 1999, p. 118) and South Asian countries need more leverage in the decision

making on world security, and share greater responsibility for own security and managing strategic need. These strategic exigencies emanate from terrorism, which by all count is the biggest challenge that the world is facing at the moment. Also important is the reconstruction of post-Taliban Afghanistan or flashing out the hot-spots of terror such as Kashmir, Tamil issue in Sri Lanka and tribal unrest in the North of India and East of Bangladesh. However, regional involvement in these matters while more effective than international would be impeded by India's alignment with the USA.

VI. CONCLUSION

Regionalism has been a catch-word in contemporary political vocabulary, yet different regions have attained different levels of success over the past decades. While in Europe it has taken a formal existence, in other regions such as South Asia, attaining the same level of success has remained problematic. As a result integration between states in South Asia has remained markedly low. South Asia's future with regionalism has been affected by two conditions. On the one hand, its history is riddled with psychological trauma generated and passed on to its contemporary life by the partition of British India in 1947. The partition, although sixty years have passed by, permeates specific forms of hostilities between states internalising them as irreducible and permanent. The peculiar psychology of division and accompanying hatred controls human movement, defines ethical and moral standpoints of individuals, and national security issues. As a result, various pockets of conflict that South Asia is riddled with find legitimation in the name of community and religion. Promotion of normative projects such as regional organisation, free trade, collective self-reliance, and common security is hampered by the social and political wreckage carried over from its tumultuous past.

On the other hand, a crucial point in regionalism debate has been the asymmetric nature of South Asia. Compared to India most other nation states lie on the fringe. India's galloping developmental pace has created new problems for intra-regional relationship. Most states in South Asia unlike India have not been able to overcome the weight of colonially inherited systems and remain economically backward. The asymmetry is so extensive that inter state relationship has acquired a centre-periphery pattern whereby the structural division of wealth and labour has acquired a relation of dependency. India's military power also adds to this asymmetry. Asymmetry manifests in the governance of South Asian countries. The salience of a regime with open and liberal economy (Kindleberger, 1976) is crucial in curbing out a strong independent region as the classics of international relations confirm. However,

most South Asian states apart from India lack “any established bourgeoisie hegemony” (Cox, 1987: 218) and hence remains politically vulnerable to non-democratic and dictatorial rule.

It however seems paradoxical that despite deep asymmetry no hegemonic power has come to exist in South Asia. This has negatively impacted on regionalisation because initiating and maintaining economic and political institutions, designed to deliver collective good have faced significant obstruction. India’s long held policy of non-alignment and refusal to commit to a policy of engagement with either of the super powers during the cold war have contributed to this keeping India oblivious to regional need. This had also provided a leeway for other regional powers particularly China to cash in and exert its influence over those countries.

Although South Asia has become one of the key areas of the world system since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the abrupt end it brought to the politics of cold war, as the backwater of global politics it is turning into a site of great game involving the USA and China. This has been made possible by the USA — India strategic partnership that materialised after a dramatic shift in USA policy towards India. India-USA alliance will fail to involve other regional countries in all major issues that concern and influence global politics such as the issues of Islamic militancy, nuclear and missile proliferation; global trade and drugs, illicit arms and human migration. However, the prospect of regionalism in the longer term is not too gloomy. One example of liberal pragmatism is the SAFTA signed in Islamabad at the 12th Summit meeting in 2004. The implementation of the Free Trade Agreement may still be sketchy on how it will overcome the non-tariff barriers and trade documentation issues but it has the potential to bring profound change into areas of trade, finance and indeed regionalisation.

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Aviation Security: The South Asian Perspective

*Geoff Harrison**

I. INTRODUCTION

The age of modern international terrorism began on 12 July 1968 with the hijacking of El Al Flight from Rome. It could be argued that one of the earliest events of global *jihadi* terrorism was the 1994 hijacking of Air France Flight with the intention of using it in a suicide attack against Paris. The most dramatic terrorist attack in history was the aviation attacks conducted by Al-Qaeda on 11 September 2001. One can trace the development of terrorism as a phenomenon and its tactical development through studying their interaction with international civil aviation. Even as terrorism moves through its organizational evolution, from highly structured organizations to the self generated and operationalized cells, such as those that planned to attack Fort Dix in New Jersey and the plot against JFK, their focus remains on aviation.

Transnational criminal organizations use the aviation system to transport contraband and increasingly people across the globe. Cocaine smugglers used the FedEx air deliver system to transport their product across the United States, narcotics smugglers from Guyana used US Mail pouches to smuggle millions of dollars of cocaine into the United States through JFK airport. Organized gangs of human smugglers use the aviation system to move people into North America and Europe as a matter of routine. Kenyans desperate to flee the poverty of their country have been known to stow away in the wheel wells of British Airways flights, arriving frozen to death at Heathrow. One must add this to the all too common issue of theft of goods from airports as

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well as the use of black market parts, one can see the aviation system under tremendous threat.

This article will look at the international situation in order to provide a context for the South Asian region. Critically the article will attempt to provide a method to better evaluate the operational environment faced by civil aviation industry. Through examining the evolution of the threat environment and applying a risk based approach to evaluation the impact on the system the authors hope to provide a rigorous view of the problem and realistic solutions.

II. THREAT VS. RISK

One of the ironic issues facing aviation is that while the industry is advanced in evaluation of economic risks in its decision making, and taking the necessary steps to manage that risk, it is still focused on responding to security threats and appears to have great difficulty in developing and articulating a response. In most of the world the service providers, particular the carriers, are no longer responsible for security, but loss prevention remains in their remit, the industry bears the direct and indirect costs of both implementing any directive, and any failures.

The suggestion here is that instead of looking at threat, there needs to be a better system to evaluate and respond to risk. The first element in this approach is to define the terms. *Threat* faced by a target is an exploitable vulnerability. When one examines the range of potential targets a modern aviation offers to a perspective terrorist, the threat appears enormous and unmanageable. Travel document theft and forgery, attacks against land and air side, equipment theft, just to name a few, are all rife with weaknesses and potential gaps for terrorist to exploit. And as the IRA famously stated to British authorities “we have to be lucky once, you have to be lucky all the time. So how does a society protect everything it values? It can not, what it needs to do is shift from responding to threat, and examines the situation for a risk perspective.

There are many ways of examining risk, but the two critical elements are the probability of a given vulnerability being exploited, and the consequences of that exploitation. This simply process helps to order the environment and allows limited resources to be deployed properly. One can further refine this model by applying the threats structure to terrorist groups. Evaluating the threat posed by any given groups rests on knowledge in three areas. The intentions a given group has, its capabilities to act on those intentions, and the operational environment it faces. This additional step is critical to assessing the threat and risk environment, without it, the security community will remain

focused on the potential threat, and never grasp the actual threat and its accompany risk. While the primary focus of security related information has been on the users of the aviation system, there needs to be more awareness on those working within the system. The recent terrorist plot against JFK as well as the April, 2004 arrest of 25 cargo and baggage handlers working for a Guyana based cocaine smuggling ring.¹ The ability to conduct rapid and ongoing security checks on staff in all aspects of aviation is necessary first step in protecting the carriers and nations interests.

III. THREAT BY AVIATION CLASS

The above discussion raises the question what then are the threats to aviation? Given the size and complexity of the system there is no simple answer. The two broad categories of aviation are the landside and airside, each of which will be addressed in this section. From the terrorist perspective the landside offers a large and relatively untapped operational environment. Only three notable attacks have taken place against landside aviation: The Japanese Red Army Attack on Lod Airport in 1972, The Abu Nidal Attack on Rome and Vienna Airport in 1985, and the Tamil Tigers attack on Colombo Airport in 2001. One can argue that the more traditional terrorist organizations, such as those above, wanted to limit casualties and retain a moral legitimacy thus targeting large numbers of innocent passengers would undermine both objectives. New terrorist groups have neither limitation so it remains unclear as to why this has not yet occurred. Enormous numbers of distracted people waiting to clear check in and security checkpoints provide a large pool of victims.

Criminal activity is more common on the landside. This includes smuggling, theft, and other activities directly related to aviation, but also ancillary items such as identity theft from travel documents or airport based hotels. This issue becomes more pressing as the industry moves to wireless travel, as envisioned by some Japanese airports.

Access control is a critical issue for security. This includes both accesses to secured and unsecured areas, but the perimeter fencing as well. There are many countries where that basic security device is lacking or in poor repair, allowing for easy penetration for refugees to gain access to aircraft as stow-aways. While there is currently no evidence to suggest terrorists are exploiting this weakness the possibility exists. The current high-tech solutions offered by bio-metrics and other technology are encouraging. But the best way to

¹ Baggage, cargo handlers arrested in drug probe. Smuggling ring accused of importing 400 kilos of cocaine by Deborah Feyerick and Phil Hirschhorn CNN New York Bureau Wednesday, November 26, 2003 Posted: 1058 GMT (6:58 PM HKT).

protect aviation is also the weakest. The need for trained and motivated staff who are encouraged and supported in their efforts to protect civil aviation is the most vital component. All of the profiling and scanning equipment will not stop a determined attacker if the security is inattentive or corrupt. This is exactly what occurred in dual suicide bombings targeting Russian aviation in August of 2004. Thus while the threat is potentially high, the risk posed by terrorist attacks on the land side remains, with minor exceptions, quite low. The criminal threat is higher, but risk is low, as the impact of criminal interference with landside aviation is marginal.

There are generally thought to be broad categories of aviation. The first is international civil aviation, which refers in the main to commercial civil passenger aviation; this will be the primary focus of this work. The threat posed by the tactics that will be discussed in more detail below, remain high, while the impact to civil aviation is high to catastrophic. The second is military and other government related aviation. Aircraft having to do with this aspect are targets of terrorists, e.g., Al-Qaeda tried to shoot down a US military cargo aircraft in Saudi Arabia in 1995.² But actions against such official aircraft do not usually generate the publicity that assaults on passenger aviation do, so while the threat risk particular in combat zones is high, outside is it remains a low threat and risk. The third, cargo aviation, is economically important never been explicitly targeted. The 2003 attempt to shoot down the DHL aircraft in Baghdad was a target of opportunity as few passenger aircraft serve Iraq.³ Although Al-Qaeda has allegedly been interested in hijacking a cargo aircraft, to date there has been no publicly disclosed evidence, so while the author periodically refers to cargo security issues, it is the threat and risk is low. The fourth category is general aviation, which includes private aviation, corporate aircraft, charter aviation, agricultural aviation, and all other aviation sectors not mentioned earlier. The report does not cover this category because terrorists have generally ignored it until recently. Al-Qaeda has been interested in "crop dusters" as a means of dispersing chemical or biological weapons and may have plotted to attack the U.S. Embassy in Paris⁴ by use of a suicide helicopter attack, and a plot to attack Nato shipping in the Straights of Gibraltar are the exceptions to the general rule. Additionally, given the limited damage caused by these aircraft, such as the accidental crash in 2006 in by a private

² Dr. Rohan Gunaratna during a question and answer session after the author's presentation at the Changing Face of Terrorism Conference Singapore, 2003.

³ Robert Wall and David Hughes, "Missile Attack on DHL Jet Keeps Self-Defence Issue Bubbling," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, November 30, 2003.

⁴ Malcolm Brabant, "French Police Probe Helicopter Attack," *BBC online*, September 26, 2001.

aircraft into an apartment building in New York City, the threat and risk remain low.

The criminal exploitation of aviation is common across all four categories. The threat posed to the system is of two folds; first the use of aviation to transport contraband and humans illegally into a state. Second the theft of goods in transit as well as parts. Both are a growing issue of concern for the industry, but as the commercially motivated threat to the industry is much less than the politically oriented one posed by terrorists, and the responses are often overlapping, the focus of this work will be the latter.

It is critical to note that any security measure must balance not just individual rights and convince, but criminal and terrorist activity. Over emphasises terrorism response at the expense of counter-criminal efforts are often self defeating. Any facility that is well maintained and policed will help to dissuade terrorist from using it as a point of attack. Terrorists and criminals share many methodologies in common, thus having an alert and active staff and police presence is the best deterrent.

IV. THE THREE PHASES OF THE POLITICAL THREAT

The terrorist threat to international civil aviation has gone through three phases during the past eighty years. The first, 1948 to 1968, was characterized by flight from persecution or prosecution. The second, 1968 to 1994, was political. The third began in 1994 and is on going: the weapon or warfare stage. Each is marked by singular, defining, traces that can be found in others. This section will discuss only the political threats, while recognizing the importance of criminal interference with international civil aviation, terrorism is a political activity and as it is this threat that is the focus of the work, it will be the focus of this section.

The first phase is the flight from persecution or prosecution phase, (1948 to the early 1968) when people attempting to leave their home countries *hijacked* aircraft for fast and convenient get away. The first hijacking occurred on 6 April, 1948 when the three-crew members (including the pilot) and twenty-one of the twenty-six passengers hijacked a Ceskoslovenske Aerolinie (CSA) internal flight from Prague to Bratislava and landed in the US Occupation Zone in Munich. All twenty-one were seeking political asylum.⁵ This type of escape was appealing because many of the hijackers were former military pilots familiar with the aircraft. The defectors were greeted as heroes who had made a dramatic dash for freedom. Even when a Soviet pilot was killed

⁵ David Gero, *Flights of Terror: Aerial hijack and sabotage since 1930*, p. 10.

resisting a take-over of his flight, few in the West viewed this as a criminal act. From then through the late 1950s, asylum was a fairly common goal (twenty out of thirty-seven hijackings).⁶ The escape from persecution or prosecution phase waned from the late 1950s onward as the jet aircraft became more wide spread and the focus shifted to the United States from Eastern Europe.

The revolution in Cuba led by Fidel Castro overthrew the pro-US dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista in January 1959, and Castro began to consolidate his hold on power. A *hijacker* "highway" between the United States and the island soon appeared. Cubans who had been associated with the Batista regime or disliked the drift toward communism, devised ways to get to the United States, just ninety miles away. From 1960 to 1969 there were forty-nine *hijackings* or attempted hijackings between Cuba and its neighbour out of a world wide total of ninety-one.⁷ From 1961 some of the traffic went in the opposite direction; those wishing to make a quick exit from US jurisdiction — criminals, the mentally unbalanced, and some self-described revolutionaries — escaped to Cuba. Almost all ended up serving time in Cuban jails, although a few 'revolutionaries' managed to escape that fate.

There may have been political motivations in escaping from Eastern Europe or Cuba, but aircraft were not viewed as the means of delivering the message. There was no effort the use the aircraft for anything other than a vehicle for escape; individuals fleeing communist countries were manifesting a desire to flee that repressive system, but they were not seizing aircraft to call attention to the broader political questions, only their individual desire for a better life. Those fleeing to Cuba were attempting to escape justice, or in the case of homesick Cubans return home; they had no broader political agenda. People still use aircraft as a means of escape; there were several *hijackings* attempted in China during early 2003 which were initiated by persons trying to reach Taiwan. But as a primary means of escape, *hijacking* was rarely used. This phase also had an impact on South Asia, as the first hijacking took place in 1961 and most of the subsequent hijackings appear to be inspired by the desire to flee.

Phase two wedded politics to interference with international civil aviation and began in 1968.⁸ The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 10-17, for the motivations and see Jin-Tai Choi, *Aviation Terrorism: Historical Survey, Perspectives and Responses*, p. 6, for the total numbers for the period.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Gero, pp. 17-31, and Choi p. 6. A total of 80 of the 91 *hijackings* or attempted *hijackings* had as a destination Cuba.

⁸ There were politically motivated interferences before 1968, The *hijacking* of a PAN AM flight during the 1931 coup in Peru is the first example, while others argue the *hijacking* of a Cuban internal flight by Raul Castro in 1959 as the first political *hijacking*.

hijacked Israeli State airline El Al flight 426 bound for Tel Aviv from Rome on 23 July. The three *hijackers* diverted the Boeing 707 and its thirty-eight passengers and ten crew to Algiers. For some of the victims, the ordeal lasted five weeks, the longest *hijacking* on record. Many terrorism experts date the age of modern terrorism from the incident. The PFLP also introduced mass *hijackings* as a tactic when from September 6 to 12, 1970, the PFLP and its allies *hijacked* four aircraft, a total of 577 passengers and 39 crewmembers. Only two of the four aircraft arrived at the PFLP-occupied Dawson's Field in Jordan (a former British military field and the name given to the *hijacking* incident). The *hijackers* demanded that the Swiss, German, UK and Israeli governments release the Arabs they were holding. The *hijacking* ended with the destruction of three aircraft (two in Jordan and one that landed in Egypt) but no passengers were lost. During this incident the PFLP had attempted to *hijack* an El Al flight departing from Amsterdam, but was foiled by an in-flight security officer. The flight landed safely in London.⁹

Dr. George Habash, a Marxist-leaning Palestinian Christian who was attempting to establish a Palestinian state on Israeli territory, founded and led the PFLP. Dr. Habash had witnessed the Israelis inflict three conventional defeats on Arab forces since 1948. He understood that Israel's military might was underpinned by a strong economy, and that its body losses in battle could be replenished through immigration. Essentially an island, lacking political and economic ties to neighbours, Israel was dependent on more distant nations for trade by sea and air. Its immigrants and tourists, an important source of foreign currency, arrived primarily by air; hence international civil aviation was a natural terrorist target. The PFLP used its attacks as a strategic weapon in Habash's effort to destroy the state of Israel. Despite its failure as a strategic weapon, attacks on international civil aviation remain an important tactical tool that was quickly adopted by terrorists groups elsewhere, such as the Japanese Red Army and Black September (a Palestinian group linked to Yasser Arafat).¹⁰ A terrorist organization utilizes hijackings and bombings as a way of calling attention to its cause, embarrassing its opponents (government and other terrorist organizations), damaging the economy of the target nation, and, more important using it as a tool of extortion, either for the release of interned colleagues or money for not attacking particular airlines. The aircraft is seen as a proxy for the state, the terrorist was attempting to utilize the tremendous media potential of a *hijacking* or bombing to exert pressure on the state to change its policy or policies.

⁹ See Chapter 3, p. 14.

¹⁰ Simon Reeve, *One Day in September*, pp. 21, 27-29.

Hijackings were the most popular tactic for many kinds of individuals. Between 1967 and 2008 there were about 954 *hijackings* (a number that includes those carried out for political and criminal purposes) out of around 1,123 total incidents against airlines, that is 84 percent of the total.¹¹ 190 of the *hijackings* were conducted by terrorists.¹² There have been about twenty five¹³ total incidents against South Asian civil aviation since the first *hijacking* 1961, twenty but the motivations for most remain unclear, thus providing an accurate assessment of the political trends are difficult. Given the rapid development of aviation in the region, and the volatile situation in several countries there is a high probability that this situation could change rapidly.

The international civil aviation regime began to respond to the menace, deploying the so-called X-ray machines, for example. That measure was only partially effective as it foiled on average 19 percent of terrorist *hijackings* at the time.¹⁴ It did cause the terrorists to switch to other tactics.

Terrorists switched from *hijackings* to sabotage bombing, partially as a result of increased security. Terrorists, during this phase were looking for the drama of armed propaganda, while limiting the risk of casualties, but sabotage bombing presented a greater risk for the terrorists because of the large numbers of casualties created by such an attack,¹⁵ but was still deployed frequently to convey a message, usually retaliatory. The bombing of Pan Am flight 103 was one such bombing; it was targeted in response to US raids on the Libyan military and terrorist infrastructure. It was not intended to 'instruct' the public, no official claim of responsibility was issued. The United States didn't require a claim of responsibility to know where responsibility lay. This attack also illustrates the risks inherent in such operations. Because the aircraft exploded over land, rather than the ocean as planned, it provided gruesome images that enraged the public. Any intended message was drowned out by the grief and cries for retaliation. The image of the nose section of the Boeing 747 resting

¹¹ Ariel Merari, "Attacks on Civil Aviation: Trends and Lessons," in *Aviation Terrorism and Security*, (eds.) Paul Wilkinson and Brian Jenkins, p. 12. The statistics from 1997-2004 are augmented with those from the FAA and Aviation Safety network. The numbers are estimates as neither definitions of hijackings or reporting of them are standard.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 13 and above note.

¹³ The author looks at only incidents that either originate in the region or are targeting carriers from the region. Additionally hoax bomb threats and attacks on airline offices are not included, the former appears to be a favorite of delayed passengers in recent years.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 20 and above note.

¹⁵ For an excellent debate on the subject of when and why to claim credit for attacks see "Terrorism and Claiming Credit: The Debate" in *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9:1 Spring, 1997, pp. 1-19.

in the Scottish field became the enduring symbol of international terrorism until 9/11.

South Asia experienced one of the worst aviation terrorism incidents of the 1980s when dual bombs exploded Narita Airport in Japan and aboard Air India Flight 182 of the Irish coast in June of 1985. Sikh extremists were attempting to avenge the Indian government's 1984 raid on the Golden Temple, the holiest Sikh shrine, which was occupied by heavily armed terrorists, whose cause was an independent homeland for the Sikh faithful. Upwards of a thousand people (mainly Sikhs) were killed by the Indian government in the raid. The attack killed 329 passengers and crew on flight 182, and two baggage handlers in Narita. Justice remains unfulfilled as many of the suspects in the bombing have either never been identified or those who have, have not served prison time for the attack.

It is critical to remember that for traditional terrorists casualty figures are not vital; in fact, the fewer the better. The propaganda value of an attack is more important than the lives lost; the brutal calculus of terrorism allows for only so much death.

The third phase, which began in 1994 and is ongoing, is characterized by the use of aircraft not as a means of delivering a message but as an instrument to inflict massive casualties. Terrorism experts had begun to detect a trend in the late 1980s toward an extremist's interpretation of religion by terrorist groups. Islamic groups' interpretations were the most sophisticated, but extremist violence also emerged in the Sikh, Christian, Jewish and Hindu religions, as well as so called new religions also known as cults. While much of the cult violence was directed inward¹⁶ with the notable exception of Aum Shinrikyo,¹⁷ the traditional religions oriented violence outward. This externally focused violence sought to justify extreme violence against non-coreligionists through demonization of 'the other' and rationalizing wanton destruction through making violence a sacred duty.

International civil aviation concerns about religiously-motivated terrorism characterised phase three. On December 24, 1994 Air France flight 8969 bound for Paris from Algiers was hijacked by the Algerian terrorist organization Armed Islamic Group (GIA). Four hijackers boarded the aircraft disguised as

¹⁶ See chapter 1 page 31 note 76.

¹⁷ The 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway by the Aum Shinrikyo cult seemed to confirm all the trends identified by terrorism experts. A religious group used a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) in this case a gas, against a civilian target in order to inflict massive casualties. While most commentators point to this attack as the first example of the trend, I think the GIA attack covered in this section is actually the first.

Air Algeria security staff.¹⁸ Authorities delayed departure, but were intimidated into giving the go-ahead when two of the 227 persons on board met their deaths at the hands of the hijackers. The French government decided not to allow the aircraft to approach Paris because its consulate in Oran, Algeria had received an intelligence warning that the hijackers intended to blow up the aircraft over the capital.¹⁹ The flight crew convinced the *hijackers* that refuelling in Marseille was a must. After the aircraft touched down, hours of fruitless negotiations ensued, whereupon the terrorists demanded fuel on pain of destruction of the aircraft. French police commandos (GIGN) stormed the aircraft and, after a twenty-minute fire fight, rescued the 161 remaining passengers (some had been released during the negotiations) and 3 members of the flight crew.²⁰ The melee ended with the deaths of the hijackers and 9 GIGN commandos were injured, some seriously. The terrorists had not revealed their exact target, but it was Paris, and the aircraft was their weapon. This change in tactics ushered in a new era for international civil aviation. No longer was civil aviation a political stage for terrorists; it was their weapon and battleground.

The GIA, a radical Islamic terrorist organization, had been attempting to establish an Islamic state in Algeria. Its brutal tactics contributed to more than 100,000 deaths during the civil war fought there throughout the 1990s. France was a particular target because of its support for the military government that denied the radicals an election victory in 1991. The suicide *hijacking* was the GIA's revenge. Using civil aviation as an instrument of revenge is not new, using it to target an entire city is.

Al-Qaeda is in a class by itself in conceiving and, in some cases executing, terrorist spectacles. The first was Ramzi Yousef's attack on New York's World Trade Center in February, 1993. Yousef and his co-conspirators had planned to topple one tower into the other potentially causing 250,000 casualties. The 1993 incident killed six and wounded thousands. The failure of the ground based attack led the cell to consider an aviation attack.

The most audacious plan, the Bojinka Plot, was an operation designed by Khalid Sheik Mohamed, Yousef's uncle. Yousef and five co-conspirators would place bombs on eleven or twelve U.S. transpacific carriers during a 48-hour span that would have killed as many as 5,000 people.²¹ The explosive was to

¹⁸ Peter Harclerode, *Secret Soldiers*, p. 507.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 510.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 509-515.

²¹ Simon Reeve, *The New Jackals*, pp. 90-91. Bojinka is Croatian for explosion, an apt name for this plan. Not only did the plotters intend to attack 11/12 American airliners, but also attempt to assassinate Pope John Paul II and President Clinton on each man's visit to the Philippines.

have been liquid nitrogen concealed in contact solution bottles that, in the opinion of most experts, even the most highly skilled and motivated security screener would not have been able to detect. It was to have been part of a larger operation that included an aviation suicide attack against the Central Intelligence Agency headquarters. It remains publicly unclear if the operation was to have involved a general aviation aircraft, such as the one that was crashed into the White House in February 1993 by a man (not a terrorist) committing suicide, or an attack similar to those that were to occur on 9/11.²² Yousef was captured before the Bojinka Plot was carried out.

Al-Qaeda demonstrated its creativity on 9/11 when its operatives turned four jumbo jets into a quartet of poor-man's cruise missiles. These events, and the case of Richard Reid and the missile attack in Mombassa were devised to inflict enormous casualties, any political message aside. The perpetrators' willingness — even eagerness — to die makes Phase 3 of the threat the most dangerous and certainly the most difficult to defend against.

V. THE TACTICAL ENVIRONMENT

Four terrorist tactics have been actualised against international civil aviation over the past three decades: *hijackings*; sabotage; shooting down aircraft; and assaults on airports and related ground facilities. Each has led to a response by the international civil aviation regime.

The most common terrorist tactic, both internationally and in South Asia is *hijacking*, in which one person but usually between two and five take control of an aircraft in flight by brandishing real or what they assert to be real, weapons. *Hijackers* have a political agenda and, at least prior to the early 1990s, wanted to survive the action. People were killed during some *hijackings* and US Navy diver Robert Stethem was murdered by the *hijackers* of TWA flight 847, but a captive has greater chances of being killed in a rescue mission. On November 23, 1985 one such instance occurred during a rescue mission conducted by Egyptian commandos to rescue the 98 hostages (including four security personnel) on Egypt Air flight 648. The Cairo scheduled Athens flight was diverted to Malta. The Elite Group 777 of Egyptian commandos were sent in to conduct this complex and dangerous rescue. A US Army Delta Force operator was sent in to observe and support the commandos whom he had trained. The American-trained commandos had been replaced by an untrained group

Each attempt would use aircraft to attack the site of the Pope's open air mass, and to drop bombs on President Clinton's motorcade. There was also a preliminary plan for the 9/11 attacks.

²² Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al-Qaeda*, p.6.

that was considered more politically reliable,²³ a decision that contributed to the death of 68 people on the aircraft.

Terrorists' next-most-common tactic is the use of explosives against civil aviation, a tactic that 'came of age' in connection with bombings during the post 1968 period.²⁴ Between 1967 and 2004, terrorists perpetrated 88 of 95 sabotage bombings.²⁵ Non-state groups were predominant in the cohort, but three of the most notorious attacks were carried out by states. In 1987 North Korean intelligence agents placed a bomb aboard KAL flight 858, killing all 115 passengers and crew. Libya conducted two attacks; the December 1988 bombing over Lockerbie caused a total of 270 deaths, and the September 1989 attack over the Niger desert on UTA flight 772 killed all 184 on board.

Political protest and retaliation seem to be the most common motivation for these kinds of attacks. Libya was protesting the dealings of the United States and France with Libya; North Korea was protesting the awarding of the 1988 Olympic games to South Korea. Non-state terrorists also make retaliatory use of explosives, such as the June 1985 destruction of Air India flight 182 off the Irish coast by Sikh extremists. They were attempting to avenge the Indian government's 1984 raid on the Golden Temple, the holiest Sikh shrine, which was occupied by heavily armed terrorists, whose cause was an independent homeland for the Sikh faithful. Upwards of a thousand people (mainly Sikhs) were killed by the Indian government in the raid.

Terrorists have found the use of explosives against carriers to be an effective way to make their political points. They are able to call attention to their grievances without risking their lives. Very small numbers of people, sometimes as few as two, have a limited likelihood of being stopped in the attempt or captured later. (Only 17 percent of attempts are halted prior the bomb's introduction into the aircraft.²⁶ Even when the accused bomber is identified, it can take years to bring him or her to justice.²⁷

²³ Eric Haney, *Inside Delta Force*, p. 277.

²⁴ One of the earliest examples involved a woman in Canada who planted a bomb on a Canadian domestic flight in order to kill her husband in an attempted insurance scam. She succeed in killing her husband and several others on board, but not with the fraud. See David Gero, *Flights of Terror*, p.12.

²⁵ Ariel Merari, "Attacks on Civil Aviation: Trends and Lessons," in *Aviation Terrorism and Security*, ed. Paul Wilkinson and Brian Jenkins, p. 12, 13. And see the Aviation Safety Network, safety issues page, security, sabotage bombing link. Aviation-safety.net.

²⁶ Ariel Merari, "Attacks on Civil Aviation: Trends and Lessons", in *Aviation Terrorism and Security*, (eds.) Paul Wilkinson and Brian Jenkins, p. 22.

²⁷ It took more than a decade for the Pan Am 103 bombers to be brought to court; the bombers of UTA 772 have been found guilty *in absentia* by a French court, but still have not been remanded to French custody.

Legal and technical tools are already in place to prevent the introduction of explosives into an aircraft, but they are frequently ignored. The 1985 Air India bombing occurred because Air Canada ground staff allowed a bag with no confirmed seat holder to be checked through to its final destination.²⁸ It appears that a clerical error in Malta opened the door for a bomb to enter the aviation system and ultimately end up on Pan Am 103.²⁹ Pan Am was supposed to hand-check all inter-line transfer bags rather than use an x-ray machine. Its failure to follow FAA regulations very likely contributed to the subsequent destruction of the aircraft.

The bombings of KAL flight 858 and Philippines Airlines flight 434 could have been prevented if personnel had been alert to the empty seats of passengers who failed to re board after a layover.³⁰ Still, the KAL bombers were almost detected in Baghdad while passing through security; the Iraqi security officer was suspicious of the radio in the carry-on baggage. When asked to remove it, the male North Korean agent raised a ruckus and thereby avoided the search. Available technical counter-measures, such as the Thermal Neutron Accelerator (TNA) are said to be a reliable detector of the presence of explosives, but as long as humans are involved in securing the aviation system, lapses are inevitable. Security could be avoided altogether if a terrorist were to smuggle weapons onboard an aircraft waiting on the taxiway. British Airways (BA) has been concerned about illegal immigrants (primarily Africans leaving Kenya) 'hitchhiking' in the wheel wells of its aircraft who position themselves while the aircraft is waiting to take off only to freeze to death in flight in the pressurized but unheated wheel wells.³¹ It is not beyond imagining that a suicide bomber might adopt the paratactic. The possibility could become reality by virtue of the presence of active Al-Qaeda cells in Kenya.

²⁸ Rodney Wallis, *Combating Air Terrorism*, p.7. Air Canada was serving as a feeder for Air India flying from Montreal to India with a stop in London. The Sikh passenger wanted his bag checked to India even though he did not have a reserved seat on the Air India flight. The agent knew this was not allowed, but was bullied into consenting due to the large crowd waiting to check in for the Montreal leg. Further compounding the error, Air Canada did not offload the bag even though the passenger never boarded. See Salim Jiwa, *Death of Air India Flight 182* for a full discussion.

²⁹ Rodney Wallis, *Lockerbie: The Story and the Lessons*, pp. 74-79.

³⁰ The Philippines Airline flight miraculously suffered only one loss of life; as the skill of the flight crew allowed for a safe landing. Ramzi Yousef was the no-return passenger in this case; he was engaged in a practice run for the Bojinka Plot, which would have used the same type liquid nitrogen explosive hidden in contact solution bottles.

³¹ David Sterland, "Stowaways a journey in the wheel bay" *Aviation Security International* June, 2001, pp. 6-8.

A third tactical tool available to terrorists is Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS). Before November, 2002 the threat of MANPADS in the hands of a terrorist group against a civil jet was only a spot on a distant horizon. Ever the innovators, Al-Qaeda, attempted then to bring down an Israeli airliner departing from Mombassa, Kenya using a MANPAD in November of that year. It was a Soviet manufactured SA-7 and depending on the model, entered service in 1967 (SA-7A) or 1972 (SA-7B). It has a range of 14,000 to 16,000 feet and an operational altitude of 9,000 to 14,000 feet.³² The Soviets exported more than 100,000 of the SA-7s and a later model SA-14. Many were supplied to Somalia, where, since the collapse of the government in the early 1990s, they are easily available to the militias that now control the country and where Al-Qaeda has connections.³³ The United States exported 9,000 of the highly capable Stinger MANPADS to the Afghan rebels during their war against the Soviet Union and despite the US effort to buy them back, not all were returned. Some may be in Al-Qaeda's arsenal. It is unclear how well maintained the missiles used in the Mombassa assault were, but they engage the target from the side and not from the tail which they are designed to do, which rendered them ineffective.³⁴ A terrorist organization need not actually use a missile, but merely threaten to do so in order to create potential havoc; witness the threat directed at London's Heathrow Airport in February 2003. The availability and dispersion of these weapons, (at least 27 terrorist and insurgent groups has access to MANPADS), makes them dangerous. Yet it is difficult to determine how many have been used against international civil aviation.

The rush to mitigate this undeniable threat has obscured the actual threat. There are some who have rushed to adapt and deploy systems from the military to protect civilian aircraft from attack. The fact that there have been 30 attempts to shoot down civilian aircraft, with 24 successes, over the last 30 years, causing 500 deaths starkly, illustrates the threat.³⁵ These numbers are not clear, however, and even if they are accurate, why had this long-standing

³²Marvin Schaffer, "The Missile Threat to Civil Aviation," in *Aviation Terrorism and Security*, (eds.) Paul Wilkinson and Brian Jenkins, p. 71.

³³In June of 1989 a Somali militia shot down a Somali Air flight killing all thirty persons a board. See David Gero, *Flights of Terror*, p. 116. The launcher used in the Mombassa attack was traced to Saudi Arabia. The launcher, and possibly the missiles, was traced to a cache that had been used in an unsuccessful and little noticed attack against an American military transport aircraft landing at a Saudi Airbase.

³⁴Federation of American Scientists web page www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/MANPADS/MANPADS.html, Issue Brief 1 MANPADS Proliferation.

³⁵Fred Bayles, "Threat is 'no longer theoretical'" *US Today*' August 13, 2003.

real threat not impacted international civil aviation yet? Some argue the low probability of a missile attack because of the difficulty of effective operation³⁶ and maintenance which makes justifying the expense of installing defensive systems difficult, others argue the opposite.³⁷ The disputed nature of the threat should not be taken as an excuse for doing nothing. Placing monetary value on human life is a problematic undertaking, but the civil aviation industry has to account for its security expenditures based on the probability of potential threats. Unless a nation is willing to underwrite the costs, the costs are prohibitively out of bounds for the industry.³⁸ Depending on many variables, twenty billion dollars is not an excessive estimate. If the terrorists increase this activity the equation will undergo revision.

The fourth terrorist tactic exercised against civil aviation has to do with ground facilities and can take two forms: terrorist attacks and insurgent attacks. The former specifically targets non-combatants at the airport and other ground facilities; the latter, military or government operations likewise situated.

Attacks by the Japanese Red Army (JRA), the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), and the IRA, are examples of terrorist attacks. The JRA attacked Israel's Lod Airport in 1972 killing twenty-seven (including six Puerto Rican pilgrims) and wounding seventy-six. JRA members working for the PLFP had smuggled weapons in their hold luggage and then later fired on passengers who were retrieving luggage. The incident at Lod was an attempt to undermine Israel's tourist economy. The ANO's most infamous attacks were on the Rome and Vienna airports in December 1985 (discussed above). The IRA fired mortars at London's Heathrow Airport's runways in two March 1994 attacks. The mortars failed to explode, but disrupted the operations at the world's busiest international airport for several hours each time. Although suicide-bombing inside crowded terminals, or even vehicle bombings, clearly have not occurred, yet the impact of a suicide bomber attacking Chicago O'Hare International Airport on a busy Friday, or on the Sunday after the Thanksgiving holiday in the United States, the busiest travel day of the year, is almost beyond imagination. The devastation wrought by a bus full of explosives or a small, coordinated suicide attack, would bring the international civil aviation system

³⁶The US Army anticipates that a fully trained operator will only achieve a hit about a 30% of the time. Peter Harclerode, *Fighting Dirty*, p. 564. It's not clear how effective a poorly trained terrorist would be against an unprotected civil aircraft.

³⁷Thomas Hunter, "The proliferation of MANPADS" *Janes Intelligence Review*, 28 November 2002. www.janes.com.

³⁸El AL has just introduced a flare counter-measures system which will cost about 600,000 pounds (sterling) per aircraft. The United States FAA will not allow the system to be used in the United States for fear of starting ground fires. *Sunday Times*.

to its knees and leave a nation substantially altered. Terrorists, chief among them Al-Qaeda, are acutely aware of this.

Insurgents have targeted civil aviation throughout the developing world, primarily to assist in the isolating of sections of the population from government control. Guerrillas are attempting to develop both political and physical space in which to operate (see chapter 2). Many developing regions lack sufficient roads to link hinterlands to the metropole, and where roads exist, they are frequently ambush sites. Governments are forced to rely on air transport to reach outlying areas that render airstrips primary targets.³⁹ Maoist insurgents in Nepal began to lay siege to remote airstrips in their struggle against the government in 2002⁴⁰ in an attempt to isolate the communities from the government.

Another Asian conflict provides the best example of targeting civil aviation's infrastructure: the LTTE assault on the Colombo airport in 2001. A team of LTTE suicide 'commandos' infiltrated the Sri Lankan government's self-declared most-secure facility and destroyed most of the Sri Lankan air force on the ground as well as several civil aircraft belonging to the state carrier Air Lanka.⁴¹ The infiltrators were detected at least twice. First, when perimeter security personnel discovered bags of discarded Sri Lankan security uniforms close to a breached perimeter fence, but failed to notify anyone. Second, when control tower personnel caught sight of armed men in the area between two runways, but assumed they were participating in a security drill and did not notify anyone. The LTTE's immediate military agenda was to destroy the air force aircraft on the ground, but the primary agenda was political. If the LTTE could infiltrate the facility undetected — at least that's what the 'commandos' thought — how could the government protect any other location, let alone be able to defeat the LTTE militarily? The LTTE scored a second unanticipated propaganda coup as well: just as the attack began, a planeload of UK tourists arrived from Mauritius. None were hurt, and all used their camcorders and provided incredible on-the-scene-footage to the BBC. This attack seems to have had the desired political impact, in light of the 2002 cease-fire.

³⁹ Fr. O'Riely S.J. recounted his experience while on missionary assignment during 1987-1988 in Southern Sudan, where the Jesuit order ran a school and airstrip in the town of Wau. Both the insurgents of the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) and government wanted control of this vital location. Each side shelled the facility and adjacent school regularly, eventually driving the school out.

⁴⁰ St. Andrews Domestic Terrorism Data base.

⁴¹ *Op.cit* number 5. Air Lanka had 3 Airbus destroyed and another 3 damaged. The air force had 3 fighter and 3 training aircraft and two helicopter gunships destroyed. The air force also had 6 fighter aircraft and six helicopters damaged. Two of those were gunships.

The 2007 plot against John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York City, and the Glasgow attack underscores the continuing fascination terrorists have with aviation. This is one of the few times where aviation ground infrastructure has been targeted; albeit for what the plotters hoped would be a city wide disaster. The potential damage caused by the JFK plot makes Vancouver International Airport's lackadaisical response to the discovery of a map of its fuel system on the internet earlier this year all the more worrying.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

South Asia has been a relatively peaceful aviation environment; this is rather surprising given the range of violent political activity and the presentences of some of the conflicts. The increasing radicalization of some of the South Asian militant groups, and the increasing access to and importance of civil aviation has the potential to create a highly toxic situation for the passengers and industry. Given the long experience the region has with terrorism, and the international community has with aviation security, there are ways that the risk faced by the industry can be mitigated.

There are three levels of recommendations that are needed to address this international problem: strategic, operational, and tactical. Each will be addressed below.

The Strategic Level involves the battle space of ideas. In general terms we are not even engaged in this issue in any serious or sustained manner. While the international aviation system can not, nor should it, be involved in this directly, it can and must understand what the change in terrorism has meant and how it will impact its operations.

Recommendations

Strategic

- A sustained research effort by the industry to understand the trends in transnational threats and how they will impact its operations.
- The industry must invest in non-technical research in order to support technical security efforts.

The above social science research is essential to assisting in both understanding terrorism and also the more operational approach to continuing the threat and mitigating the risk posed by terrorists. The enormous lead time and expenditure required to develop and deploy technology often means that it is redundant due to a shift in terrorist tactics. By engaging with the existing threat research infrastructure this continuing problem can be avoided.

The second level of analysis on terrorism is the operational level. This refers to both the organized groups, such as Al-Qaeda, Hamas, JI and others, but also the response to these groups. The response community is doing exceptionally well in this area. Organized groups are finding their operational environment heavily restricted. The aviation environment has had some equal success. Through a commitment to a multi-layered approach such as increase access control, air marshals, and locked cockpit doors are positive basic steps. But the international community needs to take a more active role in the critical area of standards and information sharing.

Operational

- International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) needs to establish basic standards for such items as cargo screening, document security and other in-flight issues.
- The ICAO needs to have enforcement power, which can and should include economic incentives for meeting required standards and recommended practices.
- The ICAO and International Air Transport Association (IATA) should establish Joint Systems Integration Command (JSIC).

The international community is attempting to address the first issue, but there are powerful domestic forces that are hindering these efforts. There are, for example, technology requirements for screening systems that are designed not to enhance security, but to protect domestic manufacturers for competition. This is understandable but not acceptable. ICAO member states can currently opt out of security requirements by simply informing the ICAO that it is doing it, but it is not required to disclose which or how many requirements it is not following, how long it intends to be out of compliance, and if it has any intentions to regain its former status.

One way to provide enforcement is to work with the insurance industry to have adjustable rates for carriers and airports who are in various levels of compliance. One can look at other funding areas such as infrastructure bonds as well.

As mentioned throughout this paper, the best way to defeat an asymmetric opponent is through information sharing. The international aviation community can provide an example through merging the efforts of the ICAO and IATA in creating a Joint Security and Intelligence Center. This can leverage the laudable security efforts of both organizations with a central repository for the collection of information relating to terrorist and criminal interference with civil aviation. This will offer the ability for the industry to

have both a tactical and strategic analysis capability addressing industry specific needs.

The final level of analysis is the tactical level. This is dealing with the increasing threat presented by the self-organized, self-radicalized and self-operationalized cells, illustrated by the recent plots against Fort Dix and JFK. The general record against this threat is mixed. There are far more of these cells so the threat is greater, but the risk they pose is substantially less, as they are more limited in their access to funding and training so their skills are reduced. They are thus more likely to conduct London or Madrid style operations rather than 9/11. They still pose a potential threat to aviation as it is relatively simple to hijack an aircraft and a bit more complicated to introduce an explosive device. As this is the emerging trend the industry can use the space to address existing weaknesses and develop a coherent proactive strategy to deal with current and emerging threats.

Tactical

- Develop and implement a more coherent tactical response.
- Regular and realistic training is required.
- Assist in developing economically viable responses across the system.

The two critical elements in the first recommendation are staff and training. The industry must be involved again in its own security. This may require input in recruiting and training the proper staff. It also requires all staff in the industry to recognize their role in security and that they are empowered to act on their concerns. Staff must understand their operational environment and what aspect can easily be turned into a defensive tool in the event of an incident. For example, if there is an attempt to hijack an aircraft the cabin crew must recognize that they have a non-lethal weapon readily available to disrupt an attacker. Coffee, ideally hot. Armed guards and self-defense are useful, but unless there are going to be regular sessions in the gym the likelihood of a martial arts approach working is limited. Using coffee or the food cart is much more effective in disruption of an operation.

The above illustrates why training is important. The understanding of how an event will take place and how to respond is not intuitive, but can be learned. It is believed that the first 5 to 7 seconds in a hostage or other type of attack is the most critical. How one responds may determine the outcome for both the individual and all involved.

Any security program must be economically viable. This seems to be common sense, but too frequently it is not. As can be illustrated with the debate over the protection against MANPADS, the economic cost is prohibitive

when looked at through a threat and risk assessment. Just as important any security policy must include inputs from the individual who are going to have to implement them. They are the ones who will have to be able to understand the operational environment and the best most efficient way to implement a new policy, and deal with the daily consequences of each new initiative.

The above recommendations all rest on the ability for the stakeholders to have access to high quality information and intelligence. While the cooperation between the government and industry is improving there is still room for progress. One way to work around chock points within the system is to access information directly. 95-99% of all information in the counter-terrorism field is available in the open source domain. This includes both analysis and raw information that can help create the picture the industry needs to evaluate its risk. The aviation industry does not need to invest in its own analytical capabilities, it can tap into existing systems such as *World-Check* who provide both access to raw intelligence as well as some analytical capabilities. Academic centers such as the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research can also provide information and analysis, so there are a wide range of providers to support this critical industry.

The threat and risk facing international civil aviation is constantly evolving. It is now common for groups to have an evolutionary live cycle of around six months making response very difficult. The most effective security strategy is to develop a comprehensive layered security structure. The critical components in maintaining a robust and flexible response are: staff, training, intelligence and most critically will.

Terrorism and crime are human activities and thus can be reduced and perhaps prevented by human activity. Thus the move to greater reliance on technology in all aspects of aviation and security may have a negative impact on security. Humans, with all of our limitations, are some of the best early warning detectors currently available. While the focus is identifying the correct personality type to work in security, one needs to understand that there needs to be an all of staff approach to make sure everyone understands and is empowered to act in a potential security related situation. This is not confined to the security and other ground staff. Ticked agents, sky caps and anyone else in the industry needs to have the investment in the notion that security is an all points effort. The only way to protect civil aviation is to calibrate our response to the threat and risk posed by a given threat, and allow humans to remain engaged in attempting to reduce the threat.